From: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
To: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Eric Blake" <eblake@redhat.com>,
"Peter Maydell" <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Huth" <thuth@redhat.com>,
"Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>,
qemu-arm@nongnu.org, "Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
"Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
"Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 09/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-core.c
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 14:45:41 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <73fe41f7-dff0-4506-8769-1997323c0a76@amazon.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <kk4f5e3olb26qfjveqefkuzrjc45djikkk7uspz4yj7iesdmbj@zointitbvhdp>
On 12.02.25 13:28, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 12, 2025 at 12:30:20PM +0100, Alexander Graf wrote:
>> On 12.02.25 11:24, Gerd Hoffmann wrote:
>>> Why do you use confidential computing in the first place if you trust
>>> the host with your EFI variables? I'd rather see something simliar
>>> running under guest control, in svsm context.
>> That depends heavily on your threat model. You can use a host provided
>> variable store to gain variable persistence for things like boot variables
>> and then have an ephemeral SVSM based TPM that you use to measure the loaded
>> payloads. A malicious host can already replace your root volume, so
>> extending the threat to variables is not the end of the world.
> If you go depend on measured boot instead of secure boot then yes, this
> might be a workable model. Should be doable with a small svsm driver
> which forwards requests to the host via svsm-controlled bounce buffer
> (where the svsm has control over page properties).
In a BYOF world it's even useful without SVSM at all, because the launch
digest performs measurement for you, but you still want to find your
boot variables.
>>> The firmware knows all this very well though. The OS passes a mapping
>>> table to the firmware, efi runtime drivers can subscribe to mapping
>>> updates and can use RT->ConvertPointer to translate addresses from
>>> physical to virtual.
>>>
>>> The edk2 code (https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/pull/10695) does
>>> exactly that.
>>>
>>> I see your driver does that too, so in theory it should work just fine.
>>> I'm wondering what exactly the problem with macOS is?
>> You get to know the new virtual address, but ConvertPointer never tells you
>> what the new *physical* address is. That means you have no idea where to DMA
>> from once you're in virtual land.
> Yes. Knowing both physical and virtual address works only for memory
> you allocated yourself before ExitBootServices. So you can't pass on
> pointers from the OS, you have to copy the data to a buffer where you
> know the physical address instead. Yes, some overhead. Should still
> be much faster than going to pio transfer mode ...
MacOS takes over the full physical address map past ExitBootServices:
Your code no longer has VA access to random code and it literally
memcpy()'s all preserved (virtual available) code and data to different
physical addresses. You simply have nothing that is all of 1) RAM
(mapped as cacheable on ARM), 2) known VA 3) known PA.
So we really really need a fallback mechanism that works without DMA :).
Alex
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-12 13:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-11 9:22 [PATCH v3 00/23] hw/uefi: add uefi variable service Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:22 ` [PATCH v3 01/23] hw/uefi: add include/hw/uefi/var-service-api.h Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 02/23] hw/uefi: add include/hw/uefi/var-service-edk2.h Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 03/23] hw/uefi: add include/hw/uefi/var-service.h Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 04/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-guid.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 05/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-utils.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 06/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-vars.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 07/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-auth.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 08/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-policy.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 09/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-core.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:45 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-12 10:24 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-12 11:30 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-12 12:28 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-12 13:45 ` Alexander Graf [this message]
2025-02-12 15:18 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-12 21:26 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-13 9:28 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-02-13 10:06 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-13 9:52 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-13 10:14 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-13 14:54 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-13 22:25 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-14 7:55 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-14 9:51 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-14 11:16 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-14 12:22 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 10/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-pkcs7.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 11/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-pkcs7-stub.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 12/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-siglist.c Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 13/23] hw/uefi: add var-service-json.c + qapi for NV vars Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 14/23] hw/uefi: add trace-events Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 15/23] hw/uefi: add UEFI_VARS to Kconfig Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 16/23] hw/uefi: add to meson Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 17/23] hw/uefi: add uefi-vars-sysbus device Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 18/23] hw/uefi-vars-sysbus: qemu platform bus support Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 19/23] hw/uefi-vars-sysbus: allow for arm virt Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 20/23] hw/uefi: add uefi-vars-isa device Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 21/23] hw/uefi-vars-isa: add acpi device Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 22/23] docs: add uefi variable service documentation Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-11 9:23 ` [PATCH v3 23/23] hw/uefi: add MAINTAINERS entry Gerd Hoffmann
2025-02-13 9:41 ` [PATCH v3 00/23] hw/uefi: add uefi variable service Ard Biesheuvel
2025-02-13 10:11 ` Alexander Graf
2025-02-13 10:13 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-02-20 12:43 ` Ilias Apalodimas
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