Re: [PATCH 00/22] Introduce credential record

[Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>]

--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:

> 
> 
> Hi Al, Christoph, Trond, Stephen, Casey,
> 
> Here's a set of patches that implement a very basic set of COW credentials. 
> It
> compiles, links and runs for x86_64 with EXT3, (V)FAT, NFS, AFS, SELinux and
> keyrings all enabled.  Most other filesystems are disabled, apart from things
> like proc.  It is not intended to completely cover the kernel at this point.
> 
> The cred struct contains the credentials that the kernel needs to act upon
> something or to create something.  Credentials that govern how a task may be
> acted upon remain in the task struct.
> 
> In essence, the introduction of the cred struct separates a task's subjective
> context (the authority with which it acts) from its objective context (the
> authorisation required by others that want to act upon it), and permits
> overriding of the subjective context by a kernel service so that the service
> can act on the task's behalf to do something the task couldn't do on its own
> authority.
> 
> Because keyrings and effective capabilities can be installed or changed in
> one
> process by another process, they are shadowed by the cred structure rather
> than
> residing there.  Additionally, the session and process keyrings are shared
> between all the threads of a process.  The shadowing is performed by
> update_current_cred() which is invoked on entry to any system call that might
> need it.
> 
> A thread's cred struct may be read by that thread without any RCU precautions
> as only that thread may replace the its own cred struct.  To change a
> thread's
> credentials, dup_cred() should be called to create a new copy, the copy
> should
> be changed, and then set_current_cred() should be called to make it live. 
> Once
> live, it may not be changed as it may then be shared with file descriptors,
> RPC
> calls and other threads.  RCU will be used to dispose of the old structure.
> 
> 
> The four patches are:
> 
>  (1) Introduce struct cred and migrate fsuid, fsgid, the groups list and the
>      keyrings pointer to it.
> 
>  (2) Introduce a security pointer into the cred struct and add LSM hooks to
>      duplicate the information pointed to thereby and to free it.
> 
>      Make SELinux implement the hooks, splitting out some the task security
>      data to be associated with struct cred instead.
> 
>  (3) Migrate the effective capabilities mask into the cred struct.
> 
>  (4) Provide a pair of LSM hooks so that a kernel service can (a) get a
>      credential record representing the authority with which it is permitted
> to
>      act, and (b) alter the file creation context in a credential record.
> 
> In addition, as this works with cachefiles, I've included all the FS-Cache,
> CacheFiles, NFS and AFS patches.
> 
> To substitute a temporary set of credentials, the cred struct attached to the
> task should be altered, like so:
> 
> 	int get_privileged_creds(...)
> 	{
> 		/* get special privileged creds */
> 		my_special_cred = get_kernel_cred("cachefiles", current);
> 		change_create_files_as(my_special_cred, my_cache_dir);
> 	}
> 
> 	int do_stuff(...)
> 	{
> 		struct cred *cred;
> 
> 		/* rotate in the new creds, saving the old */
> 		cred = __set_current_cred(get_cred(my_special_cred));
> 
> 		do_privileged_stuff();
> 
> 		/* restore the old creds */
> 		set_current_cred(cred);
> 	}
> 
> One thing I'm not certain about is how this should interact with /proc, which
> can display some of the stuff in the cred struct.  I think it may be
> necessary
> to have a real cred pointer and an effective cred pointer, with the contents
> of
> /proc coming from the real, but the effective governing what actually goes
> on.

I think you want the effective values to show up in /proc.



Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com

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