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From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org,
	peterz@infradead.org, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org, sohil.mehta@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config
Date: Tue, 20 Jan 2026 17:24:54 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <81bb8149-45c7-472a-a240-46d43bd33b5d@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251026201911.505204-3-xin@zytor.com>



On 10/27/2025 4:18 AM, Xin Li (Intel) wrote:
> From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> 
> Setup VM entry/exit FRED controls in the global vmcs_config for proper
> FRED VMCS fields management:
>   1) load guest FRED state upon VM entry.
>   2) save guest FRED state during VM exit.
>   3) load host FRED state during VM exit.
> 

Nit:
I think it's worth noting that IA32_FRED_RSP0 and IA32_FRED_SSP0 are treated
differently. The change log might need more context on which MSRs are
atomically switched in order to describe that though.
  

> Also add FRED control consistency checks to the existing VM entry/exit
> consistency check framework.

Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>

> 
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
> Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> ---
> 
> Change in v5:
> * Remove the pair VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED/VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS,
>   since the secondary VM exit controls are unconditionally enabled anyway, and
>   there are features other than FRED needing it (Chao Gao).
> * Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
> 
> Change in v4:
> * Do VM exit/entry consistency checks using the new macro from Sean
>   Christopherson.
> 
> Changes in v3:
> * Add FRED control consistency checks to the existing VM entry/exit
>   consistency check framework (Sean Christopherson).
> * Just do the unnecessary FRED state load/store on every VM entry/exit
>   (Sean Christopherson).
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 4 ++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c     | 2 ++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h     | 7 +++++--
>  3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> index 1f60c04d11fb..dd79d027ea70 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
> @@ -109,6 +109,9 @@
>  #define VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE                  0x10000000
>  #define VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS	0x80000000
>  
> +#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED	BIT_ULL(0)
> +#define SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED	BIT_ULL(1)
> +
>  #define VM_EXIT_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR	0x00036dff
>  
>  #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS            0x00000004
> @@ -122,6 +125,7 @@
>  #define VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP			0x00020000
>  #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL		0x00040000
>  #define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE                 0x00100000
> +#define VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED			0x00800000
>  
>  #define VM_ENTRY_ALWAYSON_WITHOUT_TRUE_MSR	0x000011ff
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 8de841c9c905..be48ba2d70e1 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -2622,6 +2622,8 @@ static int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
>  		u32 entry_control;
>  		u64 exit_control;
>  	} const vmcs_entry_exit2_pairs[] = {
> +		{ VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED,
> +			SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED | SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED },
>  	};
>  
>  	memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> index 349d96e68f96..645b0343e88c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
> @@ -487,7 +487,8 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
>  	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS |					\
>  	 VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |					\
>  	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL |					\
> -	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)
> +	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE |					\
> +	 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
>  
>  #define __KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS				\
>  	(VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS |					\
> @@ -514,7 +515,9 @@ static inline u8 vmx_get_rvi(void)
>  	       VM_EXIT_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
>  
>  #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0)
> -#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS (0)
> +#define KVM_OPTIONAL_VMX_SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_CONTROLS			\
> +	     (SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_FRED |			\
> +	      SECONDARY_VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_FRED)
>  
>  #define KVM_REQUIRED_VMX_PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL			\
>  	(PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK |					\


  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-20  9:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 123+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-26 20:18 [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 01/22] KVM: VMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 02/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2026-01-20  9:24   ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2026-01-22 17:57     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 03/22] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2026-03-05  0:25   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 04/22] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 05/22] x86/cea: Use array indexing to simplify exception stack access Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:49   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-28  2:31     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 13:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 06/22] x86/cea: Export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-27 15:50   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-30 13:46   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-30 16:35     ` Xin Li
2026-01-30 17:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-03-07  7:38     ` Xin Li
2026-03-09 15:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-09 22:57         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 07/22] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  2:44   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  6:44   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 18:14     ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  0:45       ` Xin Li
2026-01-22  1:56         ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-22 17:22           ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:23     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:27       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:21         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:25           ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 08/22] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:49   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:48     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  5:56       ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  2:30       ` Chao Gao
2026-03-06 15:54         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-16 19:49   ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-17  0:43     ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 09/22] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  5:59   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  7:23   ` Binbin Wu
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 10/22] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:16   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-01  6:20     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:18 ` [PATCH v9 11/22] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  6:19   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-21  8:05   ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-21 16:46     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21 20:24       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-21 22:38         ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 12/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  3:24   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-29 17:12     ` Xin Li
2026-01-29 17:21       ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-01-29 22:50         ` Xin Li
2026-03-04 16:42           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 13/22] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:54   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-07  2:07   ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-07  3:05     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 14/22] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  6:13   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 15/22] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:26   ` Chao Gao
2026-03-05  0:58     ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05  7:20       ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 15:35         ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-05 17:09           ` Xin Li
2026-03-05 17:46             ` Xin Li
2026-03-06  5:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 16/22] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-19  7:40   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-30 18:42     ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 17/22] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12  7:30   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:56     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  8:07       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:09         ` Xin Li
2026-01-20  9:46           ` Binbin Wu
2026-01-20 15:25             ` Sean Christopherson
2026-01-20 18:04               ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 17:58             ` Xin Li
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 18/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable support for secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-12 13:42   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 19/22] KVM: nVMX: Handle FRED VMCS fields in nested VMX context Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:32   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  6:30     ` Xin Li
2026-01-20 16:07       ` Dave Hansen
2026-01-20 18:10         ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  0:44       ` Chao Gao
2026-01-22 16:52         ` Xin Li
2025-12-08 22:37   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 20/22] KVM: nVMX: Validate FRED-related VMCS fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:00   ` Chao Gao
2026-01-20  9:19     ` Xin Li
2026-01-21  2:33       ` Chao Gao
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 21/22] KVM: nVMX: Guard SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros with VMX feature checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-12-02  6:35   ` Chao Gao
2025-12-08 22:49   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-26 20:19 ` [PATCH v9 22/22] KVM: nVMX: Enable VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-11-13  3:20   ` Chao Gao
2025-11-06 17:35 ` [PATCH v9 00/22] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li
2025-11-13 22:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-08 22:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-12-09 17:08   ` Xin Li
2026-04-23 14:35 ` David Woodhouse
2026-04-23 22:56   ` Xin Li
2026-05-05 18:04     ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-05 18:30       ` Andrew Cooper
2026-05-05 19:29         ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-05-05 20:20         ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-05 20:27           ` Andrew Cooper
2026-05-06 14:05             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07  7:49           ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 12:59             ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 13:35               ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 13:53                 ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-07 14:01                   ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-07 23:00                   ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-08 14:25                     ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman
2026-05-08 14:46                       ` David Woodhouse
2026-05-08 18:06                         ` Maciej Wieczor-Retman

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