From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:21:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8887.1519309313@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8846.1519309243@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> I'm intending on inserting the attached patch before this one.
And replacing this patch with the attached.
David
---
commit ed0424c531d7dd25adebdec0ee6a78a5784f207a
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Feb 22 14:01:49 2018 +0000
kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through
kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down unless IMA can be used
to validate the image.
[Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with
other lockdowns]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: kexec at lists.infradead.org
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index d5931e392050..c47c4de604cd 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -167,6 +167,14 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
}
ret = 0;
+ if (is_ima_appraise_enabled())
+ break;
+
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
break;
/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
jforbes@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:21:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8887.1519309313@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8846.1519309243@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> I'm intending on inserting the attached patch before this one.
And replacing this patch with the attached.
David
---
commit ed0424c531d7dd25adebdec0ee6a78a5784f207a
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Feb 22 14:01:49 2018 +0000
kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down
When KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is not enabled, kernel should not load images through
kexec_file systemcall if the kernel is locked down unless IMA can be used
to validate the image.
[Modified by David Howells to fit with modifications to the previous patch
and to return -EPERM if the kernel is locked down for consistency with
other lockdowns]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>
cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
index d5931e392050..c47c4de604cd 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
@@ -167,6 +167,14 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd,
}
ret = 0;
+ if (is_ima_appraise_enabled())
+ break;
+
+ if (kernel_is_locked_down(reason)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
break;
/* All other errors are fatal, including nomem, unparseable
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-22 14:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 130+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-09 17:30 [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 01/30] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 03/30] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 05/30] Restrict /dev/{mem, kmem, port} when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 06/30] kexec: Disable at runtime if " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 07/30] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <151024869793.28329.4817577607302613028.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-11 11:59 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 11:59 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 11:59 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:02 ` [PATCH 08b/30] " Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:02 ` Jiri Bohac
[not found] ` <20180111115915.dejachty3l7fwpmf-Q+Z4OdfSLAKN3ZZ/Hiejyg@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-11 12:01 ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:01 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:01 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 12:43 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-01-11 12:43 ` David Howells
2018-01-11 12:43 ` David Howells
2018-01-11 12:47 ` David Howells
2018-01-11 12:47 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <13005.1515674877-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-11 15:44 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 15:44 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-11 15:44 ` Jiri Bohac
[not found] ` <20180111154445.duootisvanetnr24-Q+Z4OdfSLAKN3ZZ/Hiejyg@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-17 16:16 ` David Howells
2018-01-17 16:16 ` David Howells
2018-01-17 16:16 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <20180111120157.23qceywzi6omvvkb-Q+Z4OdfSLAKN3ZZ/Hiejyg@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-16 16:31 ` [PATCH 08a/30] kexec_file: split KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE David Howells
2018-01-16 16:31 ` David Howells
2018-01-16 16:31 ` David Howells
2018-01-16 19:39 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-16 19:39 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-17 16:34 ` David Howells
2018-01-17 16:34 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <24618.1516206864-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-19 12:54 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-19 12:54 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-01-19 12:54 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-21 16:20 ` David Howells
2018-02-21 16:20 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 14:20 ` [PATCH 08/30] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2018-02-22 14:20 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 14:21 ` David Howells [this message]
2018-02-22 14:21 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 19:14 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 19:14 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 19:08 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 19:08 ` Jiri Bohac
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 10/30] uswsusp: Disable when " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 11/30] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 12/30] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 13/30] x86/msr: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 14/30] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 15/30] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 16/30] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 17/30] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` [PATCH 18/30] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:32 ` David Howells
2019-11-07 8:21 ` Joey Lee
2022-05-28 0:11 ` joeyli
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 19/30] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 20/30] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 21/30] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 22/30] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 23/30] x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 24/30] debugfs: Disallow use of debugfs files when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 25/30] Lock down /proc/kcore David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` [PATCH 26/30] Lock down ftrace David Howells
2017-11-09 17:33 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <151024883613.28329.14808632296386937974.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 9:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 9:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 9:23 ` Jiri Kosina
[not found] ` <alpine.LRH.2.00.1711101021440.24296-n3slAPhISTXBD9DXoRIzZw@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 10:07 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:07 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:07 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <27323.1510308432-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 10:15 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:15 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:15 ` Jiri Kosina
[not found] ` <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1711101114410.32604-YHPUNQjx9ReKbouaWp301Q@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 10:21 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:21 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:21 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 10:23 ` Jiri Kosina
2017-11-10 10:23 ` Jiri Kosina
[not found] ` <nycvar.YFH.7.76.1711101122190.32604-YHPUNQjx9ReKbouaWp301Q@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-10 11:06 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 11:06 ` David Howells
2017-11-10 11:06 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 27/30] Lock down kprobes David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 28/30] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 29/30] efi: Add an EFI_SECURE_BOOT flag to indicate secure boot mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <151024863544.28329.2436580122759221600.stgit-S6HVgzuS8uM4Awkfq6JHfwNdhmdF6hFW@public.gmane.org>
2017-11-09 17:30 ` [PATCH 02/30] Add a SysRq option to lift kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:30 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 04/30] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 13:07 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 13:07 ` David Howells
2018-02-22 18:44 ` Jiri Bohac
2018-02-22 18:44 ` Jiri Bohac
2017-11-09 17:31 ` [PATCH 09/30] hibernate: Disable when " David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:31 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` [PATCH 30/30] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` David Howells
2017-11-09 17:34 ` David Howells
2018-03-03 1:18 ` [PATCH 00/30] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown Andrew Morton
2018-03-03 1:18 ` Andrew Morton
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