From: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
To: Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>, Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
Cc: kvm-devel <kvm-devel@lists.sourceforge.net>,
David Windsor <dwindsor@tresys.com>,
Joshua Brindle <jbrindle@tresys.com>,
selinux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [kvm-devel] [RFC][PATCH 00/01]qemu VM entrypoints
Date: Sat, 21 Jul 2007 02:53:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <C2C7258F.36C9%dwindsor@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <46A1A5E9.7000807@qumranet.com>
On 7/21/07 2:21 AM, "Avi Kivity" <avi@qumranet.com> wrote:
> Anthony Liguori wrote:
>> James Morris wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 20 Jul 2007, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> It could be - if your put the policy at the control API layer instead of
>>>> in QEMU itself.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Then you can bypass MAC security by invoking qemu directly.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> You can bypass MAC security by writing your own binary that uses the KVM
>> kernel interfaces.
>>
>>
>
> I guess modifying qemu makes sense if the modification gives you *more*
> permissions.
>
> i.e. you start out just with the ability to access the disk image, and
> then you transition to a new domain that allows you to access some network.
>
>
> Is that what is intended here?
The intent here is to provide some mechanism for a policy-driven transition
to occur when loading a virtual disk. So, an administrator would write
policy for say, a topsecret_vm_t domain, in which the top secret VM can run.
All access requests from this VM would have a source type of topsecret_vm_t
on the host machine. The virtual disk, labeled perhaps as topsecret_disk_t,
would need to be authorized in policy to be an entrypoint into the
topsecret_vm_t domain. This patch proposes a mechanism that allows us to
provide policy driven controls both over which files can be used as a disk
image, and to which domain a qemu process will transition after loading the
disk image.
Originally, I thought qemu was the proper place for this type of an
enforcement hook, but libvirt may be more appropriate because qemu could be
launched with a different security context if loading a virtual disk, rather
than having qemu set up the security context of the VM. Thoughts?
--
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Windsor <dwindsor-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
To: Avi Kivity <avi-atKUWr5tajBWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
Anthony Liguori <anthony-rdkfGonbjUSkNkDKm+mE6A@public.gmane.org>
Cc: kvm-devel
<kvm-devel-5NWGOfrQmneRv+LV9MX5uipxlwaOVQ5f@public.gmane.org>,
David Windsor <dwindsor-5TQdPaFcblfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Joshua Brindle <jbrindle-5TQdPaFcblfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
selinux <selinux-+05T5uksL2qpZYMLLGbcSA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 00/01]qemu VM entrypoints
Date: Sat, 21 Jul 2007 02:53:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <C2C7258F.36C9%dwindsor@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <46A1A5E9.7000807-atKUWr5tajBWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>
On 7/21/07 2:21 AM, "Avi Kivity" <avi-atKUWr5tajBWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> Anthony Liguori wrote:
>> James Morris wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 20 Jul 2007, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> It could be - if your put the policy at the control API layer instead of
>>>> in QEMU itself.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Then you can bypass MAC security by invoking qemu directly.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> You can bypass MAC security by writing your own binary that uses the KVM
>> kernel interfaces.
>>
>>
>
> I guess modifying qemu makes sense if the modification gives you *more*
> permissions.
>
> i.e. you start out just with the ability to access the disk image, and
> then you transition to a new domain that allows you to access some network.
>
>
> Is that what is intended here?
The intent here is to provide some mechanism for a policy-driven transition
to occur when loading a virtual disk. So, an administrator would write
policy for say, a topsecret_vm_t domain, in which the top secret VM can run.
All access requests from this VM would have a source type of topsecret_vm_t
on the host machine. The virtual disk, labeled perhaps as topsecret_disk_t,
would need to be authorized in policy to be an entrypoint into the
topsecret_vm_t domain. This patch proposes a mechanism that allows us to
provide policy driven controls both over which files can be used as a disk
image, and to which domain a qemu process will transition after loading the
disk image.
Originally, I thought qemu was the proper place for this type of an
enforcement hook, but libvirt may be more appropriate because qemu could be
launched with a different security context if loading a virtual disk, rather
than having qemu set up the security context of the VM. Thoughts?
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-07-21 6:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-07-20 19:32 [RFC][PATCH 00/01]qemu VM entrypoints David Windsor
2007-07-20 19:32 ` David Windsor
[not found] ` <C2C68600.366D%dwindsor-5TQdPaFcblfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2007-07-20 20:03 ` Anthony Liguori
2007-07-20 21:55 ` [kvm-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-20 21:55 ` [Qemu-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-20 21:55 ` David Windsor
2007-07-20 22:19 ` [kvm-devel] " Anthony Liguori
2007-07-20 22:19 ` [Qemu-devel] " Anthony Liguori
2007-07-20 20:11 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2007-07-20 20:30 ` [kvm-devel] " James Morris
2007-07-20 20:30 ` James Morris
2007-07-20 20:38 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2007-07-20 20:46 ` Anthony Liguori
2007-07-20 22:42 ` [kvm-devel] " James Morris
2007-07-20 22:42 ` James Morris
2007-07-20 22:53 ` Anthony Liguori
2007-07-20 23:33 ` [kvm-devel] " James Morris
2007-07-20 23:33 ` James Morris
2007-07-21 2:48 ` [kvm-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-21 2:48 ` David Windsor
2007-07-21 2:51 ` [Qemu-devel] " David Windsor
[not found] ` <46A11F1A.2080004-rdkfGonbjUSkNkDKm+mE6A@public.gmane.org>
2007-07-21 6:21 ` Avi Kivity
2007-07-21 6:53 ` David Windsor [this message]
2007-07-21 6:53 ` David Windsor
[not found] ` <C2C7258F.36C9%dwindsor-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2007-07-21 15:54 ` Anthony Liguori
2007-07-21 17:55 ` [kvm-devel] " James Morris
2007-07-21 17:55 ` James Morris
2007-07-21 19:01 ` [kvm-devel] " Joshua Brindle
2007-07-21 19:01 ` Joshua Brindle
[not found] ` <6FE441CD9F0C0C479F2D88F959B01588DE1B1E-Lp/cVzEoVybUo1n7N8X6UhN0Am9MfdqnVpNB7YpNyf8@public.gmane.org>
2007-07-22 19:07 ` Anthony Liguori
2007-07-22 20:22 ` [kvm-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-22 20:22 ` David Windsor
2007-07-22 20:27 ` [Qemu-devel] [kvm-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-22 17:39 ` David Windsor
2007-07-22 17:39 ` David Windsor
2007-07-20 21:57 ` [kvm-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-20 21:57 ` [Qemu-devel] " David Windsor
2007-07-20 21:57 ` David Windsor
[not found] ` <25a1d91b0707201457m6865a505maf93d22c5c28f0cc-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2007-07-20 23:50 ` Daniel P. Berrange
2007-07-20 23:50 ` [Qemu-devel] Re: [kvm-devel] " Daniel P. Berrange
2007-07-21 1:41 ` James Morris
2007-07-21 1:41 ` [Qemu-devel] " James Morris
2007-07-21 1:41 ` James Morris
2007-07-20 20:35 ` [kvm-devel] " James Morris
2007-07-20 20:35 ` James Morris
2007-07-20 21:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " David Windsor
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