Re: [PATCH 1/2] proc.5: Document /proc/[pid]/setgroups

[ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman)]

"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> writes:

> Hi Eric,
>
> Ping!
>
> Cheers,
>
> Michael

My apologies.  You description wasn't wrong but it may be a bit
misleading, explanation below.  You will have to figure out how to work
that into your proposed text.

> On 2 February 2015 at 16:36, Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
> <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
>> [Adding Josh to CC in case he has anything to add.]
>>
>> On 12/12/2014 10:54 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>>> ---
>>>  man5/proc.5 | 15 +++++++++++++++
>>>  1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/man5/proc.5 b/man5/proc.5
>>> index 96077d0dd195..d661e8cfeac9 100644
>>> --- a/man5/proc.5
>>> +++ b/man5/proc.5
>>> @@ -1097,6 +1097,21 @@ are not available if the main thread has already terminated
>>>  .\"       Added in 2.6.9
>>>  .\"       CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
>>>  .TP
>>> +.IR /proc/[pid]/setgroups " (since Linux 3.19-rc1)"
>>> +This file reports
>>> +.BR allow
>>> +if the setgroups system call is allowed in the current user namespace.
>>> +This file reports
>>> +.BR deny
>>> +if the setgroups system call is not allowed in the current user namespace.
>>> +This file may be written to with values of
>>> +.BR allow
>>> +and
>>> +.BR deny
>>> +before
>>> +.IR /proc/[pid]/gid_map
>>> +is written to (enabling setgroups) in a user namespace.
>>> +.TP
>>>  .IR /proc/[pid]/smaps " (since Linux 2.6.14)"
>>>  This file shows memory consumption for each of the process's mappings.
>>>  (The
>>
>> Hi Eric,
>>
>> Thanks for this patch. I applied it, and then tried to work in
>> quite a few other details gleaned from the source code and commit
>> message, and Jon Corbet's article at http://lwn.net/Articles/626665/.
>> Could you please let me know if the following is correct:

It is close but it may be misleading.

>>     /proc/[pid]/setgroups (since Linux 3.19)
>>            This file displays the string "allow"  if  processes  in
>>            the  user  namespace  that  contains the process pid are
>>            permitted to employ the setgroups(2)  system  call,  and
>>            "deny"  if  setgroups(2)  is  not permitted in that user
>>            namespace.

With the caveat that when gid_map is not set that setgroups is also not
allowed.

>>            A privileged process (one with the  CAP_SYS_ADMIN  capa‐
>>            bility in the namespace) may write either of the strings
>>            "allow" or "deny" to this file before writing a group ID
>>            mapping   for   this   user   namespace   to   the  file
>>            /proc/[pid]/gid_map.  Writing the string "deny" prevents
>>            any  process  in  the user namespace from employing set‐
>>            groups(2).

Or more succintly.  You are allowed to write to /proc/[pid]/setgroups
when calling setgroups is not allowed because gid_map is unset.  This
ensures we do not have any transitions from a state where setgroups
is allowed to a state where setgroups is denied.  There are only
transitions from setgroups not-allowed to setgroups allowed.

>>            The default value of  this  file  in  the  initial  user
>>            namespace is "allow".
>>
>>            Once  /proc/[pid]/gid_map has been written to (which has
>>            the effect of enabling setgroups(2) in the  user  names‐
>>            pace),  it is no longer possible to deny setgroups(2) by
>>            writing to /proc/[pid]/setgroups.
>>
>>            A child user namespace inherits the  /proc/[pid]/gid_map
>>            setting from its parent.
>>
>>            If  the  setgroups  file  has the value "deny", then the
>>            setgroups(2) system call can't subsequently be reenabled
>>            (by writing "allow" to the file) in this user namespace.
>>            This restriction also propagates down to all child  user
>>            namespaces of this user namespace.

Eric
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