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From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	"AKASHI, Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 21:19:19 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87efusyi3s.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87d1adihhk.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>


Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> writes:

> Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
>> On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being
>> implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures.
>
> I still want you to implement arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() as well :)

Yes, I will implement it! We are still working on loading the public
keys for kernel signing from the firmware into a kernel keyring, so
there's not much point in implementing arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
without having that first.

The same problem also affects IMA: even with these patches, new code
still neededs to be added to make IMA use the platform keys for kernel
signature verification.

-- 
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Jessica Yu <jeyu@redhat.com>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, "AKASHI\,
	Takahiro" <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/6] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 18:19:19 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87efusyi3s.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87d1adihhk.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>


Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> writes:

> Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
>> On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being
>> implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures.
>
> I still want you to implement arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() as well :)

Yes, I will implement it! We are still working on loading the public
keys for kernel signing from the firmware into a kernel keyring, so
there's not much point in implementing arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
without having that first.

The same problem also affects IMA: even with these patches, new code
still neededs to be added to make IMA use the platform keys for kernel
signature verification.

-- 
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Thiago Jung Bauermann)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/6] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal
Date: Fri, 09 Jun 2017 18:19:19 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87efusyi3s.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87d1adihhk.fsf@concordia.ellerman.id.au>


Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> writes:

> Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
>
>> On the OpenPOWER platform, secure boot and trusted boot are being
>> implemented using IMA for taking measurements and verifying signatures.
>
> I still want you to implement arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() as well :)

Yes, I will implement it! We are still working on loading the public
keys for kernel signing from the firmware into a kernel keyring, so
there's not much point in implementing arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig
without having that first.

The same problem also affects IMA: even with these patches, new code
still neededs to be added to make IMA use the platform keys for kernel
signature verification.

-- 
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center

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  reply	other threads:[~2017-06-09 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-08  1:49 [PATCH v2 0/6] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49 ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/6] integrity: Small code improvements Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-15 16:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-15 16:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-15 16:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-08  1:49 ` [PATCH v2 2/6] ima: Simplify policy_func_show Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-15 16:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-15 16:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-15 16:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-08  1:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/6] ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-15 16:00   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-15 16:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-15 16:00     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-08  1:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/6] integrity: Introduce struct evm_hmac_xattr Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/6] MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/6] ima: Support module-style appended signatures for appraisal Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-08  1:49   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-14 12:39   ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-14 12:39     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-14 12:39     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-21 17:45     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-21 17:45       ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-21 17:45       ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-22  1:33       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-22  1:33         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-22  1:33         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-05  2:22         ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-05  2:22           ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-05  2:22           ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-07-05 12:13           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-05 12:13             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-07-05 12:13             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-09 10:27 ` [PATCH v2 0/6] Appended signatures support for IMA appraisal Michael Ellerman
2017-06-09 10:27   ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-09 10:27   ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-09 21:19   ` Thiago Jung Bauermann [this message]
2017-06-09 21:19     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-09 21:19     ` Thiago Jung Bauermann
2017-06-13 10:18     ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-13 10:18       ` Michael Ellerman
2017-06-13 10:18       ` Michael Ellerman

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