* [moderation/CI] Re: uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access
@ 2026-04-27 21:44 syzbot ci
2026-04-28 6:18 ` Aleksandr Nogikh
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: syzbot ci @ 2026-04-27 21:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: syzkaller-upstream-moderation; +Cc: syzbot
syzbot ci has tested the following series
[v1] uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access
https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1777306795.git.chleroy@kernel.org
* [RFC PATCH v1 1/9] uaccess: Split check_zeroed_user() out of usercopy.c
* [RFC PATCH v1 2/9] uaccess: Convert INLINE_COPY_{TO/FROM}_USER to kconfig and reduce ifdefery
* [RFC PATCH v1 3/9] x86/umip: Be stricter in fixup_umip_exception()
* [RFC PATCH v1 4/9] uaccess: Introduce copy_{to/from}_user_partial()
* [RFC PATCH v1 5/9] uaccess: Switch to copy_{to/from}_user_partial() when relevant
* [RFC PATCH v1 6/9] uaccess: Change copy_{to/from}_user to return -EFAULT
* [RFC PATCH v1 7/9] x86: Add unsafe_copy_from_user()
* [RFC PATCH v1 8/9] arm64: Add unsafe_copy_from_user()
* [RFC PATCH v1 9/9] uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access
and found the following issue:
general protection fault in rt_sigprocmask
Full report is available here:
https://ci.syzbot.org/series/aa7fc2a4-0ff8-418d-a7f8-d564d6337c56
***
general protection fault in rt_sigprocmask
tree: bpf-next
URL: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git
base: 7c8d208d816d0504aa916138ae097d9cb4ed4e56
arch: amd64
compiler: Debian clang version 21.1.8 (++20251221033036+2078da43e25a-1~exp1~20251221153213.50), Debian LLD 21.1.8
config: https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/e539adaf-05e5-409c-80f8-973dab3db2a7/config
Key type big_key registered
Key type encrypted registered
AppArmor: AppArmor sha256 policy hashing enabled
ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!
Loading compiled-in module X.509 certificates
Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 63d9792cbf98a5c58c0509974cba8c406c7870ed'
ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256
ima: No architecture policies found
evm: Initialising EVM extended attributes:
evm: security.selinux (disabled)
evm: security.SMACK64 (disabled)
evm: security.SMACK64EXEC (disabled)
evm: security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE (disabled)
evm: security.SMACK64MMAP (disabled)
evm: security.apparmor
evm: security.ima
evm: security.capability
evm: HMAC attrs: 0x1
PM: Magic number: 6:723:551
block sda: hash matches
acpi PNP0C0F:02: hash matches
netconsole: network logging started
gtp: GTP module loaded (pdp ctx size 128 bytes)
rdma_rxe: loaded
cfg80211: Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates for regulatory database
Loaded X.509 cert 'sforshee: 00b28ddf47aef9cea7'
Loaded X.509 cert 'wens: 61c038651aabdcf94bd0ac7ff06c7248db18c600'
clk: Disabling unused clocks
ALSA device list:
#0: Dummy 1
#1: Loopback 1
#2: Virtual MIDI Card 1
md: Waiting for all devices to be available before autodetect
md: If you don't use raid, use raid=noautodetect
md: Autodetecting RAID arrays.
md: autorun ...
md: ... autorun DONE.
EXT4-fs (sda1): mounted filesystem b4773fba-1738-4da0-8a90-0fe043d0a496 ro with ordered data mode. Quota mode: none.
VFS: Mounted root (ext4 filesystem) readonly on device 8:1.
devtmpfs: mounted
VFS: Pivoted into new rootfs
Freeing unused kernel image (initmem) memory: 26948K
Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 221184k
Freeing unused kernel image (text/rodata gap) memory: 2032K
Freeing unused kernel image (rodata/data gap) memory: 1428K
x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
x86/mm: Checking user space page tables
x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
Failed to set sysctl parameter 'max_rcu_stall_to_panic=1': parameter not found
Run /sbin/init as init process
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0000be81c51ea95: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00007f40e28f54a8-0x00007f40e28f54af]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0x139/0x310
Code: 00 00 e8 3a f1 a5 00 48 b8 00 f0 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 49 39 c4 4c 0f 47 e0 0f 1f 00 48 8d 44 24 60 48 8b 08 4c 89 e0 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 18 00 74 0e 4c 89 e7 48 89 cb e8 56 ef a5 00 48 89 d9 49 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000067de0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 00000fe81c51ea95 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc90000067e40
RBP: ffffc90000067ee0 R08: ffffc90000067e47 R09: 1ffff9200000cfc8
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200000cfc9 R12: 00007f40e28f54a8
R13: 1ffff9200000cfc0 R14: ffff8881026f6210 R15: 1ffff110204dec42
FS: 00007f40e25f5380(0000) GS:ffff8882a8fd4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f40e28baf3f CR3: 0000000171dca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f40e26f5773
Code: 00 f3 a5 48 8d 74 24 88 48 b9 ff ff ff 7f fe ff ff ff 48 21 c8 48 89 44 24 88 41 ba 08 00 00 00 44 89 c7 b8 0e 00 00 00 0f 05 <45> 31 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 76 06 41 89 c0 41 f7 d8 44 89 c0 5a c3 41
RSP: 002b:00007fffc2ca58c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffc2ca5ac8 RCX: 00007f40e26f5773
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f40e28f54a8 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007f40e28f54a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f40e2904b5d
R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f40e28f54a0
R13: 00007fffc2ca5ad8 R14: 0000562515803169 R15: 00007f40e292ea80
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:__se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0x139/0x310
Code: 00 00 e8 3a f1 a5 00 48 b8 00 f0 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 49 39 c4 4c 0f 47 e0 0f 1f 00 48 8d 44 24 60 48 8b 08 4c 89 e0 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 18 00 74 0e 4c 89 e7 48 89 cb e8 56 ef a5 00 48 89 d9 49 89
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000067de0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 00000fe81c51ea95 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc90000067e40
RBP: ffffc90000067ee0 R08: ffffc90000067e47 R09: 1ffff9200000cfc8
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200000cfc9 R12: 00007f40e28f54a8
R13: 1ffff9200000cfc0 R14: ffff8881026f6210 R15: 1ffff110204dec42
FS: 00007f40e25f5380(0000) GS:ffff8882a8fd4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f40e28baf3f CR3: 0000000171dca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
***
If these findings have caused you to resend the series or submit a
separate fix, please add the following tag to your commit message:
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
syzbot ci engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
To test a patch for this bug, please reply with `#syz test`
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The patch should be attached to the email.
Note: arguments like custom git repos and branches are not supported.
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If the report looks fine to you, reply with:
#syz upstream
If the report is a false positive, reply with
#syz invalid
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [moderation/CI] Re: uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access
2026-04-27 21:44 [moderation/CI] Re: uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access syzbot ci
@ 2026-04-28 6:18 ` Aleksandr Nogikh
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Aleksandr Nogikh @ 2026-04-28 6:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: syzbot ci; +Cc: syzkaller-upstream-moderation, syzbot
Probably better not to report it.
Should be easily noticed by others (boot time KASAN) + the series like
won't pass anyway given Linus' comments.
On Mon, Apr 27, 2026 at 11:44 PM syzbot ci
<syzbot+ci59ae1c0b8d5ca61e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
>
> syzbot ci has tested the following series
>
> [v1] uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1777306795.git.chleroy@kernel.org
> * [RFC PATCH v1 1/9] uaccess: Split check_zeroed_user() out of usercopy.c
> * [RFC PATCH v1 2/9] uaccess: Convert INLINE_COPY_{TO/FROM}_USER to kconfig and reduce ifdefery
> * [RFC PATCH v1 3/9] x86/umip: Be stricter in fixup_umip_exception()
> * [RFC PATCH v1 4/9] uaccess: Introduce copy_{to/from}_user_partial()
> * [RFC PATCH v1 5/9] uaccess: Switch to copy_{to/from}_user_partial() when relevant
> * [RFC PATCH v1 6/9] uaccess: Change copy_{to/from}_user to return -EFAULT
> * [RFC PATCH v1 7/9] x86: Add unsafe_copy_from_user()
> * [RFC PATCH v1 8/9] arm64: Add unsafe_copy_from_user()
> * [RFC PATCH v1 9/9] uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access
>
> and found the following issue:
> general protection fault in rt_sigprocmask
>
> Full report is available here:
> https://ci.syzbot.org/series/aa7fc2a4-0ff8-418d-a7f8-d564d6337c56
>
> ***
>
> general protection fault in rt_sigprocmask
>
> tree: bpf-next
> URL: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next.git
> base: 7c8d208d816d0504aa916138ae097d9cb4ed4e56
> arch: amd64
> compiler: Debian clang version 21.1.8 (++20251221033036+2078da43e25a-1~exp1~20251221153213.50), Debian LLD 21.1.8
> config: https://ci.syzbot.org/builds/e539adaf-05e5-409c-80f8-973dab3db2a7/config
>
> Key type big_key registered
> Key type encrypted registered
> AppArmor: AppArmor sha256 policy hashing enabled
> ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!
> Loading compiled-in module X.509 certificates
> Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 63d9792cbf98a5c58c0509974cba8c406c7870ed'
> ima: Allocated hash algorithm: sha256
> ima: No architecture policies found
> evm: Initialising EVM extended attributes:
> evm: security.selinux (disabled)
> evm: security.SMACK64 (disabled)
> evm: security.SMACK64EXEC (disabled)
> evm: security.SMACK64TRANSMUTE (disabled)
> evm: security.SMACK64MMAP (disabled)
> evm: security.apparmor
> evm: security.ima
> evm: security.capability
> evm: HMAC attrs: 0x1
> PM: Magic number: 6:723:551
> block sda: hash matches
> acpi PNP0C0F:02: hash matches
> netconsole: network logging started
> gtp: GTP module loaded (pdp ctx size 128 bytes)
> rdma_rxe: loaded
> cfg80211: Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates for regulatory database
> Loaded X.509 cert 'sforshee: 00b28ddf47aef9cea7'
> Loaded X.509 cert 'wens: 61c038651aabdcf94bd0ac7ff06c7248db18c600'
> clk: Disabling unused clocks
> ALSA device list:
> #0: Dummy 1
> #1: Loopback 1
> #2: Virtual MIDI Card 1
> md: Waiting for all devices to be available before autodetect
> md: If you don't use raid, use raid=noautodetect
> md: Autodetecting RAID arrays.
> md: autorun ...
> md: ... autorun DONE.
> EXT4-fs (sda1): mounted filesystem b4773fba-1738-4da0-8a90-0fe043d0a496 ro with ordered data mode. Quota mode: none.
> VFS: Mounted root (ext4 filesystem) readonly on device 8:1.
> devtmpfs: mounted
> VFS: Pivoted into new rootfs
> Freeing unused kernel image (initmem) memory: 26948K
> Write protecting the kernel read-only data: 221184k
> Freeing unused kernel image (text/rodata gap) memory: 2032K
> Freeing unused kernel image (rodata/data gap) memory: 1428K
> x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
> x86/mm: Checking user space page tables
> x86/mm: Checked W+X mappings: passed, no W+X pages found.
> Failed to set sysctl parameter 'max_rcu_stall_to_panic=1': parameter not found
> Run /sbin/init as init process
> Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xe0000be81c51ea95: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
> KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x00007f40e28f54a8-0x00007f40e28f54af]
> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
> RIP: 0010:__se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0x139/0x310
> Code: 00 00 e8 3a f1 a5 00 48 b8 00 f0 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 49 39 c4 4c 0f 47 e0 0f 1f 00 48 8d 44 24 60 48 8b 08 4c 89 e0 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 18 00 74 0e 4c 89 e7 48 89 cb e8 56 ef a5 00 48 89 d9 49 89
> RSP: 0018:ffffc90000067de0 EFLAGS: 00010206
> RAX: 00000fe81c51ea95 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc90000067e40
> RBP: ffffc90000067ee0 R08: ffffc90000067e47 R09: 1ffff9200000cfc8
> R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200000cfc9 R12: 00007f40e28f54a8
> R13: 1ffff9200000cfc0 R14: ffff8881026f6210 R15: 1ffff110204dec42
> FS: 00007f40e25f5380(0000) GS:ffff8882a8fd4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00007f40e28baf3f CR3: 0000000171dca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> do_syscall_64+0x15f/0xf80
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
^^^^
curious why symbolization doesn't work for boot time errors..
> RIP: 0033:0x7f40e26f5773
> Code: 00 f3 a5 48 8d 74 24 88 48 b9 ff ff ff 7f fe ff ff ff 48 21 c8 48 89 44 24 88 41 ba 08 00 00 00 44 89 c7 b8 0e 00 00 00 0f 05 <45> 31 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 76 06 41 89 c0 41 f7 d8 44 89 c0 5a c3 41
> RSP: 002b:00007fffc2ca58c0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000e
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fffc2ca5ac8 RCX: 00007f40e26f5773
> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f40e28f54a8 RDI: 0000000000000000
> RBP: 00007f40e28f54a8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f40e2904b5d
> R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f40e28f54a0
> R13: 00007fffc2ca5ad8 R14: 0000562515803169 R15: 00007f40e292ea80
> </TASK>
> Modules linked in:
> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
> RIP: 0010:__se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0x139/0x310
> Code: 00 00 e8 3a f1 a5 00 48 b8 00 f0 ff ff ff 7f 00 00 49 39 c4 4c 0f 47 e0 0f 1f 00 48 8d 44 24 60 48 8b 08 4c 89 e0 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 18 00 74 0e 4c 89 e7 48 89 cb e8 56 ef a5 00 48 89 d9 49 89
> RSP: 0018:ffffc90000067de0 EFLAGS: 00010206
> RAX: 00000fe81c51ea95 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
> RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffc90000067e40
> RBP: ffffc90000067ee0 R08: ffffc90000067e47 R09: 1ffff9200000cfc8
> R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200000cfc9 R12: 00007f40e28f54a8
> R13: 1ffff9200000cfc0 R14: ffff8881026f6210 R15: 1ffff110204dec42
> FS: 00007f40e25f5380(0000) GS:ffff8882a8fd4000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> CR2: 00007f40e28baf3f CR3: 0000000171dca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
>
>
> ***
>
> If these findings have caused you to resend the series or submit a
> separate fix, please add the following tag to your commit message:
> Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>
> ---
> This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
> syzbot ci engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
>
> To test a patch for this bug, please reply with `#syz test`
> (should be on a separate line).
>
> The patch should be attached to the email.
> Note: arguments like custom git repos and branches are not supported.
>
> The email will later be sent to:
> [akpm@linux-foundation.org amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org bpf@vger.kernel.org chleroy@kernel.org david.laight.linux@gmail.com dmaengine@vger.kernel.org dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org kasan-dev@googlegroups.com kvm@vger.kernel.org linux-alpha@vger.kernel.org linux-arch@vger.kernel.org linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org linux-csky@vger.kernel.org linux-efi@vger.kernel.org linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org linux-fsi@lists.ozlabs.org linux-hexagon@vger.kernel.org linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org linux-media@vger.kernel.org linux-mips@vger.kernel.org linux-mm@kvack.org linux-openrisc@vger.kernel.org linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org linux-s390@vger.kernel.org linux-serial@vger.kernel.org linux-sh@vger.kernel.org linux-snps-arc@lists.infradead.org linux-sound@vger.kernel.org linux-spi@vger.kernel.org linux-staging@lists.linux.dev linux-um@lists.infradead.org linux-usb@vger.kernel.org linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org linux-x25@vger.kernel.org linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org loongarch@lists.linux.dev netdev@vger.kernel.org ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org sound-open-firmware@alsa-project.org sparclinux@vger.kernel.org tglx@linutronix.de torvalds@linux-foundation.org xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org ynorov@nvidia.com]
>
> If the report looks fine to you, reply with:
> #syz upstream
>
> If the report is a false positive, reply with
> #syz invalid
>
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2026-04-27 21:44 [moderation/CI] Re: uaccess: Convert small fixed size copy_{to/from}_user() to scoped user access syzbot ci
2026-04-28 6:18 ` Aleksandr Nogikh
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