[GIT PULL] x86 fixes

[Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>]

Linus,

Please pull the latest x86/urgent git tree from:

   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-urgent-2022-08-28

   # HEAD: 00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

Misc fixes:

 - Fix PAT on Xen, which caused i915 driver failures
 - Fix compat INT 80 entry crash on Xen PV guests
 - Fix 'MMIO Stale Data' mitigation status reporting on older Intel CPUs
 - Fix RSB stuffing regressions
 - Fix ORC unwinding on ftrace trampolines
 - Add Intel Raptor Lake CPU model number
 - Fix (work around) a SEV-SNP bootloader bug providing bogus values in
   boot_params->cc_blob_address, by ignoring the value on !SEV-SNP bootups.
 - Fix SEV-SNP early boot failure
 - Fix the objtool list of noreturn functions and annotate snp_abort(),
   which bug confused objtool on gcc-12.
 - Fix the documentation for retbleed

 Thanks,

	Ingo

------------------>
Borislav Petkov (1):
      x86/sev: Mark snp_abort() noreturn

Chen Zhongjin (1):
      x86/unwind/orc: Unwind ftrace trampolines with correct ORC entry

Jan Beulich (1):
      x86/PAT: Have pat_enabled() properly reflect state when running on Xen

Juergen Gross (1):
      x86/entry: Fix entry_INT80_compat for Xen PV guests

Michael Roth (1):
      x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address

Pawan Gupta (1):
      x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data

Peter Zijlstra (2):
      x86/nospec: Unwreck the RSB stuffing
      x86/nospec: Fix i386 RSB stuffing

Salvatore Bonaccorso (1):
      Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs

Tom Lendacky (1):
      x86/sev: Don't use cc_platform_has() for early SEV-SNP calls

Tony Luck (1):
      x86/cpu: Add new Raptor Lake CPU model number


 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |  1 +
 .../hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst          | 14 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h                    | 12 ++-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c                     |  8 ++
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S                   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |  5 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h                |  2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h               | 92 ++++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h                         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         | 14 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       | 42 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c                              | 18 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c                       | 15 ++--
 arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c                          | 10 ++-
 tools/objtool/check.c                              | 34 ++++----
 15 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 5bf61881f012..760c889b6cd1 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -523,6 +523,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
index 9393c50b5afc..c98fd11907cc 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
@@ -230,6 +230,20 @@ The possible values in this file are:
      * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
        - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
          enabled.
+     * - 'Unknown: No mitigations'
+       - The processor vulnerability status is unknown because it is
+	 out of Servicing period. Mitigation is not attempted.
+
+Definitions:
+------------
+
+Servicing period: The process of providing functional and security updates to
+Intel processors or platforms, utilizing the Intel Platform Update (IPU)
+process or other similar mechanisms.
+
+End of Servicing Updates (ESU): ESU is the date at which Intel will no
+longer provide Servicing, such as through IPU or other similar update
+processes. ESU dates will typically be aligned to end of quarter.
 
 If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended to
 the above information:
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
index 4910bf230d7b..62208ec04ca4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h
@@ -132,7 +132,17 @@ void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr);
 void snp_set_page_shared(unsigned long paddr);
 void sev_prep_identity_maps(unsigned long top_level_pgt);
 #else
-static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
+static inline void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+	/*
+	 * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+	 * Initialize it to 0 unconditionally (thus here in this stub too) to
+	 * ensure that uninitialized values from buggy bootloaders aren't
+	 * propagated.
+	 */
+	if (bp)
+		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+}
 static inline void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void) { }
 static inline bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index 52f989f6acc2..c93930d5ccbd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -276,6 +276,14 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 	struct msr m;
 	bool snp;
 
+	/*
+	 * bp->cc_blob_address should only be set by boot/compressed kernel.
+	 * Initialize it to 0 to ensure that uninitialized values from
+	 * buggy bootloaders aren't propagated.
+	 */
+	if (bp)
+		bp->cc_blob_address = 0;
+
 	/*
 	 * Setup/preliminary detection of SNP. This will be sanity-checked
 	 * against CPUID/MSR values later.
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 682338e7e2a3..4dd19819053a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(entry_INT80_compat)
 	 * Interrupts are off on entry.
 	 */
 	ASM_CLAC			/* Do this early to minimize exposure */
-	SWAPGS
+	ALTERNATIVE "swapgs", "", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
 
 	/*
 	 * User tracing code (ptrace or signal handlers) might assume that
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 235dc85c91c3..ef4775c6db01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -457,7 +457,8 @@
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index def6ca121111..aeb38023a703 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
  *		_X	- regular server parts
  *		_D	- micro server parts
  *		_N,_P	- other mobile parts
+ *		_S	- other client parts
  *
  *		Historical OPTDIFFs:
  *
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@
 
 #define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE		0xB7
 #define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P		0xBA
+#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S		0xBF
 
 /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e64fd20778b6..c936ce9f0c47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -35,33 +35,56 @@
 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS		32	/* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
 
 /*
+ * Common helper for __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER and __FILL_ONE_RETURN.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_SLOT			\
+	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;		\
+	call	772f;				\
+	int3;					\
+772:
+
+/*
+ * Stuff the entire RSB.
+ *
  * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
  * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
  * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
  */
-#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)	\
-	mov	$(nr/2), reg;			\
-771:						\
-	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;		\
-	call	772f;				\
-773:	/* speculation trap */			\
-	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;			\
-	pause;					\
-	lfence;					\
-	jmp	773b;				\
-772:						\
-	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;		\
-	call	774f;				\
-775:	/* speculation trap */			\
-	UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;			\
-	pause;					\
-	lfence;					\
-	jmp	775b;				\
-774:						\
-	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;	\
-	dec	reg;				\
-	jnz	771b;				\
-	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */	\
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr)			\
+	mov	$(nr/2), reg;				\
+771:							\
+	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT				\
+	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT				\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, %_ASM_SP;	\
+	dec	reg;					\
+	jnz	771b;					\
+	/* barrier for jnz misprediction */		\
+	lfence;
+#else
+/*
+ * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't
+ * do a loop.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr)			\
+	.rept nr;					\
+	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT;				\
+	.endr;						\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Stuff a single RSB slot.
+ *
+ * To mitigate Post-Barrier RSB speculation, one CALL instruction must be
+ * forced to retire before letting a RET instruction execute.
+ *
+ * On PBRSB-vulnerable CPUs, it is not safe for a RET to be executed
+ * before this point.
+ */
+#define __FILL_ONE_RETURN				\
+	__FILL_RETURN_SLOT				\
+	add	$(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP;		\
 	lfence;
 
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -132,28 +155,15 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
-.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
-	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
-	call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@
-	int3
-.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
-	add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
-	lfence
-.endm
-
  /*
   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
   * monstrosity above, manually.
   */
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2
-.ifb \ftr2
-	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
-.else
-	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2
-.endif
-	__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
-.Lunbalanced_\@:
-	ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS)
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
+		__stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \
+		__stringify(__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2
+
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 4a23e52fe0ee..ebc271bb6d8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
 void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
 void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
 bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
-void snp_abort(void);
+void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
 int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned long *fw_err);
 #else
 static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 510d85261132..da7c361f47e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -433,7 +433,8 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	u64 ia32_cap;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
-	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+	     boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
+	     cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
 		return;
 	}
@@ -538,6 +539,8 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
 		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+	else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
 }
 
 static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -2275,6 +2278,9 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 {
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+		return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+
 	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
 		return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
 
@@ -2421,6 +2427,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		return srbds_show_state(buf);
 
 	case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+	case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
 		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
 
 	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
@@ -2480,7 +2487,10 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 {
-	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+		return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+	else
+		return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 }
 
 ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 64a73f415f03..3e508f239098 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1135,7 +1135,8 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
 #define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
 #define NO_SPECTRE_V2		BIT(8)
-#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB		BIT(9)
+#define NO_MMIO			BIT(9)
+#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB		BIT(10)
 
 #define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)	\
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)
@@ -1158,6 +1159,11 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL(VORTEX,	6, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
 
 	/* Intel Family 6 */
+	VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE,			NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE_L,		NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE,			NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE_L,		NO_MMIO),
+
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
@@ -1176,9 +1182,9 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP,		NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -1193,18 +1199,18 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D,		NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
 
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
-	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
 
 	/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
-	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	7, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL(ZHAOXIN,	7, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	7, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
+	VULNWL(ZHAOXIN,	7, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1358,10 +1364,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
 	 * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
 	 * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+	 *
+	 * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
+	 * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO) &&
-	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+	if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+		else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+	}
 
 	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
 		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 63dc626627a0..a428c62330d3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -701,7 +701,13 @@ static void __init early_set_pages_state(unsigned long paddr, unsigned int npage
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					 unsigned int npages)
 {
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+	/*
+	 * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
+	 * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
+	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
+	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
+	 */
+	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	 /*
@@ -717,7 +723,13 @@ void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
 void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
 					unsigned int npages)
 {
-	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
+	/*
+	 * This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
+	 * use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
+	 * This eliminates worries about jump tables or checking boot_cpu_data
+	 * in the cc_platform_has() function.
+	 */
+	if (!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	/* Invalidate the memory pages before they are marked shared in the RMP table. */
@@ -2100,7 +2112,7 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 	return true;
 }
 
-void __init snp_abort(void)
+void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void)
 {
 	sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index 38185aedf7d1..0ea57da92940 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -93,22 +93,27 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsigned long ip);
 static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	struct ftrace_ops *ops;
-	unsigned long caller;
+	unsigned long tramp_addr, offset;
 
 	ops = ftrace_ops_trampoline(ip);
 	if (!ops)
 		return NULL;
 
+	/* Set tramp_addr to the start of the code copied by the trampoline */
 	if (ops->flags & FTRACE_OPS_FL_SAVE_REGS)
-		caller = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_call;
+		tramp_addr = (unsigned long)ftrace_regs_caller;
 	else
-		caller = (unsigned long)ftrace_call;
+		tramp_addr = (unsigned long)ftrace_caller;
+
+	/* Now place tramp_addr to the location within the trampoline ip is at */
+	offset = ip - ops->trampoline;
+	tramp_addr += offset;
 
 	/* Prevent unlikely recursion */
-	if (ip == caller)
+	if (ip == tramp_addr)
 		return NULL;
 
-	return orc_find(caller);
+	return orc_find(tramp_addr);
 }
 #else
 static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find(unsigned long ip)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
index d5ef64ddd35e..66a209f7eb86 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 
 static bool __read_mostly pat_bp_initialized;
 static bool __read_mostly pat_disabled = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAT);
+static bool __initdata pat_force_disabled = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_PAT);
 static bool __read_mostly pat_bp_enabled;
 static bool __read_mostly pat_cm_initialized;
 
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ void pat_disable(const char *msg_reason)
 static int __init nopat(char *str)
 {
 	pat_disable("PAT support disabled via boot option.");
+	pat_force_disabled = true;
 	return 0;
 }
 early_param("nopat", nopat);
@@ -272,7 +274,7 @@ static void pat_ap_init(u64 pat)
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, pat);
 }
 
-void init_cache_modes(void)
+void __init init_cache_modes(void)
 {
 	u64 pat = 0;
 
@@ -313,6 +315,12 @@ void init_cache_modes(void)
 		 */
 		pat = PAT(0, WB) | PAT(1, WT) | PAT(2, UC_MINUS) | PAT(3, UC) |
 		      PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WT) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, UC);
+	} else if (!pat_force_disabled && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		/*
+		 * Clearly PAT is enabled underneath. Allow pat_enabled() to
+		 * reflect this.
+		 */
+		pat_bp_enabled = true;
 	}
 
 	__init_cache_modes(pat);
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
index 0cec74da7ffe..ad51689dfb41 100644
--- a/tools/objtool/check.c
+++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
@@ -162,32 +162,34 @@ static bool __dead_end_function(struct objtool_file *file, struct symbol *func,
 
 	/*
 	 * Unfortunately these have to be hard coded because the noreturn
-	 * attribute isn't provided in ELF data.
+	 * attribute isn't provided in ELF data. Keep 'em sorted.
 	 */
 	static const char * const global_noreturns[] = {
+		"__invalid_creds",
+		"__module_put_and_kthread_exit",
+		"__reiserfs_panic",
 		"__stack_chk_fail",
-		"panic",
+		"__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable",
+		"cpu_bringup_and_idle",
+		"cpu_startup_entry",
 		"do_exit",
+		"do_group_exit",
 		"do_task_dead",
-		"kthread_exit",
-		"make_task_dead",
-		"__module_put_and_kthread_exit",
+		"ex_handler_msr_mce",
+		"fortify_panic",
 		"kthread_complete_and_exit",
-		"__reiserfs_panic",
+		"kthread_exit",
+		"kunit_try_catch_throw",
 		"lbug_with_loc",
-		"fortify_panic",
-		"usercopy_abort",
 		"machine_real_restart",
+		"make_task_dead",
+		"panic",
 		"rewind_stack_and_make_dead",
-		"kunit_try_catch_throw",
-		"xen_start_kernel",
-		"cpu_bringup_and_idle",
-		"do_group_exit",
+		"sev_es_terminate",
+		"snp_abort",
 		"stop_this_cpu",
-		"__invalid_creds",
-		"cpu_startup_entry",
-		"__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable",
-		"ex_handler_msr_mce",
+		"usercopy_abort",
+		"xen_start_kernel",
 	};
 
 	if (!func)