From: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
To: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@gmail.com>,
Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>,
Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] exec: Check Xen is enabled before calling the Xen API
Date: Fri, 08 May 2020 10:39:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wo5mes6g.fsf@secure.mitica> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200508080738.2646-2-philmd@redhat.com> ("Philippe Mathieu-Daudé"'s message of "Fri, 8 May 2020 10:07:37 +0200")
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> ---
> include/exec/ram_addr.h | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/exec/ram_addr.h b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> index 5e59a3d8d7..dd8713179e 100644
> --- a/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> +++ b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> @@ -330,7 +330,9 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_range(ram_addr_t start,
> }
> }
>
> - xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, length);
> + if (xen_enabled()) {
> + xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, length);
> + }
> }
>
> #if !defined(_WIN32)
> @@ -388,7 +390,9 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
> }
> }
>
> - xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, pages << TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
> + if (xen_enabled()) {
> + xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, pages << TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
> + }
> } else {
> uint8_t clients = tcg_enabled() ? DIRTY_CLIENTS_ALL : DIRTY_CLIENTS_NOCODE;
I don't object moving the xen code to accell. But I think that this
change is bad.
On the following patch:
- You export xen_allowed
(ok, it was already exported, but I think it shouldn't)
(master)$ find . -type f | xargs grep xen_allowed
./hw/xen/xen-common.c: ac->allowed = &xen_allowed;
./include/hw/xen/xen.h:extern bool xen_allowed;
./include/hw/xen/xen.h: return xen_allowed;
./softmmu/vl.c:bool xen_allowed;
This are all the users that I can find.
And xen_havm_modified_memory() is an empty function if xen is not
compiled in. And in the case that xen is compiled in, the 1st thing
that it checks is:
if (unlikely(xen_in_migration)) {
That is way more restrictive that xen_enabled().
So, I think that it is better to drop this patch, maintain next one, but
just un-exporting xen_allowed.
What do you think?
Later, Juan.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
To: "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Aleksandar Markovic <aleksandar.qemu.devel@gmail.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>,
Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>,
Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] exec: Check Xen is enabled before calling the Xen API
Date: Fri, 08 May 2020 10:39:51 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87wo5mes6g.fsf@secure.mitica> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200508080738.2646-2-philmd@redhat.com> ("Philippe Mathieu-Daudé"'s message of "Fri, 8 May 2020 10:07:37 +0200")
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
> ---
> include/exec/ram_addr.h | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/exec/ram_addr.h b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> index 5e59a3d8d7..dd8713179e 100644
> --- a/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> +++ b/include/exec/ram_addr.h
> @@ -330,7 +330,9 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_range(ram_addr_t start,
> }
> }
>
> - xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, length);
> + if (xen_enabled()) {
> + xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, length);
> + }
> }
>
> #if !defined(_WIN32)
> @@ -388,7 +390,9 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_set_dirty_lebitmap(unsigned long *bitmap,
> }
> }
>
> - xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, pages << TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
> + if (xen_enabled()) {
> + xen_hvm_modified_memory(start, pages << TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
> + }
> } else {
> uint8_t clients = tcg_enabled() ? DIRTY_CLIENTS_ALL : DIRTY_CLIENTS_NOCODE;
I don't object moving the xen code to accell. But I think that this
change is bad.
On the following patch:
- You export xen_allowed
(ok, it was already exported, but I think it shouldn't)
(master)$ find . -type f | xargs grep xen_allowed
./hw/xen/xen-common.c: ac->allowed = &xen_allowed;
./include/hw/xen/xen.h:extern bool xen_allowed;
./include/hw/xen/xen.h: return xen_allowed;
./softmmu/vl.c:bool xen_allowed;
This are all the users that I can find.
And xen_havm_modified_memory() is an empty function if xen is not
compiled in. And in the case that xen is compiled in, the 1st thing
that it checks is:
if (unlikely(xen_in_migration)) {
That is way more restrictive that xen_enabled().
So, I think that it is better to drop this patch, maintain next one, but
just un-exporting xen_allowed.
What do you think?
Later, Juan.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-08 8:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-08 8:07 [PATCH v2 0/2] accel: Move Xen accelerator code under accel/xen/ Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 8:07 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 8:07 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] exec: Check Xen is enabled before calling the Xen API Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 8:07 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 8:39 ` Juan Quintela [this message]
2020-05-08 8:39 ` Juan Quintela
2020-05-08 9:31 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 9:31 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 8:07 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] accel: Move Xen accelerator code under accel/xen/ Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2020-05-08 8:07 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
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