From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
will@kernel.org, Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
kernel-team@android.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
"Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, surenb@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2022 07:58:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sfs06b1u.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220225033548.1912117-5-kaleshsingh@google.com>
On Fri, 25 Feb 2022 03:34:49 +0000,
Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> wrote:
>
> Maps the stack pages in the flexible private VA range and allocates
> guard pages below the stack as unbacked VA space. The stack is aligned
> to twice its size to aid overflow detection (implemented in a subsequent
> patch in the series).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v4:
> - Replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL check with IS_ERR check now that
> pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() returns an error for null
> pointer, per Fuad
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark
>
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> index 27af337f9fea..1b69a25c1861 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> @@ -105,11 +105,28 @@ static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va;
> + /*
> + * Private mappings are allocated upwards from __io_map_base
> + * so allocate the guard page first then the stack.
> + */
> + start = (void *)pkvm_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (IS_ERR(start))
> + return PTR_ERR(start);
> +
> + /*
> + * The stack is aligned to twice its size to facilitate overflow
> + * detection.
> + */
> + end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_pa;
> start = end - PAGE_SIZE;
> - ret = pkvm_create_mappings(start, end, PAGE_HYP);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> + start = (void *)__pkvm_create_private_mapping((phys_addr_t)start,
> + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE * 2, PAGE_HYP);
Similar comments as the previous patch. I'd rather you treat each
stack as a two-page VA, populated by a single page. It would be a lot
clearer, and less fragile.
> + if (IS_ERR(start))
> + return PTR_ERR(start);
> + end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> + /* Update stack_hyp_va to end of the stack's private VA range */
> + per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va = (unsigned long) end;
> }
>
> /*
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: will@kernel.org, qperret@google.com, tabba@google.com,
surenb@google.com, kernel-team@android.com,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
"Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2022 07:58:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sfs06b1u.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220225033548.1912117-5-kaleshsingh@google.com>
On Fri, 25 Feb 2022 03:34:49 +0000,
Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> wrote:
>
> Maps the stack pages in the flexible private VA range and allocates
> guard pages below the stack as unbacked VA space. The stack is aligned
> to twice its size to aid overflow detection (implemented in a subsequent
> patch in the series).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v4:
> - Replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL check with IS_ERR check now that
> pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() returns an error for null
> pointer, per Fuad
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark
>
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> index 27af337f9fea..1b69a25c1861 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> @@ -105,11 +105,28 @@ static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va;
> + /*
> + * Private mappings are allocated upwards from __io_map_base
> + * so allocate the guard page first then the stack.
> + */
> + start = (void *)pkvm_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (IS_ERR(start))
> + return PTR_ERR(start);
> +
> + /*
> + * The stack is aligned to twice its size to facilitate overflow
> + * detection.
> + */
> + end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_pa;
> start = end - PAGE_SIZE;
> - ret = pkvm_create_mappings(start, end, PAGE_HYP);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> + start = (void *)__pkvm_create_private_mapping((phys_addr_t)start,
> + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE * 2, PAGE_HYP);
Similar comments as the previous patch. I'd rather you treat each
stack as a two-page VA, populated by a single page. It would be a lot
clearer, and less fragile.
> + if (IS_ERR(start))
> + return PTR_ERR(start);
> + end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> + /* Update stack_hyp_va to end of the stack's private VA range */
> + per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va = (unsigned long) end;
> }
>
> /*
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
Cc: will@kernel.org, qperret@google.com, tabba@google.com,
surenb@google.com, kernel-team@android.com,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>,
"Madhavan T. Venkataraman" <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>,
Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
Andrew Scull <ascull@google.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) hypervisor stack
Date: Wed, 02 Mar 2022 07:58:05 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87sfs06b1u.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220225033548.1912117-5-kaleshsingh@google.com>
On Fri, 25 Feb 2022 03:34:49 +0000,
Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com> wrote:
>
> Maps the stack pages in the flexible private VA range and allocates
> guard pages below the stack as unbacked VA space. The stack is aligned
> to twice its size to aid overflow detection (implemented in a subsequent
> patch in the series).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>
> ---
>
> Changes in v4:
> - Replace IS_ERR_OR_NULL check with IS_ERR check now that
> pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() returns an error for null
> pointer, per Fuad
>
> Changes in v3:
> - Handle null ptr in IS_ERR_OR_NULL checks, per Mark
>
> arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> index 27af337f9fea..1b69a25c1861 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
> @@ -105,11 +105,28 @@ static int recreate_hyp_mappings(phys_addr_t phys, unsigned long size,
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> - end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va;
> + /*
> + * Private mappings are allocated upwards from __io_map_base
> + * so allocate the guard page first then the stack.
> + */
> + start = (void *)pkvm_alloc_private_va_range(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
> + if (IS_ERR(start))
> + return PTR_ERR(start);
> +
> + /*
> + * The stack is aligned to twice its size to facilitate overflow
> + * detection.
> + */
> + end = (void *)per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_pa;
> start = end - PAGE_SIZE;
> - ret = pkvm_create_mappings(start, end, PAGE_HYP);
> - if (ret)
> - return ret;
> + start = (void *)__pkvm_create_private_mapping((phys_addr_t)start,
> + PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE * 2, PAGE_HYP);
Similar comments as the previous patch. I'd rather you treat each
stack as a two-page VA, populated by a single page. It would be a lot
clearer, and less fragile.
> + if (IS_ERR(start))
> + return PTR_ERR(start);
> + end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
> +
> + /* Update stack_hyp_va to end of the stack's private VA range */
> + per_cpu_ptr(&kvm_init_params, i)->stack_hyp_va = (unsigned long) end;
> }
>
> /*
Thanks,
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-02 7:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-02-25 3:34 [PATCH v4 0/8] KVM: arm64: Hypervisor stack enhancements Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] KVM: arm64: Introduce hyp_alloc_private_va_range() Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] KVM: arm64: Introduce pkvm_alloc_private_va_range() Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 7:46 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 7:46 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 7:46 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 17:24 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 17:24 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 17:24 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:29 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-03 17:29 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-03 17:29 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-03 17:45 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:45 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-03 17:45 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for KVM nVHE hypervisor stack Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 7:53 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 7:53 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 7:53 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 17:31 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 17:31 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 17:31 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] KVM: arm64: Add guard pages for pKVM (protected nVHE) " Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-03-02 7:58 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2022-03-02 7:58 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-03-02 7:58 ` Marc Zyngier
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] KVM: arm64: Detect and handle hypervisor stack overflows Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] KVM: arm64: Add hypervisor overflow stack Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] KVM: arm64: Unwind and dump nVHE HYP stacktrace Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] KVM: arm64: Symbolize the nVHE HYP backtrace Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
2022-02-25 3:34 ` Kalesh Singh
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=87sfs06b1u.wl-maz@kernel.org \
--to=maz@kernel.org \
--cc=broonie@kernel.org \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=kaleshsingh@google.com \
--cc=kernel-team@android.com \
--cc=kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=madvenka@linux.microsoft.com \
--cc=mhiramat@kernel.org \
--cc=pcc@google.com \
--cc=qwandor@google.com \
--cc=surenb@google.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.