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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: "Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek" <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Szabolcs Nagy" <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Jeremy Linton" <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-abi-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, nd@arm.com,
	shuah@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] mm: Implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 15:35:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3Ox1QxAzdouCGUr@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <45419a7d-04dd-2749-2534-6ba3bbd5d060@gmail.com>

On Sat, Nov 12, 2022 at 08:11:24AM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> On 10.11.2022 14.03, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 11:27:14AM +0000, Joey Gouly wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 11:51:00AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 04:04:56PM +0100, Joey Gouly wrote:
> > > > > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > index 099468aee4d8..42eaf6683216 100644
> > > > > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > @@ -1409,6 +1409,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> > > > >   			vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
> > > > >   	}
> > > > > +	if (map_deny_write_exec(NULL, vm_flags))
> > > > > +		return -EACCES;
> > > > > +
> > > > 
> > > > This seems like the wrong place to do the check -- that the vma argument
> > > > is a hard-coded "NULL" is evidence that something is wrong. Shouldn't
> > > > it live in mmap_region()? What happens with MAP_FIXED, when there is
> > > > an underlying vma? i.e. an MAP_FIXED will, I think, bypass the intended
> > > > check. For example, we had "c" above:
> > > > 
> > > >       c)	mmap(PROT_READ);
> > > > 	mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);		// fails
> > > > 
> > > > But this would allow another case:
> > > > 
> > > >       e)	addr = mmap(..., PROT_READ, ...);
> > > > 	mmap(addr, ..., PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED, ...);	// passes
> > > 
> > > I can move the check into mmap_region() but it won't fix the MAP_FIXED
> > > example that you showed here.
> > > 
> > > mmap_region() calls do_mas_munmap(..) which will unmap overlapping regions.
> > > However the `vma` for the 'old' region is not kept around, and a new vma will
> > > be allocated later on "vma = vm_area_alloc(mm);", and the vm_flags are just set
> > > to what is passed into mmap_region(), so map_deny_write_exec(vma, vm_flags)
> > > will just be as good as passing NULL.
> > > 
> > > It's possible to save the vm_flags from the region that is unmapped, but Catalin
> > > suggested it might be better if that is part of a later extension, what do you
> > > think?
> > 
> > I thought initially we should keep the behaviour close to what systemd
> > achieves via SECCOMP while only relaxing an mprotect(PROT_EXEC) if the
> > vma is already executable (i.e. check actual permission change not just
> > the PROT_* flags).
> > 
> > We could pass the old vm_flags for that region (and maybe drop the vma
> > pointer entirely, just check old and new vm_flags). But this feels like
> > tightening slightly systemd's MDWE approach. If user-space doesn't get
> > confused by this, I'm fine to go with it. Otherwise we can add a new
> > flag later for this behaviour
> > 
> > I guess that's more of a question for Topi on whether point tightening
> > point (e) is feasible/desirable.
> 
> I think we want 1:1 compatibility with seccomp() for the basic version, so
> MAP_FIXED shouldn't change the verdict. Later we can introduce more versions
> (perhaps even less strict, too) when it's requested by configuration, like
> MemoryDenyWriteExecute=[relaxed | strict].

Are you ok with allowing mprotect(PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI) if the mapping is
already PROT_EXEC? Or you'd rather reject that as well?

-- 
Catalin

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
Cc: "Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Lennart Poettering" <lennart@poettering.net>,
	"Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek" <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Szabolcs Nagy" <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
	"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Jeremy Linton" <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-abi-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, nd@arm.com,
	shuah@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 1/2] mm: Implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2022 15:35:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3Ox1QxAzdouCGUr@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <45419a7d-04dd-2749-2534-6ba3bbd5d060@gmail.com>

On Sat, Nov 12, 2022 at 08:11:24AM +0200, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> On 10.11.2022 14.03, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 10, 2022 at 11:27:14AM +0000, Joey Gouly wrote:
> > > On Fri, Oct 28, 2022 at 11:51:00AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > > On Wed, Oct 26, 2022 at 04:04:56PM +0100, Joey Gouly wrote:
> > > > > diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > index 099468aee4d8..42eaf6683216 100644
> > > > > --- a/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> > > > > @@ -1409,6 +1409,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
> > > > >   			vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
> > > > >   	}
> > > > > +	if (map_deny_write_exec(NULL, vm_flags))
> > > > > +		return -EACCES;
> > > > > +
> > > > 
> > > > This seems like the wrong place to do the check -- that the vma argument
> > > > is a hard-coded "NULL" is evidence that something is wrong. Shouldn't
> > > > it live in mmap_region()? What happens with MAP_FIXED, when there is
> > > > an underlying vma? i.e. an MAP_FIXED will, I think, bypass the intended
> > > > check. For example, we had "c" above:
> > > > 
> > > >       c)	mmap(PROT_READ);
> > > > 	mprotect(PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC);		// fails
> > > > 
> > > > But this would allow another case:
> > > > 
> > > >       e)	addr = mmap(..., PROT_READ, ...);
> > > > 	mmap(addr, ..., PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC, MAP_FIXED, ...);	// passes
> > > 
> > > I can move the check into mmap_region() but it won't fix the MAP_FIXED
> > > example that you showed here.
> > > 
> > > mmap_region() calls do_mas_munmap(..) which will unmap overlapping regions.
> > > However the `vma` for the 'old' region is not kept around, and a new vma will
> > > be allocated later on "vma = vm_area_alloc(mm);", and the vm_flags are just set
> > > to what is passed into mmap_region(), so map_deny_write_exec(vma, vm_flags)
> > > will just be as good as passing NULL.
> > > 
> > > It's possible to save the vm_flags from the region that is unmapped, but Catalin
> > > suggested it might be better if that is part of a later extension, what do you
> > > think?
> > 
> > I thought initially we should keep the behaviour close to what systemd
> > achieves via SECCOMP while only relaxing an mprotect(PROT_EXEC) if the
> > vma is already executable (i.e. check actual permission change not just
> > the PROT_* flags).
> > 
> > We could pass the old vm_flags for that region (and maybe drop the vma
> > pointer entirely, just check old and new vm_flags). But this feels like
> > tightening slightly systemd's MDWE approach. If user-space doesn't get
> > confused by this, I'm fine to go with it. Otherwise we can add a new
> > flag later for this behaviour
> > 
> > I guess that's more of a question for Topi on whether point tightening
> > point (e) is feasible/desirable.
> 
> I think we want 1:1 compatibility with seccomp() for the basic version, so
> MAP_FIXED shouldn't change the verdict. Later we can introduce more versions
> (perhaps even less strict, too) when it's requested by configuration, like
> MemoryDenyWriteExecute=[relaxed | strict].

Are you ok with allowing mprotect(PROT_EXEC|PROT_BTI) if the mapping is
already PROT_EXEC? Or you'd rather reject that as well?

-- 
Catalin


  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-15 15:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-26 15:04 [PATCH v1 0/2] mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE) Joey Gouly
2022-10-26 15:04 ` Joey Gouly
2022-10-26 15:04 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] mm: Implement memory-deny-write-execute as a prctl Joey Gouly
2022-10-26 15:04   ` Joey Gouly
2022-10-28 18:51   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-28 18:51     ` Kees Cook
2022-11-10 11:27     ` Joey Gouly
2022-11-10 11:27       ` Joey Gouly
2022-11-10 12:03       ` Catalin Marinas
2022-11-10 12:03         ` Catalin Marinas
2022-11-12  6:11         ` Topi Miettinen
2022-11-12  6:11           ` Topi Miettinen
2022-11-15 15:35           ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2022-11-15 15:35             ` Catalin Marinas
2022-11-15 19:31             ` Topi Miettinen
2022-11-15 19:31               ` Topi Miettinen
2022-10-26 15:04 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] kselftest: vm: add tests for memory-deny-write-execute Joey Gouly
2022-10-26 15:04   ` Joey Gouly
2022-10-28 17:03   ` Mark Brown
2022-10-28 17:03     ` Mark Brown
2022-11-08 17:33     ` Joey Gouly
2022-11-08 17:33       ` Joey Gouly
2022-11-09 13:33       ` Mark Brown
2022-11-09 13:33         ` Mark Brown
2022-10-28 17:45   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-28 17:45     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-28 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-28 20:16     ` Kees Cook
2022-11-07 12:23     ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-11-07 12:23       ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-10-28 20:19   ` Kees Cook
2022-10-28 20:19     ` Kees Cook
2022-11-06 19:42 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] mm: In-kernel support for memory-deny-write-execute (MDWE) Topi Miettinen
2022-11-06 19:42   ` Topi Miettinen

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