* [LTP] [PATCH v1] splice10.c: New splice tests involving memfd secret
@ 2025-07-16 12:05 Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-16 7:13 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-07-21 14:25 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2025-07-16 12:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Linux commit cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
secretmem LSM bypass") prevents any access to secret memory pages from other
kernel subsystems.
Splice operations involving memfd secret are checked within this case.
Discussed-on: https://lists.linux.it/pipermail/ltp/2025-July/044351.html
Reference: cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass")
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index b4a387b28..d6da59bd2 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1585,6 +1585,7 @@ splice06 splice06
splice07 splice07
splice08 splice08
splice09 splice09
+splice10 splice10
tee01 tee01
tee02 tee02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
index 96b1727a1..5e98981fe 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@
/splice07
/splice08
/splice09
+/splice10
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98ee73ef0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Linux commit cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
+ * secretmem LSM bypass") prevents any access to secret memory pages from other
+ * kernel subsystems.
+ * This case check splice operations involving memfd secret should return EACCES.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
+
+static void verify_splice(void)
+{
+ char buf[1024];
+ int fd;
+ int pipefd[2];
+
+ memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (!tst_selinux_enforcing())
+ tst_brk(TCONF, "SELinux not running");
+
+ fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ tst_brk(TCONF | TERRNO,
+ "Skipping __NR_memfd_secret check");
+ }
+
+ SAFE_PIPE(pipefd);
+ SAFE_WRITE(1, pipefd[1], buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(splice(pipefd[0], NULL, fd, NULL, sizeof(buf), 0), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(splice(fd, NULL, pipefd[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), 0), EACCES);
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(pipefd[0]);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(pipefd[1]);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .test_all = verify_splice,
+ .min_kver = "6.16",
+};
--
2.49.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* Re: [LTP] [PATCH v1] splice10.c: New splice tests involving memfd secret
2025-07-16 12:05 [LTP] [PATCH v1] splice10.c: New splice tests involving memfd secret Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2025-07-16 7:13 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-07-21 14:22 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-21 14:25 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Andrea Cervesato via ltp @ 2025-07-16 7:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao, ltp
Hi!
On 7/16/25 2:05 PM, Wei Gao via ltp wrote:
> Linux commit cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
> secretmem LSM bypass") prevents any access to secret memory pages from other
> kernel subsystems.
>
> Splice operations involving memfd secret are checked within this case.
"Test if splice syscall prevents any access to secret memory pages from
other kernel subsystems."
The linux commit is given via "Reference:" anyway.
>
> Discussed-on: https://lists.linux.it/pipermail/ltp/2025-July/044351.html
> Reference: cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass")
> Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> ---
> runtest/syscalls | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
>
> diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
> index b4a387b28..d6da59bd2 100644
> --- a/runtest/syscalls
> +++ b/runtest/syscalls
> @@ -1585,6 +1585,7 @@ splice06 splice06
> splice07 splice07
> splice08 splice08
> splice09 splice09
> +splice10 splice10
>
> tee01 tee01
> tee02 tee02
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
> index 96b1727a1..5e98981fe 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
> @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@
> /splice07
> /splice08
> /splice09
> +/splice10
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..98ee73ef0
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2025 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * Linux commit cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
> + * secretmem LSM bypass") prevents any access to secret memory pages from other
> + * kernel subsystems.
> + * This case check splice operations involving memfd secret should return EACCES.
> + */
> +
> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
> +
> +static void verify_splice(void)
> +{
> + char buf[1024];
> + int fd;
> + int pipefd[2];
Since we are testing only a failure, it makes sense to create input
arguments via tst_test.bufs and initialize them in the setup().
> +
> + memset(buf, 0xff, sizeof(buf));
> +
> + if (!tst_selinux_enforcing())
Maybe it's better to use tst_selinux_enabled() after merging:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/ltp/patch/20250709-xattr_bug_repr-v3-1-379c2c291bb7@suse.com/
> + tst_brk(TCONF, "SELinux not running");
> +
> + fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0);
> + if (fd < 0) {
> + tst_brk(TCONF | TERRNO,
> + "Skipping __NR_memfd_secret check");
> + }
> +
> + SAFE_PIPE(pipefd);
> + SAFE_WRITE(1, pipefd[1], buf, sizeof(buf));
> +
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(splice(pipefd[0], NULL, fd, NULL, sizeof(buf), 0), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(splice(fd, NULL, pipefd[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), 0), EACCES);
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(pipefd[0]);
> + SAFE_CLOSE(pipefd[1]);
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
And this part will go in the cleanup().
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .test_all = verify_splice,
> + .min_kver = "6.16",
We will need to add the reference to commit cbe4134ea4bc in here.
> +};
- Andrea
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH v2] splice10.c: New splice tests involving memfd secret
2025-07-16 12:05 [LTP] [PATCH v1] splice10.c: New splice tests involving memfd secret Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-16 7:13 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
@ 2025-07-21 14:25 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-02-18 12:27 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2025-07-21 14:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Linux commit cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix
secretmem LSM bypass") prevents any access to secret memory pages from other
kernel subsystems.
Splice operations involving memfd secret are checked within this case.
Discussed-on: https://lists.linux.it/pipermail/ltp/2025-July/044351.html
Reference: cbe4134ea4bc ("fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass")
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index b4a387b28..d6da59bd2 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1585,6 +1585,7 @@ splice06 splice06
splice07 splice07
splice08 splice08
splice09 splice09
+splice10 splice10
tee01 tee01
tee02 tee02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
index 96b1727a1..5e98981fe 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/.gitignore
@@ -7,3 +7,4 @@
/splice07
/splice08
/splice09
+/splice10
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..871899b3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/splice/splice10.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Test if splice syscall prevents any access to secret memory pages from
+ * other kernel subsystems.
+ *
+ * Reference kernel commit:
+ * commit cbe4134ea4bc493239786220bd69cb8a13493190
+ * Author: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
+ * Date: Fri Jun 20 07:03:30 2025 +0000
+ *
+ * fs: export anon_inode_make_secure_inode() and fix secretmem LSM bypass
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
+
+static char *buf;
+static int fd = -1;
+static int pipefd[2] = {-1, -1};
+
+static void verify_splice(void)
+{
+ SAFE_WRITE(1, pipefd[1], buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(splice(pipefd[0], NULL, fd, NULL, sizeof(buf), 0), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(splice(fd, NULL, pipefd[1], NULL, sizeof(buf), 0), EACCES);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ if (!tst_selinux_enforcing())
+ tst_brk(TCONF, "SELinux not running");
+
+ fd = syscall(__NR_memfd_secret, 0);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ tst_brk(TCONF | TERRNO,
+ "Skipping __NR_memfd_secret check");
+ }
+
+ SAFE_PIPE(pipefd);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ if (pipefd[i] >= 0)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(pipefd[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (fd >= 0)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .test_all = verify_splice,
+ .min_kver = "6.16",
+ .bufs = (struct tst_buffers []) {
+ {&buf, .size = 1024},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "cbe4134ea4b"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.49.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-02-18 12:28 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2025-07-16 12:05 [LTP] [PATCH v1] splice10.c: New splice tests involving memfd secret Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-16 7:13 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-07-21 14:22 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-21 14:25 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-02-18 12:27 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
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