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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode
Date: Sat, 2 Sep 2023 12:46:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZPMSbabIw5ZtTqbo@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230901094053.GDZPGxpcG56GwE0LyG@fat_crate.local>


* Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 25, 2023 at 10:19:32AM -0000, tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:
> > 
> > Commit-ID:     b3be1397be0340b2c30b2dcd7339dbfaa5563e2b
> > Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/b3be1397be0340b2c30b2dcd7339dbfaa5563e2b
> > Author:        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> > AuthorDate:    Fri, 25 Aug 2023 00:01:41 -07:00
> > Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
> > CommitterDate: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 11:21:59 +02:00
> > 
> > x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode
> > 
> > The SRSO default safe-ret mitigation is reported as "mitigated" even if
> > microcode hasn't been updated.  That's wrong because userspace may still
> > be vulnerable to SRSO attacks due to IBPB not flushing branch type
> > predictions.
> > 
> > Report the safe-ret + !microcode case as vulnerable.
> > 
> > Also report the microcode-only case as vulnerable as it leaves the
> > kernel open to attacks.
> > 
> > Fixes: fb3bd914b3ec ("x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation")
> > Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/65556eeb1bf7cb9bd7db8662ef115dd73191db84.1692919072.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
> > ---
> >  Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.rst | 22 ++++++++++----
> >  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                 | 34 ++++++++++++---------
> >  2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
> 
> This is still unfixed:
> 
> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230825072542.GFZOhXdgXpUidW51lC@fat_crate.local
> 
> mingo, do you want fixes ontop or do you wanna rebase this branch?

Since these are fixes that are supposed to be fully correct,
I'd suggest we rebase it.

Josh, mind sending a v3 SRSO series, as a replacement for x86/bugs,
with Boris's review & testing feedback addressed?

[ Feel free to send it as a delta series against v2 in x86/bugs and I'll 
  backmerge it all. ]

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-02 10:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-25  7:01 [PATCH v2 00/23] SRSO fixes/cleanups Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 01/23] x86/srso: Fix srso_show_state() side effect Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 02/23] x86/srso: Set CPUID feature bits independently of bug or mitigation status Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 03/23] x86/srso: Don't probe microcode in a guest Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:52   ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 04/23] KVM: x86: Add IBPB_BRTYPE support Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 18:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-26 15:49     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 05/23] KVM: x86: Add SBPB support Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 18:20   ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 06/23] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for spec_rstack_overflow=off Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 07/23] x86/srso: Fix SBPB enablement for (possible) future fixed HW Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 08/23] x86/srso: Print actual mitigation if requested mitigation isn't possible Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 09/23] x86/srso: Print mitigation for retbleed IBPB case Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 10/23] x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-09-01  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-02 10:46       ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2023-09-02 17:04         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-03 14:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-09-05  4:57         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 11/23] x86/srso: Fix unret validation dependencies Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 12/23] x86/alternatives: Remove faulty optimization Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  9:20   ` Ingo Molnar
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:27   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 13/23] x86/srso: Improve i-cache locality for alias mitigation Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 14/23] x86/srso: Unexport untraining functions Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 15/23] x86/srso: Remove 'pred_cmd' label Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 19:51   ` [PATCH 15/23] " Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-26 15:45     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 16/23] x86/bugs: Remove default case for fully switched enums Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-09-02  9:02   ` [PATCH 16/23] " Borislav Petkov
2023-09-05  5:08     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 17/23] x86/srso: Move retbleed IBPB check into existing 'has_microcode' code block Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 18/23] x86/srso: Remove redundant X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB check Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-09-02  9:10   ` [PATCH 18/23] " Borislav Petkov
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 19/23] x86/srso: Disentangle rethunk-dependent options Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 20/23] x86/rethunk: Use SYM_CODE_START[_LOCAL]_NOALIGN macros Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 21/23] x86/retpoline: Remove .text..__x86.return_thunk section Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 22/23] x86/nospec: Refactor UNTRAIN_RET[_*] Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 18:22   ` [PATCH 22/23] " Nikolay Borisov
2023-08-26 15:42     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25  7:01 ` [PATCH 23/23] x86/calldepth: Rename __x86_return_skl() to call_depth_return_thunk() Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:19   ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-25 10:38 ` [PATCH v2 00/23] SRSO fixes/cleanups Ingo Molnar
2023-08-26 15:57   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-08-26 17:00     ` Ingo Molnar
2023-10-05  1:29 ` Sean Christopherson
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-09-05  5:04 [PATCH v3 08/20] x86/srso: Fix vulnerability reporting for missing microcode Josh Poimboeuf
2023-09-05 10:09 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-09-19  9:53 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-09-23 12:20 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-20 11:37 ` tip-bot2 for Josh Poimboeuf

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