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From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
To: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	 Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	 Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	 Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	 Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	 linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	 stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:27:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <871p8ib4fm.fsf@fau.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117172341.3152407-1-ryan.roberts@arm.com>

Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com> writes:

> The BPF verifier can accept programs with unsafe speculative paths by
> inserting BPF_NOSPEC instructions instead of rejecting them. It relies
> on those instructions to prevent execution of the unsafe paths.
>
> The arm64 JIT implements BPF_NOSPEC with a speculation barrier, but the
> interpreter calls barrier_nospec(), which falls back to a no-op on
> arm64. Programs executed by the interpreter therefore lack the
> Spectre-v1 barriers assumed by the verifier. Contrary to the code
> comment, kernel-wide SSBD does not provide this protection, since it
> mitigates Spectre v4 rather than Spectre v1.
>
> Rename spec_bar() to barrier_nospec() so that the interpreter and other
> callers receive SB if supported, or DSB NSH followed by ISB otherwise.
>
> Defining barrier_nospec() would also add barriers to the generic
> copy_from_user() and copy_from_user_iter() paths. These are unnecessary
> on arm64: its uaccess primitives mask user pointers so that they cannot
> address kernel memory even when an access_ok() check is mispredicted.
>
> Introduce user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr(), defaulting to true,
> and have arm64 return false. Then update the uaccess sites to call
> barrier_nospec() conditionally on the macro.
>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Fixes: d6f1c85f2253 ("bpf: Fall back to nospec for Spectre v1")
> Signed-off-by: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>

Thanks! Tested that this prevents the attack (just recovery of OOB
value, did not aim for real secret) on Cavium ThunderX2 (no FEAT_SB) as
expected.

Tested-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@fau.de>

> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 6 +++---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 3 +++
>  arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c  | 2 +-
>  include/linux/uaccess.h          | 7 ++++++-
>  kernel/bpf/core.c                | 9 +--------
>  lib/iov_iter.c                   | 3 ++-
>  6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
> index 9495c4441a46..088ee29d36f4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h
> @@ -40,9 +40,9 @@
>   */
>  #define dgh()		asm volatile("hint #6" : : : "memory")
>
> -#define spec_bar()	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n",		\
> -						 SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n",	\
> -						 ARM64_HAS_SB))
> +#define barrier_nospec() asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("dsb nsh\nisb\n",		\
> +						  SB_BARRIER_INSN"nop\n",	\
> +						  ARM64_HAS_SB) : : : "memory")
>
>  #define gsb_ack()	asm volatile(GSB_ACK_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
>  #define gsb_sys()	asm volatile(GSB_SYS_BARRIER_INSN : : : "memory")
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 9f5bd9c69c24..6fd03dc1ae76 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static inline void __user *__uaccess_mask_ptr(const void __user *ptr)
>  	return safe_ptr;
>  }
>
> +/* __uaccess_mask_ptr() prevents speculative accesses to kernel addresses. */
> +#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() false
> +
>  /*
>   * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the address
>   * space - it must have been done previously with a separate "access_ok()"
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> index 3bcf86154d95..c96e93eca3b9 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v4_enable_hw_mitigation(void)
>  	 * could mis-speculate branches and bypass a conditional barrier.
>  	 */
>  	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_3194386))
> -		spec_bar();
> +		barrier_nospec();
>
>  	return SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
>  }
> diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> index 67cdb0a4f583..5a1fa4f48c77 100644
> --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h
> +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h
> @@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
>   #define mask_user_address(src) (src)
>  #endif
>
> +#ifndef user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr
> +#define user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr() true
> +#endif
> +
>  /*
>   * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user())
>   * and get rid of their private instances of copy_{to,from}_user() and
> @@ -179,7 +183,8 @@ _inline_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
>  		 * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
>  		 * finished:
>  		 */
> -		barrier_nospec();
> +		if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
> +			barrier_nospec();
>  	}
>  	instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
>  	res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> index 0b8456f2dce9..abd938d310bb 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -2250,14 +2250,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn)
>  	/* ST, STX and LDX*/
>  	ST_NOSPEC:
>  		/* Speculation barrier for mitigating Speculative Store Bypass,
> -		 * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion. In case of arm64, we
> -		 * rely on the firmware mitigation as controlled via the ssbd
> -		 * kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled, it
> -		 * works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any
> -		 * additional instructions here. In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
> -		 * insn for mitigation. We reuse preexisting logic from Spectre
> -		 * v1 mitigation that happens to produce the required code on
> -		 * x86 for v4 as well.
> +		 * Bounds-Check Bypass and Type Confusion.
>  		 */
>  		barrier_nospec();
>  		CONT;
> diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c
> index fa4fe2e92383..abd27189beff 100644
> --- a/lib/iov_iter.c
> +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c
> @@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ size_t copy_from_user_iter(void __user *iter_from, size_t progress,
>  		 * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
>  		 * finished:
>  		 */
> -		barrier_nospec();
> +		if (user_access_may_speculate_kernel_addr())
> +			barrier_nospec();
>  	}
>  	to += progress;
>  	instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, iter_from, len);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 14:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-17 17:23 [PATCH v1] arm64: Mitigate Spectre v1 in the BPF interpreter Ryan Roberts
2026-11-17 17:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-18  9:26   ` Ryan Roberts
2026-11-18 14:27 ` Luis Gerhorst [this message]
2026-11-19  1:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-11-20 10:02   ` Catalin Marinas
2026-11-20 17:38     ` Alexei Starovoitov

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