[PATCH bpf v2 0/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets

[PATCH bpf v2 0/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets

[HyeongJun An]

The libbpf static linker validates relocation type, symbol index and
instruction alignment in linker_sanity_check_elf_relos(), but does not
check that the relocation offset is inside the relocated section.  A
malformed BPF object processed by the static linker (e.g. via
"bpftool gen object") can therefore carry an out-of-range r_offset that
linker_append_elf_relos() then uses to index the section data, reading
and writing past the buffer.

The normal object-loading path already rejects such offsets (libbpf.c,
rel->r_offset >= scn_data->d_size); the static linker path is the
missing sibling.  Patch 1 adds the same bound.  Patch 2 adds a selftest
that builds a tiny object with an out-of-range relocation offset and
checks that the linker now rejects it, with a valid relocation as a
positive control.

Reproduced with ASAN: before patch 1 the out-of-range relocation is
accepted (and triggers a heap-buffer-overflow); after, it is rejected
with -EINVAL.

Changes in v2:
- selftest: set the generated ELF object's EI_DATA from the host byte
  order instead of hardcoding little-endian, so it works on big-endian
  hosts (e.g. s390x).
- selftest: add fallback definitions for EM_BPF and R_BPF_64_64 for
  older system headers.
Patch 1 (the fix) is unchanged.

HyeongJun An (2):
  libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets
  selftests/bpf: Test linker rejects out-of-range relocation offset

 tools/lib/bpf/linker.c                        |   6 +
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c  | 231 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 237 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c

-- 
2.43.0

[PATCH bpf v2 1/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets

[HyeongJun An]

The static linker sanity-checks relocation sections before appending them,
but for executable target sections it only verifies that r_offset is
BPF-instruction aligned.  It does not verify that the offset is inside the
relocated section.

A malformed object can therefore pass an out-of-range offset through
linker_sanity_check_elf_relos().  When the relocation is against an
STT_SECTION symbol, linker_append_elf_relos() uses the unchecked offset to
find the instruction to adjust:

  insn = dst_linked_sec->raw_data + dst_rel->r_offset;

and then reads insn->code and updates insn->imm.

This is reproducible with bpftool's static linker by crafting a BPF object
with a 16-byte executable section and a relocation in its .rel section
whose r_offset is 0x1000:

  BUG: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow in linker_append_elf_relos
  READ of size 1
   linker_append_elf_relos
   bpf_linker_add_file
   bpf_linker__add_file
   do_object

Reject relocation offsets that are outside the relocated section before any
later use.  This mirrors the normal object loading path, which already
rejects executable relocations whose r_offset is not inside the program
section.

Fixes: faf6ed321cf6 ("libbpf: Add BPF static linker APIs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
---
 tools/lib/bpf/linker.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c b/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
index 78f92c39290a..3eb23da167d2 100644
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
@@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ static int linker_sanity_check_elf_relos(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *se
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
+		if (relo->r_offset >= link_sec->shdr->sh_size) {
+			pr_warn("ELF relo #%d in section #%zu has invalid offset %zu in %s\n",
+				i, sec->sec_idx, (size_t)relo->r_offset, obj->filename);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
 		if (link_sec->shdr->sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR) {
 			if (relo->r_offset % sizeof(struct bpf_insn) != 0) {
 				pr_warn("ELF relo #%d in section #%zu points to missing symbol #%zu in %s\n",
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH bpf v2 1/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets

[sashiko-bot]

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing bounds check on st_shndx for STT_SECTION symbols bypassing validation with reserved indices causes an out-of-bounds array access.
- [High] Relocations against SHT_NOBITS sections marked with SHF_EXECINSTR lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
- [High] Integer overflow in symbol index validation leads to an out-of-bounds heap read on 32-bit platforms.
--

commit d6f111169154c451a99d6d0abcb52570ad19f6c1
Author: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>

libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets

The static linker sanity-checks relocation sections before appending them,
but for executable target sections it only verifies that r_offset is
BPF-instruction aligned.  It does not verify that the offset is inside the
relocated section.

> diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c b/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
> index 78f92c39290af..3eb23da167d29 100644
> --- a/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
> +++ b/tools/lib/bpf/linker.c
> @@ -1048,6 +1048,12 @@ static int linker_sanity_check_elf_relos(struct src_obj *obj, struct src_sec *se
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		}
>  

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but can the symbol index validation
overflow on 32-bit platforms?

In linker_sanity_check_elf_relos(), the size check just above this line
multiplies by sizeof(Elf64_Sym):

    if (!sym_idx || sym_idx * sizeof(Elf64_Sym) >= sym_sec->shdr->sh_size) {

If an exceptionally large sym_idx is provided (like 0x15555556), the
multiplication can overflow a 32-bit size_t, bypassing the bounds check.

Later in linker_append_elf_relos(), this unvalidated index is used to access
the obj->sym_map array:

    dst_sym_idx = obj->sym_map[src_sym_idx];

Could this result in an out-of-bounds heap read?

> +		if (relo->r_offset >= link_sec->shdr->sh_size) {
> +			pr_warn("ELF relo #%d in section #%zu has invalid offset %zu in %s\n",
> +				i, sec->sec_idx, (size_t)relo->r_offset, obj->filename);
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +
>  		if (link_sec->shdr->sh_flags & SHF_EXECINSTR) {
>  			if (relo->r_offset % sizeof(struct bpf_insn) != 0) {
>  				pr_warn("ELF relo #%d in section #%zu points to missing symbol #%zu in %s\n",

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but could reserved indices for STT_SECTION
symbols bypass validation and cause an out-of-bounds array access?

In linker_sanity_check_elf_symtab(), the bounds check is skipped if the index
is reserved:

    if (sym->st_shndx < SHN_LORESERVE && sym->st_shndx >= obj->sec_cnt) {

Later in linker_append_elf_relos(), relocations against STT_SECTION symbols
use this unchecked index directly:

    struct src_sec *sec = &obj->secs[src_sym->st_shndx];

If an attacker provides an ELF with a reserved index like SHN_ABS, could this
read past the allocated obj->secs array and leak heap memory when sec->dst_off
is added to the instruction?


[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but could relocations against SHT_NOBITS sections
lead to a NULL pointer dereference?

Currently, linker_sanity_check_elf() does not validate the SHF_EXECINSTR flag
for SHT_NOBITS sections. In extend_sec(), SHT_NOBITS sections skip allocating
dst->raw_data, leaving it as NULL.

When linker_append_elf_relos() processes a relocation for such a section,
it computes an address from raw_data:

    insn = dst_linked_sec->raw_data + dst_rel->r_offset;
    if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))

Since raw_data is NULL, would this result in a direct NULL pointer dereference?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260614092616.165337-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com?part=1

Re: [PATCH bpf v2 1/2] libbpf: Reject out-of-range linker relocation offsets

[Alexei Starovoitov]

On Sun Jun 14, 2026 at 2:26 AM PDT, HyeongJun An wrote:
> The static linker sanity-checks relocation sections before appending them,
> but for executable target sections it only verifies that r_offset is
> BPF-instruction aligned.  It does not verify that the offset is inside the
> relocated section.
>
> A malformed object can therefore pass an out-of-range offset through
> linker_sanity_check_elf_relos().  When the relocation is against an
> STT_SECTION symbol, linker_append_elf_relos() uses the unchecked offset to
> find the instruction to adjust:
>
>   insn = dst_linked_sec->raw_data + dst_rel->r_offset;
>
> and then reads insn->code and updates insn->imm.
>
> This is reproducible with bpftool's static linker by crafting a BPF object
> with a 16-byte executable section and a relocation in its .rel section
> whose r_offset is 0x1000:

libbpf trusts ELF.
There are many way to crash libbpf and libelf, for that matter, with corrupted ELF.

Please don't send such hardening patches.

pw-bot: cr

[PATCH bpf v2 2/2] selftests/bpf: Test linker rejects out-of-range relocation offset

[HyeongJun An]

Add regression coverage for libbpf static linker relocation offset checks.

Build a minimal ET_REL/EM_BPF object in memory with a 16-byte executable
section and one relocation against that section. Check that a valid
relocation offset is accepted and an offset outside the relocated section
is rejected with -EINVAL.

Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An <sammiee5311@gmail.com>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c  | 231 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 231 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a0a61b32fe2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/libbpf_linker.c
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <bpf/libbpf.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <test_progs.h>
+
+#ifndef EM_BPF
+#define EM_BPF 247
+#endif
+
+#ifndef R_BPF_64_64
+#define R_BPF_64_64 1
+#endif
+
+enum {
+	SEC_NULL,
+	SEC_TEXT,
+	SEC_REL_TEXT,
+	SEC_SYMTAB,
+	SEC_STRTAB,
+	SEC_SHSTRTAB,
+	SEC_CNT,
+};
+
+enum {
+	SHSTR_TEXT = 1,
+	SHSTR_REL_TEXT = SHSTR_TEXT + sizeof(".text"),
+	SHSTR_SYMTAB = SHSTR_REL_TEXT + sizeof(".rel.text"),
+	SHSTR_STRTAB = SHSTR_SYMTAB + sizeof(".symtab"),
+	SHSTR_SHSTRTAB = SHSTR_STRTAB + sizeof(".strtab"),
+};
+
+struct test_elf {
+	void *buf;
+	size_t sz;
+};
+
+static size_t elf_round_up(size_t value, size_t align)
+{
+	return (value + align - 1) / align * align;
+}
+
+static unsigned char elf_byteorder(void)
+{
+#if __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+	return ELFDATA2LSB;
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__
+	return ELFDATA2MSB;
+#else
+#error "Unrecognized __BYTE_ORDER__"
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build a minimal ET_REL object in memory. A normal .bpf.c source cannot
+ * produce a relocation whose offset points past the relocated section, so the
+ * test constructs the ELF directly and feeds it to bpf_linker__add_buf().
+ */
+static struct test_elf make_relo_obj(size_t relo_off)
+{
+	static const char shstrtab[] = "\0.text\0.rel.text\0.symtab\0.strtab\0.shstrtab";
+	static const char strtab[] = "\0";
+	struct bpf_insn insns[] = {
+		{
+			.code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K,
+			.dst_reg = BPF_REG_0,
+			.imm = 0,
+		},
+		{
+			.code = BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT,
+		},
+	};
+	size_t off, text_off, rel_off, symtab_off, strtab_off, shstrtab_off, shdr_off;
+	struct test_elf obj = {};
+	Elf64_Shdr *shdr;
+	Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+	Elf64_Sym *sym;
+	Elf64_Rel *rel;
+
+	off = sizeof(*ehdr);
+	text_off = elf_round_up(off, 8);
+	off = text_off + sizeof(insns);
+	rel_off = elf_round_up(off, 8);
+	off = rel_off + sizeof(*rel);
+	symtab_off = elf_round_up(off, 8);
+	off = symtab_off + 2 * sizeof(*sym);
+	strtab_off = off;
+	off = strtab_off + sizeof(strtab);
+	shstrtab_off = off;
+	off = shstrtab_off + sizeof(shstrtab);
+	shdr_off = elf_round_up(off, 8);
+	off = shdr_off + SEC_CNT * sizeof(*shdr);
+
+	obj.buf = calloc(1, off);
+	if (!obj.buf)
+		return obj;
+	obj.sz = off;
+
+	ehdr = obj.buf;
+	memcpy(ehdr->e_ident, ELFMAG, SELFMAG);
+	ehdr->e_ident[EI_CLASS] = ELFCLASS64;
+	ehdr->e_ident[EI_DATA] = elf_byteorder();
+	ehdr->e_ident[EI_VERSION] = EV_CURRENT;
+	ehdr->e_type = ET_REL;
+	ehdr->e_machine = EM_BPF;
+	ehdr->e_version = EV_CURRENT;
+	ehdr->e_ehsize = sizeof(*ehdr);
+	ehdr->e_shoff = shdr_off;
+	ehdr->e_shentsize = sizeof(*shdr);
+	ehdr->e_shnum = SEC_CNT;
+	ehdr->e_shstrndx = SEC_SHSTRTAB;
+
+	memcpy(obj.buf + text_off, insns, sizeof(insns));
+
+	rel = obj.buf + rel_off;
+	rel->r_offset = relo_off;
+	rel->r_info = ELF64_R_INFO(1, R_BPF_64_64);
+
+	sym = obj.buf + symtab_off;
+	sym[1].st_info = ELF64_ST_INFO(STB_LOCAL, STT_SECTION);
+	sym[1].st_shndx = SEC_TEXT;
+
+	memcpy(obj.buf + strtab_off, strtab, sizeof(strtab));
+	memcpy(obj.buf + shstrtab_off, shstrtab, sizeof(shstrtab));
+
+	shdr = obj.buf + shdr_off;
+	shdr[SEC_TEXT] = (Elf64_Shdr) {
+		.sh_name = SHSTR_TEXT,
+		.sh_type = SHT_PROGBITS,
+		.sh_flags = SHF_ALLOC | SHF_EXECINSTR,
+		.sh_offset = text_off,
+		.sh_size = sizeof(insns),
+		.sh_addralign = 8,
+		.sh_entsize = sizeof(struct bpf_insn),
+	};
+	shdr[SEC_REL_TEXT] = (Elf64_Shdr) {
+		.sh_name = SHSTR_REL_TEXT,
+		.sh_type = SHT_REL,
+		.sh_offset = rel_off,
+		.sh_size = sizeof(*rel),
+		.sh_link = SEC_SYMTAB,
+		.sh_info = SEC_TEXT,
+		.sh_addralign = 8,
+		.sh_entsize = sizeof(*rel),
+	};
+	shdr[SEC_SYMTAB] = (Elf64_Shdr) {
+		.sh_name = SHSTR_SYMTAB,
+		.sh_type = SHT_SYMTAB,
+		.sh_offset = symtab_off,
+		.sh_size = 2 * sizeof(*sym),
+		.sh_link = SEC_STRTAB,
+		.sh_info = 2,
+		.sh_addralign = 8,
+		.sh_entsize = sizeof(*sym),
+	};
+	shdr[SEC_STRTAB] = (Elf64_Shdr) {
+		.sh_name = SHSTR_STRTAB,
+		.sh_type = SHT_STRTAB,
+		.sh_offset = strtab_off,
+		.sh_size = sizeof(strtab),
+		.sh_addralign = 1,
+	};
+	shdr[SEC_SHSTRTAB] = (Elf64_Shdr) {
+		.sh_name = SHSTR_SHSTRTAB,
+		.sh_type = SHT_STRTAB,
+		.sh_offset = shstrtab_off,
+		.sh_size = sizeof(shstrtab),
+		.sh_addralign = 1,
+	};
+
+	return obj;
+}
+
+static int link_relo_obj(size_t relo_off)
+{
+	char path[] = "/tmp/libbpf_linker_relo_XXXXXX";
+	struct test_elf obj = {};
+	struct bpf_linker *linker;
+	int err, fd;
+
+	fd = mkstemp(path);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(fd, "mkstemp"))
+		return -errno;
+	close(fd);
+
+	linker = bpf_linker__new(path, NULL);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(linker, "linker_new")) {
+		err = libbpf_get_error(linker);
+		goto out_unlink;
+	}
+
+	obj = make_relo_obj(relo_off);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(obj.buf, "make_relo_obj")) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_linker;
+	}
+
+	err = bpf_linker__add_buf(linker, obj.buf, obj.sz, NULL);
+	if (!err)
+		err = bpf_linker__finalize(linker);
+
+	free(obj.buf);
+out_free_linker:
+	bpf_linker__free(linker);
+out_unlink:
+	unlink(path);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void test_valid_relo_offset(void)
+{
+	ASSERT_OK(link_relo_obj(0), "valid_relo_offset");
+}
+
+static void test_invalid_relo_offset(void)
+{
+	ASSERT_EQ(link_relo_obj(0x1000), -EINVAL, "invalid_relo_offset");
+}
+
+void test_libbpf_linker(void)
+{
+	if (test__start_subtest("valid_relo_offset"))
+		test_valid_relo_offset();
+	if (test__start_subtest("invalid_relo_offset"))
+		test_invalid_relo_offset();
+}
-- 
2.43.0