SELinux tree updates

SELinux tree updates

[Paul Moore]

Hello All,

While I try to keep rebases to the SELinux tree at a minimum, they are 
occasionally necessary to sync with upstream development; Casey's LSM stacking 
patches merit a rebase.  You may have noticed this starting yesterday, but in 
case you haven't, this serves as notice that I've rebased the SELinux upstream 
and next branches.  I apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused.  
Once Linux 4.1 is released, I will resume my usual process of updating the 
SELinux tree (described below).

* SELinux Tree
  -> git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux
  -> http://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux

* SELinux Tree Process

  1. Create a new branch, stable-X.XX, set to the upstream branch that
  was sent during the merge window.

  2. Reset the next branch to the upstream branch that was sent during
  the merge window.

  3. Accept new features into the next branch and fixes into the
  stable-X.XX branch.

  4. As necessary, merge stable-X.XX into upstream and send pull
  requests upstream.

  5. When vX.XX is released, merge next into upstream and send a pull
  request for the upstream branch.  Leave stable-X.XX untouched for
  future stable fixes.

  6. Goto step #1.

-- 
paul moore
security @ redhat

SELinux tree updates

[Paul Moore]

Hello All,

Just a quick heads-up that I've rebased selinux#next to the current 
selinux#upstream and added the SELinux next-queue on top of that.  Please take 
a look and make sure I haven't forgotten your favorite patch, if I have, let 
me know; bonus points for the most creative use of the word "shenanigans" in 
the reply.

Here is what is currently in selinux#next:

    selinux: Create a common helper to determine an inode label [ver #3]
    selinux: Augment BUG_ON assertion for secclass_map.
    selinux: initialize sock security class to default value
    selinux: reduce locking overhead in inode_free_security()
    selinux: extended permissions for ioctls
    security: add ioctl specific auditing to lsm_audit
    selinux: do not remap unknown SIDs to the unlabeled context

-- 
paul moore
security @ redhat