Re: [PATCH v10 3/8] libfs: Introduce case-insensitive string comparison helper

[Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@suse.de>]

Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@collabora.com> writes:

> From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
>
> generic_ci_match can be used by case-insensitive filesystems to compare
> strings under lookup with dirents in a case-insensitive way.  This
> function is currently reimplemented by each filesystem supporting
> casefolding, so this reduces code duplication in filesystem-specific
> code.
>
> Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
> [eugen.hristev@collabora.com: rework to first test the exact match]
> Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@collabora.com>
> ---
>  fs/libfs.c         | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/fs.h |  4 +++
>  2 files changed, 84 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/libfs.c b/fs/libfs.c
> index bb18884ff20e..82871fa1b066 100644
> --- a/fs/libfs.c
> +++ b/fs/libfs.c
> @@ -1773,6 +1773,86 @@ static const struct dentry_operations generic_ci_dentry_ops = {
>  	.d_hash = generic_ci_d_hash,
>  	.d_compare = generic_ci_d_compare,
>  };
> +
> +/**
> + * generic_ci_match() - Match a name (case-insensitively) with a dirent.
> + * This is a filesystem helper for comparison with directory entries.
> + * generic_ci_d_compare should be used in VFS' ->d_compare instead.
> + *
> + * @parent: Inode of the parent of the dirent under comparison
> + * @name: name under lookup.
> + * @folded_name: Optional pre-folded name under lookup
> + * @de_name: Dirent name.
> + * @de_name_len: dirent name length.
> + *
> + *

Since this need a respin, mind dropping the extra empty line here?

> + * Test whether a case-insensitive directory entry matches the filename
> + * being searched.  If @folded_name is provided, it is used instead of
> + * recalculating the casefold of @name.
> + *
> + * Return: > 0 if the directory entry matches, 0 if it doesn't match, or
> + * < 0 on error.
> + */
> +int generic_ci_match(const struct inode *parent,
> +		     const struct qstr *name,
> +		     const struct qstr *folded_name,
> +		     const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len)
> +{
> +	const struct super_block *sb = parent->i_sb;
> +	const struct unicode_map *um = sb->s_encoding;
> +	struct fscrypt_str decrypted_name = FSTR_INIT(NULL, de_name_len);
> +	struct qstr dirent = QSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len);
> +	int res;
> +
> +	if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) {
> +		const struct fscrypt_str encrypted_name =
> +			FSTR_INIT((u8 *) de_name, de_name_len);
> +
> +		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent)))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
> +		decrypted_name.name = kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (!decrypted_name.name)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +		res = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(parent, 0, 0, &encrypted_name,
> +						&decrypted_name);
> +		if (res < 0)
> +			goto out;
> +		dirent.name = decrypted_name.name;
> +		dirent.len = decrypted_name.len;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Attempt a case-sensitive match first. It is cheaper and
> +	 * should cover most lookups, including all the sane
> +	 * applications that expect a case-sensitive filesystem.
> +	 *


> +	 * This comparison is safe under RCU because the caller
> +	 * guarantees the consistency between str and len. See
> +	 * __d_lookup_rcu_op_compare() for details.
> +	 */

This paragraph doesn't really make sense here.  It is originally from
the d_compare hook, which can be called under RCU, but there is no RCU
here.  Also, here we are comparing the dirent with the
name-under-lookup, name which is already safe.


> +	if (folded_name->name) {
> +		if (dirent.len == folded_name->len &&
> +		    !memcmp(folded_name->name, dirent.name, dirent.len)) {
> +			res = 1;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
> +		res = !utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, folded_name, &dirent);

Hmm, second thought on this.  This will ignore errors from utf8_strncasecmp*,
which CAN happen for the first time here, if the dirent itself is
corrupted on disk (exactly why we have patch 6).  Yes, ext4_match will drop the
error, but we want to propagate it from here, such that the warning on
patch 6 can trigger.

This is why I did that match dance on the original submission.  Sorry
for suggesting it.  We really want to get the error from utf8 and
propagate it if it is negative. basically:

        res > 0: match
        res == 0: no match.
        res < 0: propagate error and let the caller handle it


> +	} else {
> +		if (dirent.len == name->len &&
> +		    !memcmp(name->name, dirent.name, dirent.len) &&
> +		    (!sb_has_strict_encoding(sb) || !utf8_validate(um, name))) {
> +			res = 1;
> +			goto out;
> +		}
> +		res = !utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, &dirent);
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	kfree(decrypted_name.name);
> +	return res;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_ci_match);
>  #endif
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index 820b93b2917f..7af691ff8d44 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -3296,6 +3296,10 @@ extern int generic_file_fsync(struct file *, loff_t, loff_t, int);
>  extern int generic_check_addressable(unsigned, u64);
>  
>  extern void generic_set_encrypted_ci_d_ops(struct dentry *dentry);
> +extern int generic_ci_match(const struct inode *parent,
> +			    const struct qstr *name,
> +			    const struct qstr *folded_name,
> +			    const u8 *de_name, u32 de_name_len);
>  
>  static inline bool sb_has_encoding(const struct super_block *sb)
>  {

-- 
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi