From: Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>
To: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
Oleksandr Andrushchenko <Oleksandr_Andrushchenko@epam.com>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 02/13] vpci: use per-domain PCI lock to protect vpci structure
Date: Thu, 27 Jul 2023 00:56:54 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87y1j2b296.fsf@epam.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZMDox0WwumxMGnzV@MacBook-Air-de-Roger.local>
Hi Roger,
Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> writes:
> On Wed, Jul 26, 2023 at 01:17:58AM +0000, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
>>
>> Hi Roger,
>>
>> Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> writes:
>>
>> > On Thu, Jul 20, 2023 at 12:32:31AM +0000, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
>> >> From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
>> >> @@ -498,6 +537,7 @@ void vpci_write(pci_sbdf_t sbdf, unsigned int reg, unsigned int size,
>> >> ASSERT(data_offset < size);
>> >> }
>> >> spin_unlock(&pdev->vpci->lock);
>> >> + unlock_locks(d);
>> >
>> > There's one issue here, some handlers will cal pcidevs_lock(), which
>> > will result in a lock over inversion, as in the previous patch we
>> > agreed that the locking order was pcidevs_lock first, d->pci_lock
>> > after.
>> >
>> > For example the MSI control_write() handler will call
>> > vpci_msi_arch_enable() which takes the pcidevs lock. I think I will
>> > have to look into using a dedicated lock for MSI related handling, as
>> > that's the only place where I think we have this pattern of taking the
>> > pcidevs_lock after the d->pci_lock.
>>
>> I'll mention this in the commit message. Is there something else that I
>> should do right now?
>
> Well, I don't think we want to commit this as-is with a known lock
> inversion.
>
> The functions that require the pcidevs lock are:
>
> pt_irq_{create,destroy}_bind()
> unmap_domain_pirq()
>
> AFAICT those functions require the lock in order to assert that the
> underlying device doesn't go away, as they do also use d->event_lock
> in order to get exclusive access to the data fields. Please double
> check that I'm not mistaken.
You are right, all three function does not access any of PCI state
directly. However...
> If that's accurate you will have to check the call tree that spawns
> from those functions in order to modify the asserts to check for
> either the pcidevs or the per-domain pci_list lock being taken.
... I checked calls for PT_IRQ_TYPE_MSI case, there is only call that
bothers me: hvm_pi_update_irte(), which calls IO-MMU code via
vmx_pi_update_irte():
amd_iommu_msi_msg_update_ire() or msi_msg_write_remap_rte().
Both functions read basic pdev fields like sbfd or type. I see no
problem there, as values of those fields are not supposed to be changed.
Also those function use own locks to protect shared state. But as IO-MMU
code is quite convoluted it is hard to be sure that it is safe to call
those functions without holding pdevs_lock. All I can say is that those
functions and their callees have no ASSERT(pcidevs_locked()).
--
WBR, Volodymyr
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-27 0:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 73+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-20 0:32 [PATCH v8 00/13] PCI devices passthrough on Arm, part 3 Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 02/13] vpci: use per-domain PCI lock to protect vpci structure Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 11:20 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 13:27 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 13:50 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-24 0:07 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-24 7:59 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 15:53 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-26 1:17 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-26 6:39 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-26 9:35 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-27 0:56 ` Volodymyr Babchuk [this message]
2023-07-27 7:41 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-27 10:31 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-27 11:37 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-27 15:13 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-27 12:42 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-27 12:56 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-27 14:43 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-28 0:21 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-28 13:55 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 16:03 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 16:14 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-21 6:02 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-21 7:43 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-21 8:48 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 16:09 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 01/13] pci: introduce per-domain PCI rwlock Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 9:45 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 22:57 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 15:40 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 23:37 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 03/13] vpci: restrict unhandled read/write operations for guests Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 11:32 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 04/13] vpci: add hooks for PCI device assign/de-assign Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 12:36 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-26 1:38 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-26 8:42 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-24 9:41 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 07/13] vpci/header: handle p2m range sets per BAR Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-21 11:49 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 06/13] rangeset: add RANGESETF_no_print flag Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 05/13] vpci/header: implement guest BAR register handlers Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 16:01 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-21 10:36 ` Rahul Singh
2023-07-21 10:50 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-21 11:52 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 08/13] vpci/header: program p2m with guest BAR view Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-21 13:05 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-24 10:30 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-24 10:43 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-24 13:16 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-24 13:31 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-24 13:42 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 11/13] vpci: add initial support for virtual PCI bus topology Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 6:50 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-21 0:43 ` Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-21 13:53 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-21 14:00 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-26 21:35 ` Stewart Hildebrand
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 10/13] vpci/header: reset the command register when adding devices Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-21 13:37 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 09/13] vpci/header: emulate PCI_COMMAND register for guests Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-21 13:32 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-21 13:40 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-24 11:06 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-24 11:03 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 12/13] xen/arm: translate virtual PCI bus topology " Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 6:54 ` Jan Beulich
2023-07-21 14:09 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-24 8:02 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-07-20 0:32 ` [PATCH v8 13/13] xen/arm: account IO handlers for emulated PCI MSI-X Volodymyr Babchuk
2023-07-20 0:41 ` [PATCH v8 00/13] PCI devices passthrough on Arm, part 3 Volodymyr Babchuk
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