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From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Andy King <acking@vmware.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: LSM stacking and the network access controls
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 12:31:22 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7528811.sQvF0CQ3Ma@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <512E39A6.1000804@schaufler-ca.com>

On Wednesday, February 27, 2013 08:51:50 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/27/2013 8:43 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tuesday, February 26, 2013 03:12:31 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> On 2/26/2013 1:21 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> On Monday, February 25, 2013 03:06:14 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>>> The set of LSMs, the order they are invoked, which LSM
> >>>> uses /proc/.../attr/current and which LSM uses Netlabel,
> >>>> XFRM and secmark are all determined by Kconfig. You can
> >>>> specify a limited set of LSMs using security= at boot,
> >>>> but not the networking configuration.
> >>> 
> >>> That's unfortunate.  I'm _really_ not in favor of that, I would much
> >>> rather see the non-shared LSM functionality assigned at the same time as
> >>> the stacking order.  I'm not sure I'd NACK the current approach, or
> >>> even\
> >>> if anyone would care that I did, but that is how I'm currently leaning
> >>> with this split (build vs runtime) selection.
> >> 
> >> I'm not against that approach. How would you see it working?
> >> 
> >> The distro compiles in all the LSMs.
> >> They specify that SELinux gets xfrm and secmark.
> >> They specify the Smack gets Netlabel.
> >> They tell (the new and improved) AppArmor to eschew networking.
> >> They specify a boot order of "selinux,smack,apparmor,yama"
> >> (They left off tomoyo for tax purposes).
> >> 
> >> On the boot line, the user types "security=apparmor".
> >> 
> >> What should happen?
> > 
> > Okay, I misunderstood what was specified at boot time; I thought the
> > stacking order could be defined at boot but based on your example I'm
> > guessing the stacking order is defined at compile time and you can only
> > enable/disable LSMs at boot?
> 
> Well, no. It looks as if I gave a poor example.
> 
> 	"security=apparmor,tomoyo,selinux"
> 
> is legitimate and indicates that AppArmor goes first,
> then TOMOYO, then SELinux. No LSM gets NetLabel because
> that was allocated to Smack. SELinux gets XFRM and secmark.

All the more reason to either adopt a mechanism that allows you to assign the 
non-shareable resources on the command line along with the stacking 
configuration or simply adopt a first-come-first-serve policy.

-- 
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat


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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Andy King <acking@vmware.com>,
	Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: LSM stacking and the network access controls
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2013 12:31:22 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7528811.sQvF0CQ3Ma@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <512E39A6.1000804@schaufler-ca.com>

On Wednesday, February 27, 2013 08:51:50 AM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 2/27/2013 8:43 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Tuesday, February 26, 2013 03:12:31 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >> On 2/26/2013 1:21 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>> On Monday, February 25, 2013 03:06:14 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >>>> The set of LSMs, the order they are invoked, which LSM
> >>>> uses /proc/.../attr/current and which LSM uses Netlabel,
> >>>> XFRM and secmark are all determined by Kconfig. You can
> >>>> specify a limited set of LSMs using security= at boot,
> >>>> but not the networking configuration.
> >>> 
> >>> That's unfortunate.  I'm _really_ not in favor of that, I would much
> >>> rather see the non-shared LSM functionality assigned at the same time as
> >>> the stacking order.  I'm not sure I'd NACK the current approach, or
> >>> even\
> >>> if anyone would care that I did, but that is how I'm currently leaning
> >>> with this split (build vs runtime) selection.
> >> 
> >> I'm not against that approach. How would you see it working?
> >> 
> >> The distro compiles in all the LSMs.
> >> They specify that SELinux gets xfrm and secmark.
> >> They specify the Smack gets Netlabel.
> >> They tell (the new and improved) AppArmor to eschew networking.
> >> They specify a boot order of "selinux,smack,apparmor,yama"
> >> (They left off tomoyo for tax purposes).
> >> 
> >> On the boot line, the user types "security=apparmor".
> >> 
> >> What should happen?
> > 
> > Okay, I misunderstood what was specified at boot time; I thought the
> > stacking order could be defined at boot but based on your example I'm
> > guessing the stacking order is defined at compile time and you can only
> > enable/disable LSMs at boot?
> 
> Well, no. It looks as if I gave a poor example.
> 
> 	"security=apparmor,tomoyo,selinux"
> 
> is legitimate and indicates that AppArmor goes first,
> then TOMOYO, then SELinux. No LSM gets NetLabel because
> that was allocated to Smack. SELinux gets XFRM and secmark.

All the more reason to either adopt a mechanism that allows you to assign the 
non-shareable resources on the command line along with the stacking 
configuration or simply adopt a first-come-first-serve policy.

-- 
paul moore
security and virtualization @ redhat


  reply	other threads:[~2013-02-27 17:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-02-22 22:33 AF_VSOCK and the LSMs Paul Moore
2013-02-22 22:33 ` Paul Moore
2013-02-22 22:54 ` Andy King
2013-02-23  0:27   ` Paul Moore
2013-02-23  0:27     ` Paul Moore
2013-02-25  7:29     ` Gerd Hoffmann
2013-02-25 15:06       ` Paul Moore
2013-02-25 15:06         ` Paul Moore
2013-02-22 23:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-22 23:00   ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-23  0:45   ` Paul Moore
2013-02-23  0:45     ` Paul Moore
2013-02-23 23:43     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-23 23:43       ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-25 16:55       ` Paul Moore
2013-02-25 16:55         ` Paul Moore
2013-02-25 18:02         ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-25 18:02           ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-25 21:05           ` Paul Moore
2013-02-25 21:05             ` Paul Moore
2013-02-25 23:06             ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-25 23:06               ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-26 21:21               ` LSM stacking and the network access controls (was: AF_VSOCK and the LSMs) Paul Moore
2013-02-26 21:21                 ` Paul Moore
2013-02-26 23:12                 ` LSM stacking and the network access controls Casey Schaufler
2013-02-26 23:12                   ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-27 16:43                   ` Paul Moore
2013-02-27 16:43                     ` Paul Moore
2013-02-27 16:51                     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-27 16:51                       ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-27 17:31                       ` Paul Moore [this message]
2013-02-27 17:31                         ` Paul Moore
2013-02-27 17:40                         ` Casey Schaufler
2013-02-27 17:40                           ` Casey Schaufler

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