[PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[Ibrahim Hashimov]

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
check has the wrong sign:

	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)

bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.

snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
(c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
embedded in.

Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,

 	signode = snod->node;

-	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
+	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_destroy;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

[PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[Ibrahim Hashimov]

ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
check has the wrong sign:

	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))

The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most

	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)

bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.

snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
(c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
embedded in.

Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
---
 fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,

 	signode = snod->node;

-	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
+	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
 		ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_destroy;
--
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

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Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

Re: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[Richard Weinberger]

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "Ibrahim Hashimov" <security@auditcode.ai>
> An: "richard" <richard@nod.at>
> CC: "chengzhihao1" <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>, "Sascha Hauer" <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>, "linux-mtd"
> <linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org>, "linux-kernel" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "stable" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2026 09:43:27
> Betreff: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

> ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
> before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
> check has the wrong sign:
> 
>	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
> 
> The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
> 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
> 
>	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
> 
> bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
> declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
> holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
> verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
> is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
> walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
> image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
> ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
> 
> snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
> (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
> subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
> correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
> embedded in.
> 
> Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
> ---
> fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

Thanks,
//richard

______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

Re: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[Richard Weinberger]

----- Ursprüngliche Mail -----
> Von: "Ibrahim Hashimov" <security@auditcode.ai>
> An: "richard" <richard@nod.at>
> CC: "chengzhihao1" <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>, "Sascha Hauer" <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>, "linux-mtd"
> <linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org>, "linux-kernel" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, "stable" <stable@vger.kernel.org>
> Gesendet: Freitag, 24. Juli 2026 09:43:27
> Betreff: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

> ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
> before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
> check has the wrong sign:
> 
>	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
> 
> The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
> 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
> 
>	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
> 
> bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
> declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
> holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
> verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
> is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
> walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
> image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
> ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
> 
> snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
> (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
> subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
> correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
> embedded in.
> 
> Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
> ---
> fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>

Thanks,
//richard

Re: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[Zhihao Cheng]

在 2026/7/24 15:43, Ibrahim Hashimov 写道:
> ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
> before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
> check has the wrong sign:
> 
> 	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
> 
> The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
> 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
> 
> 	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
> 
> bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
> declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
> holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
> verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
> is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
> walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
> image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
> ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
> 
> snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
> (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
> subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
> correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
> embedded in.
> 
> Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
> ---
>   fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
> index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
> --- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
> +++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
> @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,
> 
>   	signode = snod->node;
> 
> -	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
> +	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
>   		ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
>   		err = -EINVAL;
>   		goto out_destroy;
> --
> 2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
> .
> 


______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

Re: [PATCH] ubifs: fix out-of-bounds read in signature length check

[Zhihao Cheng]

在 2026/7/24 15:43, Ibrahim Hashimov 写道:
> ubifs_sb_verify_signature() bounds the on-disk ubifs_sig_node->len field
> before handing the signature payload to verify_pkcs7_signature(), but the
> check has the wrong sign:
> 
> 	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node))
> 
> The signature bytes start sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node) (UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ,
> 64 bytes) into the node, so the payload is at most
> 
> 	snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)
> 
> bytes long. Adding the header size instead of subtracting it accepts a
> declared length up to 2 * UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ larger than the node actually
> holds -- past the end of c->sbuf, which is vmalloc(c->leb_size).
> verify_pkcs7_signature() -> pkcs7_parse_message() -> asn1_ber_decoder()
> is then handed that inflated length and reads beyond the allocation while
> walking the DER headers. The node length comes straight from the mounted
> image, so a crafted signed UBIFS image reaches this via
> ubifs_read_superblock() before the signature is cryptographically checked.
> 
> snod->len is guaranteed to be >= UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ by the node scanner
> (c->ranges[UBIFS_SIG_NODE].min_len == UBIFS_SIG_NODE_SZ), so the corrected
> subtraction cannot underflow. Legitimately signed images are unaffected: a
> correct superblock never declares a signature longer than the node it is
> embedded in.
> 
> Fixes: 817aa094842d ("ubifs: support offline signed images")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
> Assisted-by: AuditCode-AI:2026.07
> ---
>   fs/ubifs/auth.c | 2 +-
>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ubifs/auth.c b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
> index a4a0158f712d..1f770795ee70 100644
> --- a/fs/ubifs/auth.c
> +++ b/fs/ubifs/auth.c
> @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int ubifs_sb_verify_signature(struct ubifs_info *c,
> 
>   	signode = snod->node;
> 
> -	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len + sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
> +	if (le32_to_cpu(signode->len) > snod->len - sizeof(struct ubifs_sig_node)) {
>   		ubifs_err(c, "invalid signature len %d", le32_to_cpu(signode->len));
>   		err = -EINVAL;
>   		goto out_destroy;
> --
> 2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
> .
>