From: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers
<containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
linux-fsdevel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 11:39:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87twcbq696.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec,
so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present
in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
Cc: stable-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
---
It turns out that dumpable needs to be fixed to be user namespace
aware to fix this issue. When this patch is ready I plan to place it in
my userns tree and send it to Linus, hopefully for -rc2.
include/linux/mm_types.h | 1 +
kernel/fork.c | 9 ++++++---
kernel/ptrace.c | 17 ++++++-----------
mm/init-mm.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index 4a8acedf4b7d..08d947fc4c59 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ struct mm_struct {
*/
struct task_struct __rcu *owner;
#endif
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
/* store ref to file /proc/<pid>/exe symlink points to */
struct file __rcu *exe_file;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 623259fc794d..fd85c68c2791 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -742,7 +742,8 @@ static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
#endif
}
-static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
+static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
mm->mmap = NULL;
mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
if (init_new_context(p, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
+ mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
return mm;
fail_nocontext:
@@ -827,7 +829,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_alloc(void)
return NULL;
memset(mm, 0, sizeof(*mm));
- return mm_init(mm, current);
+ return mm_init(mm, current, current_user_ns());
}
/*
@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
destroy_context(mm);
mmu_notifier_mm_destroy(mm);
check_mm(mm);
+ put_user_ns(mm->user_ns);
free_mm(mm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mmdrop);
@@ -1123,7 +1126,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
- if (!mm_init(mm, tsk))
+ if (!mm_init(mm, tsk, mm->user_ns))
goto fail_nomem;
err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2a99027312a6..f2d1b9afb3f8 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
- int dumpable = 0;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -271,16 +271,11 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
- smp_rmb();
- if (task->mm)
- dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return -EPERM;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ mm = task->mm;
+ if (!mm ||
+ ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
diff --git a/mm/init-mm.c b/mm/init-mm.c
index a56a851908d2..975e49f00f34 100644
--- a/mm/init-mm.c
+++ b/mm/init-mm.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
@@ -21,5 +22,6 @@ struct mm_struct init_mm = {
.mmap_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_mm.mmap_sem),
.page_table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_mm.page_table_lock),
.mmlist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_mm.mmlist),
+ .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
INIT_MM_CONTEXT(init_mm)
};
--
2.8.3
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org> , <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> ,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 11:39:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87twcbq696.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec,
so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present
in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
It turns out that dumpable needs to be fixed to be user namespace
aware to fix this issue. When this patch is ready I plan to place it in
my userns tree and send it to Linus, hopefully for -rc2.
include/linux/mm_types.h | 1 +
kernel/fork.c | 9 ++++++---
kernel/ptrace.c | 17 ++++++-----------
mm/init-mm.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index 4a8acedf4b7d..08d947fc4c59 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ struct mm_struct {
*/
struct task_struct __rcu *owner;
#endif
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
/* store ref to file /proc/<pid>/exe symlink points to */
struct file __rcu *exe_file;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 623259fc794d..fd85c68c2791 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -742,7 +742,8 @@ static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
#endif
}
-static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
+static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
mm->mmap = NULL;
mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
if (init_new_context(p, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
+ mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
return mm;
fail_nocontext:
@@ -827,7 +829,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_alloc(void)
return NULL;
memset(mm, 0, sizeof(*mm));
- return mm_init(mm, current);
+ return mm_init(mm, current, current_user_ns());
}
/*
@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
destroy_context(mm);
mmu_notifier_mm_destroy(mm);
check_mm(mm);
+ put_user_ns(mm->user_ns);
free_mm(mm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mmdrop);
@@ -1123,7 +1126,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
- if (!mm_init(mm, tsk))
+ if (!mm_init(mm, tsk, mm->user_ns))
goto fail_nomem;
err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2a99027312a6..f2d1b9afb3f8 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
- int dumpable = 0;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -271,16 +271,11 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
- smp_rmb();
- if (task->mm)
- dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return -EPERM;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ mm = task->mm;
+ if (!mm ||
+ ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
diff --git a/mm/init-mm.c b/mm/init-mm.c
index a56a851908d2..975e49f00f34 100644
--- a/mm/init-mm.c
+++ b/mm/init-mm.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
@@ -21,5 +22,6 @@ struct mm_struct init_mm = {
.mmap_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_mm.mmap_sem),
.page_table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_mm.page_table_lock),
.mmlist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_mm.mmlist),
+ .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
INIT_MM_CONTEXT(init_mm)
};
--
2.8.3
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access
Date: Mon, 17 Oct 2016 11:39:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87twcbq696.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (raw)
During exec dumpable is cleared if the file that is being executed is
not readable by the user executing the file. A bug in
ptrace_may_access allows reading the file if the executable happens to
enter into a subordinate user namespace (aka clone(CLONE_NEWUSER),
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), or setns(fd, CLONE_NEWUSER).
This problem is fixed with only necessary userspace breakage by adding
a user namespace owner to mm_struct, captured at the time of exec,
so it is clear in which user namespace CAP_SYS_PTRACE must be present
in to be able to safely give read permission to the executable.
The function ptrace_may_access is modified to verify that the ptracer
has CAP_SYS_ADMIN in task->mm->user_ns instead of task->cred->user_ns.
This ensures that if the task changes it's cred into a subordinate
user namespace it does not become ptraceable.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 8409cca70561 ("userns: allow ptrace from non-init user namespaces")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
---
It turns out that dumpable needs to be fixed to be user namespace
aware to fix this issue. When this patch is ready I plan to place it in
my userns tree and send it to Linus, hopefully for -rc2.
include/linux/mm_types.h | 1 +
kernel/fork.c | 9 ++++++---
kernel/ptrace.c | 17 ++++++-----------
mm/init-mm.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index 4a8acedf4b7d..08d947fc4c59 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ struct mm_struct {
*/
struct task_struct __rcu *owner;
#endif
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
/* store ref to file /proc/<pid>/exe symlink points to */
struct file __rcu *exe_file;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 623259fc794d..fd85c68c2791 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -742,7 +742,8 @@ static void mm_init_owner(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
#endif
}
-static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
+static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
mm->mmap = NULL;
mm->mm_rb = RB_ROOT;
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p)
if (init_new_context(p, mm))
goto fail_nocontext;
+ mm->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
return mm;
fail_nocontext:
@@ -827,7 +829,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_alloc(void)
return NULL;
memset(mm, 0, sizeof(*mm));
- return mm_init(mm, current);
+ return mm_init(mm, current, current_user_ns());
}
/*
@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ void __mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm)
destroy_context(mm);
mmu_notifier_mm_destroy(mm);
check_mm(mm);
+ put_user_ns(mm->user_ns);
free_mm(mm);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__mmdrop);
@@ -1123,7 +1126,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *dup_mm(struct task_struct *tsk)
memcpy(mm, oldmm, sizeof(*mm));
- if (!mm_init(mm, tsk))
+ if (!mm_init(mm, tsk, mm->user_ns))
goto fail_nomem;
err = dup_mmap(mm, oldmm);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2a99027312a6..f2d1b9afb3f8 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
- int dumpable = 0;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -271,16 +271,11 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
return -EPERM;
ok:
rcu_read_unlock();
- smp_rmb();
- if (task->mm)
- dumpable = get_dumpable(task->mm);
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(__task_cred(task)->user_ns, mode)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- return -EPERM;
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ mm = task->mm;
+ if (!mm ||
+ ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
}
diff --git a/mm/init-mm.c b/mm/init-mm.c
index a56a851908d2..975e49f00f34 100644
--- a/mm/init-mm.c
+++ b/mm/init-mm.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
@@ -21,5 +22,6 @@ struct mm_struct init_mm = {
.mmap_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_mm.mmap_sem),
.page_table_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_mm.page_table_lock),
.mmlist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_mm.mmlist),
+ .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
INIT_MM_CONTEXT(init_mm)
};
--
2.8.3
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
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next reply other threads:[~2016-10-17 16:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 159+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-10-17 16:39 Eric W. Biederman [this message]
2016-10-17 16:39 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-17 16:39 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87twcbq696.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-17 17:25 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 13:50 ` Michal Hocko
2016-10-17 17:25 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <20161017172547.GJ14666-J1fxOzX/cBvk1uMJSBkQmQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-17 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-17 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-17 17:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 13:50 ` Michal Hocko
2016-10-18 13:50 ` Michal Hocko
[not found] ` <20161018135031.GB13117-2MMpYkNvuYDjFM9bn6wA6Q@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-18 13:57 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 13:57 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 14:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 14:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 14:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 15:05 ` Jann Horn
[not found] ` <20161018150507.GP14666-J1fxOzX/cBvk1uMJSBkQmQ@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-18 15:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 15:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 15:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87twc9656s.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-18 19:12 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 19:12 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 19:12 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 21:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 21:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 21:15 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-18 21:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 6:13 ` Amir Goldstein
2016-10-19 6:13 ` Amir Goldstein
2016-10-19 13:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 13:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mvi0mpix.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 17:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:04 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CAOQ4uxjyZF346vq-Oi=HwB=jj6ePycHBnEfvVPet9KqPxL9mgg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 13:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87k2d5nytz.fsf_-_-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 6:13 ` Amir Goldstein
2016-10-19 15:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 15:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 15:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrU4SZYUEPrv4JkpUpA+0sZ=EirZRftRDp+a5hce5E7HgA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 16:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 16:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 16:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 16:52 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:29 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-19 17:29 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-19 17:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 17:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrWSY1SRse5oqSwZ=goQ+ZALd2XcTP3SZ8ry49C8rNd98Q-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 17:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87pomwi5p2.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 18:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-19 21:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87pomwghda.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 23:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <CALCETrXA2EnE8X3HzetLG6zS8YSVjJQJrsSumTfvEcGq=r5vsw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 17:02 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/3] Fixing ptrace vs exec vs userns interactions Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:02 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:05 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/3] ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87oa1eavfx.fsf_-_-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-18 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-18 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-18 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKbVkCGVSoxNQ=pTCBX1Boe3rPR1P56P-kR9AHWYHBs2w-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 18:56 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CALCETrUSnPfzpabQMNuyOu09j9QDzRDeoQVF_U51=ow3bP5pkw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 23:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:08 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:08 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87inrmavax.fsf_-_-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 20:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 20:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 20:47 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 21:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 21:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 21:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 21:51 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 22:50 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] ptrace: Don't allow accessing an undumpable mm Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 22:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 22:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:17 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 23:17 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <87shqpzpok.fsf_-_-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 23:17 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <874m3522sy.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 22:50 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <20161117213258.GA10839-K+wRfnb2/UA@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 21:51 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jJc6TmzdVp+4OMDAt5Kd68hHbNBXaRPD8X0+m558hx3qw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 21:32 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-17 23:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <20161117204707.GB10421-K+wRfnb2/UA@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 21:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-17 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-17 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87mvgxwtjv.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 0:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-18 0:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-18 0:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-11-18 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-18 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-18 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CALCETrX=61Sk9qim+Psjn83gohuizEsrpUC9gF-vwQTtR4GuJw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-18 0:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CALCETrUvKpRCXRE+K512E_q9-o8Gzgb+3XsAzSo+ZFdgqeX-eQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 23:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:10 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/3] exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:10 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87twb6avk8.fsf_-_-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 17:05 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 1/3] ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:08 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 2/3] exec: Don't allow ptracing an exec of an unreadable file Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-17 17:10 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 3/3] exec: Ensure mm->user_ns contains the execed files Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 7:17 ` [REVIEW][PATCH 0/3] Fixing ptrace vs exec vs userns interactions Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 7:17 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 7:17 ` Willy Tarreau
[not found] ` <20161119071700.GA13347-K+wRfnb2/UA@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-19 9:28 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 18:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 9:28 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 9:28 ` Willy Tarreau
[not found] ` <20161119092804.GA13553-K+wRfnb2/UA@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-19 9:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 18:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 9:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 9:33 ` Willy Tarreau
2016-11-19 18:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:44 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:35 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <87d1hrjp23.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-19 18:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-11-19 18:37 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <CALCETrUz2oU6OYwQ9K4M-SUg6FeDsd6Q1gf1w-cJRGg2PdmK8g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 21:26 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] exec: Don't exec files the userns root can not read Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <20161019172917.GE1210-GiL72Q0nGm9Crx9znvW9yA@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 17:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87y41kjn6l.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-19 17:29 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-19 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-19 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <87r37dnz74.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-18 21:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <20161018191206.GA1210-GiL72Q0nGm9Crx9znvW9yA@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-18 21:07 ` [REVIEW][PATCH] mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace_may_access Eric W. Biederman
[not found] ` <8737jt903u.fsf-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-18 15:05 ` Jann Horn
2016-10-18 18:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-10-18 18:06 ` Michal Hocko
2016-10-18 18:06 ` Michal Hocko
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