From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 17:44:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y2vnGFuj5N9/o/Ia@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221023203208.118919-3-Jason@zx2c4.com>
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 10:32:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It
> also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but
> each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized.
> Together, this means that the use of additional xors inside of the
> various stackprotector.h files is superfluous and over-complicated.
> Instead, we can get exactly the same thing, but better, by just calling
> `get_random_canary()`.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
> arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
> arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
For arm64:
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 17:44:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y2vnGFuj5N9/o/Ia@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221023203208.118919-3-Jason@zx2c4.com>
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 10:32:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It
> also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but
> each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized.
> Together, this means that the use of additional xors inside of the
> various stackprotector.h files is superfluous and over-complicated.
> Instead, we can get exactly the same thing, but better, by just calling
> `get_random_canary()`.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
> arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
> arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
For arm64:
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>,
linux-csky@vger.kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
x86@kernel.org, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
linuxppc-dev@l ists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 17:44:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y2vnGFuj5N9/o/Ia@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221023203208.118919-3-Jason@zx2c4.com>
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 10:32:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It
> also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but
> each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized.
> Together, this means that the use of additional xors inside of the
> various stackprotector.h files is superfluous and over-complicated.
> Instead, we can get exactly the same thing, but better, by just calling
> `get_random_canary()`.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
> arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
> arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
For arm64:
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>,
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-csky@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mips@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-sh@vger.kernel.org, linux-xtensa@linux-xtensa.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2022 17:44:56 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y2vnGFuj5N9/o/Ia@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221023203208.118919-3-Jason@zx2c4.com>
On Sun, Oct 23, 2022 at 10:32:08PM +0200, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> The RNG always mixes in the Linux version extremely early in boot. It
> also always includes a cycle counter, not only during early boot, but
> each and every time it is invoked prior to being fully initialized.
> Together, this means that the use of additional xors inside of the
> various stackprotector.h files is superfluous and over-complicated.
> Instead, we can get exactly the same thing, but better, by just calling
> `get_random_canary()`.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
> arch/arm/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
> arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 9 +--------
For arm64:
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-09 17:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-23 20:32 [PATCH v1 0/2] cleanup stackprotector canary generation Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] stackprotector: move CANARY_MASK and get_random_canary() into stackprotector.h Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-24 5:25 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2022-10-24 5:25 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2022-10-24 5:25 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2022-10-24 5:25 ` Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
2022-10-23 20:32 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-23 20:32 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-10-24 0:47 ` Guo Ren
2022-10-24 0:47 ` Guo Ren
2022-10-24 0:47 ` Guo Ren
2022-10-24 0:47 ` Guo Ren
2022-11-09 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2022-11-09 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-11-09 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-11-09 17:44 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-10-24 5:03 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] cleanup stackprotector canary generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-24 5:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-24 5:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-10-24 5:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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