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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 20:25:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wmhoulb9.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240913200517.3085794-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Fri, Sep 13 2024 at 13:04, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to
> enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of
> focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing
> a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of
> Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing
> a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and
> cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming
> Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel
> follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution
> Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a
> boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has
> been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional
> component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the
> Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in
> development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage
> and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available.
>
> This patchset provides detailed documentation of DRTM, the approach used for
> adding the capbility, and relevant API/ABI documentation. In addition to the
> documentation the patch set introduces Intel TXT support as the first platform
> for Linux Secure Launch.

So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it
through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the
crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already.

Can we make progress on this please?

Thanks,

        tglx


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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support
Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2024 20:25:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wmhoulb9.ffs@tglx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240913200517.3085794-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com>

On Fri, Sep 13 2024 at 13:04, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The larger focus of the TrenchBoot project (https://github.com/TrenchBoot) is to
> enhance the boot security and integrity in a unified manner. The first area of
> focus has been on the Trusted Computing Group's Dynamic Launch for establishing
> a hardware Root of Trust for Measurement, also know as DRTM (Dynamic Root of
> Trust for Measurement). The project has been and continues to work on providing
> a unified means to Dynamic Launch that is a cross-platform (Intel and AMD) and
> cross-architecture (x86 and Arm), with our recent involvment in the upcoming
> Arm DRTM specification. The order of introducing DRTM to the Linux kernel
> follows the maturity of DRTM in the architectures. Intel's Trusted eXecution
> Technology (TXT) is present today and only requires a preamble loader, e.g. a
> boot loader, and an OS kernel that is TXT-aware. AMD DRTM implementation has
> been present since the introduction of AMD-V but requires an additional
> component that is AMD specific and referred to in the specification as the
> Secure Loader, which the TrenchBoot project has an active prototype in
> development. Finally Arm's implementation is in specification development stage
> and the project is looking to support it when it becomes available.
>
> This patchset provides detailed documentation of DRTM, the approach used for
> adding the capbility, and relevant API/ABI documentation. In addition to the
> documentation the patch set introduces Intel TXT support as the first platform
> for Linux Secure Launch.

So this looks pretty reasonable to me by now and I'm inclined to take it
through the tip x86 tree, but that needs reviewed/acked-by's from the
crypto and TPM folks. EFI has been reviewed already.

Can we make progress on this please?

Thanks,

        tglx


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-31 19:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 116+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-09-13 20:04 [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:04 ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:04 ` [PATCH v11 01/20] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:04   ` Ross Philipson
2024-11-01 19:31   ` Elliott, Robert (Servers)
2024-11-01 19:31     ` Elliott, Robert (Servers)
2024-09-13 20:04 ` [PATCH v11 02/20] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:04   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 03/20] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 04/20] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 05/20] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 06/20] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 07/20] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 08/20] x86/boot: Place TXT MLE header in the kernel_info section Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 09/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 10/20] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 11/20] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 12/20] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 13/20] x86/reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 14/20] tpm: Protect against locality counter underflow Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-11-01  9:33   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  9:33     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 15/20] tpm: Ensure tpm is in known state at startup Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-11-01  9:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  9:37     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 14:02   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 14:02     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 16/20] tpm: Make locality requests return consistent values Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-11-01 10:04   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 10:04     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 14:26   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 14:26     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 17/20] tpm: Add ability to set the default locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-11-01 10:05   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 10:05     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  1:37   ` [RFC PATCH] tpm, tpm_tis: Introduce TPM_IOC_SET_LOCALITY Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  1:37     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  1:39     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  1:39       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  6:22       ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] " Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  6:22         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  6:22         ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/2] tpm: show the default locality in sysfs Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  6:22           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  6:29         ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/2] tpm, tpm_tis: Introduce TPM_IOC_SET_LOCALITY Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  6:29           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02  9:02           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-11-02  9:02             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-11-02 10:38             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 10:38               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 10:40               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 10:40                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 10:52               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-11-02 10:52                 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-11-02 13:39                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 13:39                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 14:07                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-02 14:07                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 18/20] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the default locality Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-11-01  3:17   ` James Bottomley
2024-11-01  3:17     ` James Bottomley
2024-11-01 10:06   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 10:06     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:50     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:50       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:56       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:56         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 19/20] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05 ` [PATCH v11 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-09-13 20:05   ` Ross Philipson
2024-10-31 19:25 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2024-10-31 19:25   ` [PATCH v11 00/20] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-31 22:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-31 22:37     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-10-31 23:08     ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-10-31 23:08       ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-01  0:33       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  0:33         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  0:40         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  0:40           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  8:50           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-11-01  8:50             ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-11-01  9:18             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  9:18               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  9:30               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01  9:30                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 14:51       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 14:51         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 10:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 10:28   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 20:34   ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-01 20:34     ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-01 21:13     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:13       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:19       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 21:19         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 22:04         ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-01 22:04           ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-11-01 22:18           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-11-01 22:18             ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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