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From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
To: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>,
	Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>,
	Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vmap(): don't allow invalid pages
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 13:03:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yeldih0PHotN4/bn@shell.armlinux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <319b09bc-56a2-207f-6180-3cc7d8cd43d1@arm.com>

On Thu, Jan 20, 2022 at 12:22:35PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 2022-01-19 19:12, Russell King (Oracle) wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 06:43:10PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> > > Indeed, my impression is that the only legitimate way to get hold of a page
> > > pointer without assumed provenance is via pfn_to_page(), which is where
> > > pfn_valid() comes in. Thus pfn_valid(page_to_pfn()) really *should* be a
> > > tautology.
> > 
> > That can only be true if pfn == page_to_pfn(pfn_to_page(pfn)) for all
> > values of pfn.
> > 
> > Given how pfn_to_page() is defined in the sparsemem case:
> > 
> > #define __pfn_to_page(pfn)                              \
> > ({	unsigned long __pfn = (pfn);                    \
> > 	struct mem_section *__sec = __pfn_to_section(__pfn);    \
> > 	__section_mem_map_addr(__sec) + __pfn;          \
> > })
> > #define page_to_pfn __page_to_pfn
> > 
> > that isn't the case, especially when looking at page_to_pfn():
> > 
> > #define __page_to_pfn(pg)                                       \
> > ({      const struct page *__pg = (pg);                         \
> >          int __sec = page_to_section(__pg);                      \
> > 	(unsigned long)(__pg - __section_mem_map_addr(__nr_to_section(__sec))); \
> > })
> > 
> > Where:
> > 
> > static inline unsigned long page_to_section(const struct page *page)
> > {
> > 	return (page->flags >> SECTIONS_PGSHIFT) & SECTIONS_MASK;
> > }
> > 
> > So if page_to_section() returns something that is, e.g. zero for an
> > invalid page in a non-zero section, you're not going to end up with
> > the right pfn from page_to_pfn().
> 
> Right, I emphasised "should" in an attempt to imply "in the absence of
> serious bugs that have further-reaching consequences anyway".
> 
> > As I've said now a couple of times, trying to determine of a struct
> > page pointer is valid is the wrong question to be asking.
> 
> And doing so in one single place, on the justification of avoiding an
> incredibly niche symptom, is even more so. Not to mention that an address
> size fault is one of the best possible outcomes anyway, vs. the untold
> damage that may stem from accesses actually going through to random parts of
> the physical memory map.

I don't see it as a "niche" symptom.

If we start off with the struct page being invalid, then the result of
page_to_pfn() can not be relied upon to produce something that is
meaningful - which is exactly why the vmap() issue arises.

With a pfn_valid() check, we at least know that the PFN points at
memory. However, that memory could be _anything_ in the system - it
could be the kernel image, and it could give userspace access to
change kernel code.

So, while it is useful to do a pfn_valid() check in vmap(), as I said
to willy, this must _not_ be the primary check. It should IMHO use
WARN_ON() to make it blatently obvious that it should be something we
expect _not_ to trigger under normal circumstances, but is there to
catch programming errors elsewhere.

-- 
RMK's Patch system: https://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTP is here! 40Mbps down 10Mbps up. Decent connectivity at last!

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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Russell King (Oracle)" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
To: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>,
	Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@huawei.com>,
	Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>,
	Alexey Klimov <aklimov@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vmap(): don't allow invalid pages
Date: Thu, 20 Jan 2022 13:03:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yeldih0PHotN4/bn@shell.armlinux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <319b09bc-56a2-207f-6180-3cc7d8cd43d1@arm.com>

On Thu, Jan 20, 2022 at 12:22:35PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> On 2022-01-19 19:12, Russell King (Oracle) wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 19, 2022 at 06:43:10PM +0000, Robin Murphy wrote:
> > > Indeed, my impression is that the only legitimate way to get hold of a page
> > > pointer without assumed provenance is via pfn_to_page(), which is where
> > > pfn_valid() comes in. Thus pfn_valid(page_to_pfn()) really *should* be a
> > > tautology.
> > 
> > That can only be true if pfn == page_to_pfn(pfn_to_page(pfn)) for all
> > values of pfn.
> > 
> > Given how pfn_to_page() is defined in the sparsemem case:
> > 
> > #define __pfn_to_page(pfn)                              \
> > ({	unsigned long __pfn = (pfn);                    \
> > 	struct mem_section *__sec = __pfn_to_section(__pfn);    \
> > 	__section_mem_map_addr(__sec) + __pfn;          \
> > })
> > #define page_to_pfn __page_to_pfn
> > 
> > that isn't the case, especially when looking at page_to_pfn():
> > 
> > #define __page_to_pfn(pg)                                       \
> > ({      const struct page *__pg = (pg);                         \
> >          int __sec = page_to_section(__pg);                      \
> > 	(unsigned long)(__pg - __section_mem_map_addr(__nr_to_section(__sec))); \
> > })
> > 
> > Where:
> > 
> > static inline unsigned long page_to_section(const struct page *page)
> > {
> > 	return (page->flags >> SECTIONS_PGSHIFT) & SECTIONS_MASK;
> > }
> > 
> > So if page_to_section() returns something that is, e.g. zero for an
> > invalid page in a non-zero section, you're not going to end up with
> > the right pfn from page_to_pfn().
> 
> Right, I emphasised "should" in an attempt to imply "in the absence of
> serious bugs that have further-reaching consequences anyway".
> 
> > As I've said now a couple of times, trying to determine of a struct
> > page pointer is valid is the wrong question to be asking.
> 
> And doing so in one single place, on the justification of avoiding an
> incredibly niche symptom, is even more so. Not to mention that an address
> size fault is one of the best possible outcomes anyway, vs. the untold
> damage that may stem from accesses actually going through to random parts of
> the physical memory map.

I don't see it as a "niche" symptom.

If we start off with the struct page being invalid, then the result of
page_to_pfn() can not be relied upon to produce something that is
meaningful - which is exactly why the vmap() issue arises.

With a pfn_valid() check, we at least know that the PFN points at
memory. However, that memory could be _anything_ in the system - it
could be the kernel image, and it could give userspace access to
change kernel code.

So, while it is useful to do a pfn_valid() check in vmap(), as I said
to willy, this must _not_ be the primary check. It should IMHO use
WARN_ON() to make it blatently obvious that it should be something we
expect _not_ to trigger under normal circumstances, but is there to
catch programming errors elsewhere.

-- 
RMK's Patch system: https://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTP is here! 40Mbps down 10Mbps up. Decent connectivity at last!


  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-20 13:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-18 23:52 [PATCH] vmap(): don't allow invalid pages Yury Norov
2022-01-18 23:52 ` Yury Norov
2022-01-19  0:51 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19  0:51   ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19  6:17   ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-01-19  6:17     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-01-19 17:22     ` Yury Norov
2022-01-19 17:22       ` Yury Norov
2022-01-20  3:37       ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-01-20  3:37         ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-01-20  4:27         ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-20  4:27           ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-21  2:56         ` Yury Norov
2022-01-21  2:56           ` Yury Norov
2022-01-19 11:16 ` Mark Rutland
2022-01-19 11:16   ` Mark Rutland
2022-01-19 17:00   ` Yury Norov
2022-01-19 17:00     ` Yury Norov
2022-01-19 18:06     ` Mark Rutland
2022-01-19 18:06       ` Mark Rutland
2022-01-19 13:28 ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-19 13:28   ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-19 16:27   ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19 16:27     ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19 17:54     ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 17:54       ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 18:01       ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19 18:01         ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19 18:57         ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 18:57           ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 19:35           ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19 19:35             ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-19 22:38             ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 22:38               ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 18:43     ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-19 18:43       ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-19 19:12       ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-19 19:12         ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-20 12:22         ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-20 12:22           ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-20 13:03           ` Russell King (Oracle) [this message]
2022-01-20 13:03             ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-20 16:37             ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-20 16:37               ` Robin Murphy
2022-01-20 16:54               ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-20 16:54                 ` Russell King (Oracle)
2022-01-20 19:04                 ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-20 19:04                   ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-21  5:26               ` Yury Norov
2022-01-21  5:26                 ` Yury Norov
2022-01-26  2:50   ` Matthew Wilcox
2022-01-26  2:50     ` Matthew Wilcox

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