From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Guanrui Huang <guanrui.huang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, shannon.zhao@linux.alibaba.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, yuzenghui@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix double free on error
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 14:00:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86pluwrr3u.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240411115805.115673-1-guanrui.huang@linux.alibaba.com>
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 12:58:05 +0100,
Guanrui Huang <guanrui.huang@linux.alibaba.com> wrote:
>
> if (vm != domain->host_data)
>
> This is just a safety check. It looks unlikely happened.
It's not a safety check. It is just papering over problems. If you
don't trust the vm pointer, why do you trust the domain pointer? Why
do you trust *anything* at all?
> After all, vm is obtained from the args. If the caller has a bug,
> can we check here to avoid possible problems that may arise in later
> code?
If the caller has a bug, please fix the caller. Don't paper over it.
And you can remove the BUG_ON(!vm) which is equally useless.
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Guanrui Huang <guanrui.huang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, shannon.zhao@linux.alibaba.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, yuzenghui@huawei.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix double free on error
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 14:00:53 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86pluwrr3u.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240411115805.115673-1-guanrui.huang@linux.alibaba.com>
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 12:58:05 +0100,
Guanrui Huang <guanrui.huang@linux.alibaba.com> wrote:
>
> if (vm != domain->host_data)
>
> This is just a safety check. It looks unlikely happened.
It's not a safety check. It is just papering over problems. If you
don't trust the vm pointer, why do you trust the domain pointer? Why
do you trust *anything* at all?
> After all, vm is obtained from the args. If the caller has a bug,
> can we check here to avoid possible problems that may arise in later
> code?
If the caller has a bug, please fix the caller. Don't paper over it.
And you can remove the BUG_ON(!vm) which is equally useless.
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-04-11 13:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 10:56 [PATCH v2] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix double free on error Guanrui Huang
2024-04-11 10:56 ` Guanrui Huang
2024-04-11 11:19 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-04-11 11:19 ` Marc Zyngier
2024-04-11 11:58 ` Guanrui Huang
2024-04-11 11:58 ` Guanrui Huang
2024-04-11 13:00 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2024-04-11 13:00 ` Marc Zyngier
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