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From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
To: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@android.com, Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/12] KVM: arm64: Block unsafe FF-A calls from the host
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:40:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3UgoIlukWSrT1WY@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221116170335.2341003-4-qperret@google.com>

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 05:03:26PM +0000, Quentin Perret wrote:
> From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> 
> When KVM is initialised in protected mode, we must take care to filter
> certain FFA calls from the host kernel so that the integrity of guest
> and hypervisor memory is maintained and is not made available to the
> secure world.
> 
> As a first step, intercept and block all memory-related FF-A SMC calls
> from the host to EL3. This puts the framework in place for handling them
> properly.

Shouldn't FFA_FEATURES interception actually precede this patch? At this
point in the series we're outright lying about the supported features to
the host.

--
Thanks,
Oliver
_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
To: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>,
	Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/12] KVM: arm64: Block unsafe FF-A calls from the host
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:40:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3UgoIlukWSrT1WY@google.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20221116174048.iRRKNAtGlRduBEKrCe11fIJ51nD6v5SWCZCZHg_syKM@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221116170335.2341003-4-qperret@google.com>

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 05:03:26PM +0000, Quentin Perret wrote:
> From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> 
> When KVM is initialised in protected mode, we must take care to filter
> certain FFA calls from the host kernel so that the integrity of guest
> and hypervisor memory is maintained and is not made available to the
> secure world.
> 
> As a first step, intercept and block all memory-related FF-A SMC calls
> from the host to EL3. This puts the framework in place for handling them
> properly.

Shouldn't FFA_FEATURES interception actually precede this patch? At this
point in the series we're outright lying about the supported features to
the host.

--
Thanks,
Oliver

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
To: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>,
	Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@android.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/12] KVM: arm64: Block unsafe FF-A calls from the host
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:40:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y3UgoIlukWSrT1WY@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221116170335.2341003-4-qperret@google.com>

On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 05:03:26PM +0000, Quentin Perret wrote:
> From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> 
> When KVM is initialised in protected mode, we must take care to filter
> certain FFA calls from the host kernel so that the integrity of guest
> and hypervisor memory is maintained and is not made available to the
> secure world.
> 
> As a first step, intercept and block all memory-related FF-A SMC calls
> from the host to EL3. This puts the framework in place for handling them
> properly.

Shouldn't FFA_FEATURES interception actually precede this patch? At this
point in the series we're outright lying about the supported features to
the host.

--
Thanks,
Oliver

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-16 17:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-16 17:03 [PATCH 00/12] KVM: arm64: FF-A proxy for pKVM Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 01/12] firmware: arm_ffa: Move constants to header file Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-12-01 11:43   ` Sudeep Holla
2022-12-01 11:43     ` Sudeep Holla
2022-12-01 11:43     ` Sudeep Holla
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 02/12] firmware: arm_ffa: Move comment before the field it is documenting Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-12-01 11:53   ` Sudeep Holla
2022-12-01 11:53     ` Sudeep Holla
2022-12-01 11:53     ` Sudeep Holla
2022-12-01 15:49     ` Will Deacon
2022-12-01 15:49       ` Will Deacon
2022-12-01 15:49       ` Will Deacon
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 03/12] KVM: arm64: Block unsafe FF-A calls from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:40   ` Oliver Upton [this message]
2022-11-16 17:40     ` Oliver Upton
2022-11-16 17:40     ` Oliver Upton
2023-04-18 12:41     ` Will Deacon
2023-04-18 12:41       ` Will Deacon
2022-11-16 17:48   ` Oliver Upton
2022-11-16 17:48     ` Oliver Upton
2022-11-16 17:48     ` Oliver Upton
2023-04-18 12:48     ` Will Deacon
2023-04-18 12:48       ` Will Deacon
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 04/12] KVM: arm64: Probe FF-A version and host/hyp partition ID during init Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 05/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_FEATURES call from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 06/12] KVM: arm64: Allocate pages for hypervisor FF-A mailboxes Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 07/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_RXTX_MAP and FFA_RXTX_UNMAP calls from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 08/12] KVM: arm64: Add FF-A helpers to share/unshare memory with secure world Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 09/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_MEM_SHARE calls from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 10/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_MEM_RECLAIM " Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 11/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_MEM_LEND " Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 12/12] ANDROID: KVM: arm64: pkvm: Add support for fragmented FF-A descriptors Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:06   ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:06     ` Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:06     ` Quentin Perret
2022-12-02 11:17 ` [PATCH 00/12] KVM: arm64: FF-A proxy for pKVM Will Deacon
2022-12-02 11:17   ` Will Deacon
2022-12-02 11:17   ` Will Deacon

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