* [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (5 more replies)
0 siblings, 6 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
This series includes changes to make MSI-X working with Linux stubdomain and
especially Intel Wifi 6 AX210 card. This takes care of remaining reasons for
QEMU to access /dev/mem, but also the Intel Wifi card violating spec by putting
some registers on the same page as the MSI-X table.
See individual patches for details.
This series include also tests for MSI-X using new approach (by preventing QEMU
access to /dev/mem). But for it to work, it needs QEMU change that
makes use of the changes introduced here. It can be seen at
https://github.com/marmarek/qemu/commits/msix
Here is the pipeline that used the QEMU fork above:
https://gitlab.com/xen-project/people/marmarek/xen/-/pipelines/1083468508
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (6):
x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model
x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table
automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests
automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system
[DO NOT APPLY] switch to qemu fork
[DO NOT APPLY] switch to alternative artifact repo
Config.mk | 4 +-
automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml | 4 +-
automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml | 4 +-
automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh | 9 +-
automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile | 7 +-
automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 206 ++++++++++++-
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h | 5 +-
xen/arch/x86/msi.c | 40 +++-
xen/common/kernel.c | 1 +-
xen/include/public/features.h | 8 +-
11 files changed, 272 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
base-commit: f96e2f64576cdbb147391c7cb399d393385719a9
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-27 16:18 ` Jan Beulich
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper,
Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu, George Dunlap, Julien Grall,
Stefano Stabellini
QEMU needs to know whether clearing maskbit of a vector is really
clearing, or was already cleared before. Currently Xen sends only
clearing that bit to the device model, but not setting it, so QEMU
cannot detect it. Because of that, QEMU is working this around by
checking via /dev/mem, but that isn't the proper approach.
Give all necessary information to QEMU by passing all ctrl writes,
including masking a vector. Advertise the new behavior via
XENVER_get_features, so QEMU can know it doesn't need to access /dev/mem
anymore.
While this commit doesn't move the whole maskbit handling to QEMU (as
discussed on xen-devel as one of the possibilities), it is a necessary
first step anyway. Including telling QEMU it will get all the required
information to do so. The actual implementation would need to include:
- a hypercall for QEMU to control just maskbit (without (re)binding the
interrupt again
- a methor for QEMU to tell Xen it will actually do the work
Those are not part of this series.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
---
I did not added any control to enable/disable this new behavior (as
Roger have suggested for possible non-QEMU ioreqs). I don't see how the
new behavior could be problematic for some existing ioreq server (they
already received writes to those addresses, just not all of them),
but if that's really necessary, I can probably add a command line option
to restore previous behavior system-wide.
Changes in v4:
- ignore unaligned writes with X86EMUL_OKAY
- restructure the code to forward all writes in _msixtbl_write() instead
of manipulating return value of msixtbl_write() - this makes
WRITE_LEN4_COMPLETION special case unnecessary
- advertise the changed behavior via XENVER_get_features instead of DMOP
v3:
- advertise changed behavior in XEN_DMOP_get_ioreq_server_info - make
"flags" parameter IN/OUT
- move len check back to msixtbl_write() - will be needed there anyway
in a later patch
v2:
- passthrough quad writes to emulator too (Jan)
- (ab)use len==0 for write len=4 completion (Jan), but add descriptive
#define for this magic value
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
xen/common/kernel.c | 1 +
xen/include/public/features.h | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
index 128f23636279..2436154c40b6 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
@@ -283,8 +283,8 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address,
unsigned long flags;
struct irq_desc *desc;
- if ( (len != 4 && len != 8) || (address & (len - 1)) )
- return r;
+ if ( !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
rcu_read_lock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
@@ -345,8 +345,7 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address,
unlock:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
- if ( len == 4 )
- r = X86EMUL_OKAY;
+ r = X86EMUL_OKAY;
out:
rcu_read_unlock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
@@ -357,7 +356,17 @@ static int cf_check _msixtbl_write(
const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t address, uint32_t len,
uint64_t val)
{
- return msixtbl_write(current, address, len, val);
+ /* ignore invalid length or unaligned writes */
+ if ( len != 4 && len != 8 || !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+
+ /*
+ * This function returns X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE even if write is properly
+ * handled, to propagate it to the device model (so it can keep its
+ * internal state in sync).
+ */
+ msixtbl_write(current, address, len, val);
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
}
static bool cf_check msixtbl_range(
diff --git a/xen/common/kernel.c b/xen/common/kernel.c
index 08dbaa2a054c..229784c6ce52 100644
--- a/xen/common/kernel.c
+++ b/xen/common/kernel.c
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ long do_xen_version(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_direct_mapped);
else
fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_not_direct_mapped);
+ fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_dm_msix_all_writes);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/xen/include/public/features.h b/xen/include/public/features.h
index 36936f6a4ee0..634534827d43 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/features.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/features.h
@@ -120,6 +120,14 @@
#define XENFEAT_runstate_phys_area 18
#define XENFEAT_vcpu_time_phys_area 19
+/*
+ * If set, Xen will passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model,
+ * not only those unmasking an entry. This allows device model to properly keep
+ * track of the MSI-X table without having to read it from the device behind
+ * Xen's backs. This information is relevant only for device models.
+ */
+#define XENFEAT_dm_msix_all_writes 20
+
#define XENFEAT_NR_SUBMAPS 1
#endif /* __XEN_PUBLIC_FEATURES_H__ */
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-27 17:00 ` Jan Beulich
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper,
Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu
Some devices (notably Intel Wifi 6 AX210 card) keep auxiliary registers
on the same page as MSI-X table. Device model (especially one in
stubdomain) cannot really handle those, as direct writes to that page is
refused (page is on the mmio_ro_ranges list). Instead, extend
msixtbl_mmio_ops to handle such accesses too.
Doing this, requires correlating read/write location with guest
of MSI-X table address. Since QEMU doesn't map MSI-X table to the guest,
it requires msixtbl_entry->gtable, which is HVM-only. Similar feature
for PV would need to be done separately.
This will be also used to read Pending Bit Array, if it lives on the same
page, making QEMU not needing /dev/mem access at all (especially helpful
with lockdown enabled in dom0). If PBA lives on another page, QEMU will
map it to the guest directly.
If PBA lives on the same page, discard writes and log a message.
Technically, writes outside of PBA could be allowed, but at this moment
the precise location of PBA isn't saved, and also no known device abuses
the spec in this way (at least yet).
To access those registers, msixtbl_mmio_ops need the relevant page
mapped. MSI handling already has infrastructure for that, using fixmap,
so try to map first/last page of the MSI-X table (if necessary) and save
their fixmap indexes. Note that msix_get_fixmap() does reference
counting and reuses existing mapping, so just call it directly, even if
the page was mapped before. Also, it uses a specific range of fixmap
indexes which doesn't include 0, so use 0 as default ("not mapped")
value - which simplifies code a bit.
GCC gets confused about 'desc' variable:
arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c: In function ‘msixtbl_range’:
arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c:553:8: error: ‘desc’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
553 | if ( desc )
| ^
arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c:537:28: note: ‘desc’ was declared here
537 | const struct msi_desc *desc;
| ^~~~
It's conditional initialization is actually correct (in the case where
it isn't initialized, function returns early), but to avoid
build failure initialize it explicitly to NULL anyway.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
---
Changes in v4:
- drop same_page parameter of msixtbl_find_entry(), distinguish two
cases in relevant callers
- rename adj_access_table_idx to adj_access_idx
- code style fixes
- drop alignment check in adjacent_{read,write}() - all callers already
have it earlier
- delay mapping first/last MSI-X pages until preparing device for a
passthrough
v3:
- merge handling into msixtbl_mmio_ops
- extend commit message
v2:
- adjust commit message
- pass struct domain to msixtbl_page_handler_get_hwaddr()
- reduce local variables used only once
- log a warning if write is forbidden if MSI-X and PBA lives on the same
page
- do not passthrough unaligned accesses
- handle accesses both before and after MSI-X table
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c | 191 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h | 5 +-
xen/arch/x86/msi.c | 40 +++++++-
3 files changed, 225 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
index 2436154c40b6..d1e8cb1e30f6 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c
@@ -180,6 +180,10 @@ static bool msixtbl_initialised(const struct domain *d)
return d->arch.hvm.msixtbl_list.next;
}
+/*
+ * Lookup an msixtbl_entry on the same page as given addr. It's up to the
+ * caller to check if address is strictly part of the table - if relevant.
+ */
static struct msixtbl_entry *msixtbl_find_entry(
struct vcpu *v, unsigned long addr)
{
@@ -187,8 +191,8 @@ static struct msixtbl_entry *msixtbl_find_entry(
struct domain *d = v->domain;
list_for_each_entry( entry, &d->arch.hvm.msixtbl_list, list )
- if ( addr >= entry->gtable &&
- addr < entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
+ if ( PFN_DOWN(addr) >= PFN_DOWN(entry->gtable) &&
+ PFN_DOWN(addr) <= PFN_DOWN(entry->gtable + entry->table_len - 1) )
return entry;
return NULL;
@@ -213,6 +217,131 @@ static struct msi_desc *msixtbl_addr_to_desc(
return NULL;
}
+/*
+ * Returns:
+ * - UINT_MAX if no handling should be done
+ * - UINT_MAX-1 if write should be discarded
+ * - a fixmap idx to use for handling
+ */
+#define ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE UINT_MAX
+#define ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE (UINT_MAX - 1)
+static unsigned int adjacent_handle(
+ const struct msixtbl_entry *entry, unsigned long addr, bool write)
+{
+ unsigned int adj_type;
+ const struct arch_msix *msix;
+
+ if ( !entry || !entry->pdev )
+ return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
+
+ if ( PFN_DOWN(addr) == PFN_DOWN(entry->gtable) && addr < entry->gtable )
+ adj_type = ADJ_IDX_FIRST;
+ else if ( PFN_DOWN(addr) == PFN_DOWN(entry->gtable + entry->table_len - 1) &&
+ addr >= entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
+ adj_type = ADJ_IDX_LAST;
+ else
+ return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
+
+ msix = entry->pdev->msix;
+ ASSERT(msix);
+
+ if ( !msix->adj_access_idx[adj_type] )
+ {
+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+ "Page for adjacent(%d) MSI-X table access not initialized for %pp (addr %#lx, gtable %#lx\n",
+ adj_type, &entry->pdev->sbdf, addr, entry->gtable);
+
+ return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
+ }
+
+ /* If PBA lives on the same page too, discard writes. */
+ if ( write &&
+ ((adj_type == ADJ_IDX_LAST &&
+ msix->table.last == msix->pba.first) ||
+ (adj_type == ADJ_IDX_FIRST &&
+ msix->table.first == msix->pba.last)) )
+ {
+ gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
+ "MSI-X table and PBA of %pp live on the same page, "
+ "writing to other registers there is not implemented\n",
+ &entry->pdev->sbdf);
+ return ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ return msix->adj_access_idx[adj_type];
+}
+
+static int adjacent_read(
+ unsigned int fixmap_idx,
+ paddr_t address, unsigned int len, uint64_t *pval)
+{
+ const void __iomem *hwaddr;
+
+ *pval = ~0UL;
+
+ ASSERT(fixmap_idx != ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE);
+
+ hwaddr = fix_to_virt(fixmap_idx) + PAGE_OFFSET(address);
+
+ switch ( len )
+ {
+ case 1:
+ *pval = readb(hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ *pval = readw(hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ *pval = readl(hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ case 8:
+ *pval = readq(hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ }
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+}
+
+static int adjacent_write(
+ unsigned int fixmap_idx,
+ uint64_t address, uint32_t len, uint64_t val)
+{
+ void __iomem *hwaddr;
+
+ if ( fixmap_idx == ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE )
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+
+ hwaddr = fix_to_virt(fixmap_idx) + PAGE_OFFSET(address);
+
+ switch ( len )
+ {
+ case 1:
+ writeb(val, hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ writew(val, hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ writel(val, hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ case 8:
+ writeq(val, hwaddr);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+ }
+ return X86EMUL_OKAY;
+}
+
static int cf_check msixtbl_read(
const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t address, uint32_t len,
uint64_t *pval)
@@ -220,16 +349,31 @@ static int cf_check msixtbl_read(
unsigned long offset;
struct msixtbl_entry *entry;
unsigned int nr_entry, index;
+ unsigned int adjacent_fixmap;
int r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
- if ( (len != 4 && len != 8) || (address & (len - 1)) )
+ if ( !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
return r;
rcu_read_lock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
-
entry = msixtbl_find_entry(current, address);
if ( !entry )
goto out;
+
+ adjacent_fixmap = adjacent_handle(entry, address, false);
+ if ( adjacent_fixmap != ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE )
+ {
+ r = adjacent_read(adjacent_fixmap, address, len, pval);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ( address < entry->gtable ||
+ address >= entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
+ goto out;
+
+ if ( len != 4 && len != 8 )
+ goto out;
+
offset = address & (PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE - 1);
if ( offset != PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL_OFFSET )
@@ -282,6 +426,7 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address,
int r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
unsigned long flags;
struct irq_desc *desc;
+ unsigned int adjacent_fixmap;
if ( !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
@@ -291,6 +436,19 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address,
entry = msixtbl_find_entry(v, address);
if ( !entry )
goto out;
+
+ adjacent_fixmap = adjacent_handle(entry, address, true);
+ if ( adjacent_fixmap != ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE )
+ {
+ r = adjacent_write(adjacent_fixmap, address, len, val);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ( address < entry->gtable ||
+ address >= entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
+ goto out;
+ if ( len != 4 && len != 8 )
+ goto out;
+
nr_entry = array_index_nospec(((address - entry->gtable) /
PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE),
MAX_MSIX_TABLE_ENTRIES);
@@ -356,8 +514,8 @@ static int cf_check _msixtbl_write(
const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t address, uint32_t len,
uint64_t val)
{
- /* ignore invalid length or unaligned writes */
- if ( len != 4 && len != 8 || !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
+ /* ignore unaligned writes */
+ if ( !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
return X86EMUL_OKAY;
/*
@@ -374,14 +532,22 @@ static bool cf_check msixtbl_range(
{
struct vcpu *curr = current;
unsigned long addr = r->addr;
- const struct msi_desc *desc;
+ const struct msixtbl_entry *entry;
+ const struct msi_desc *desc = NULL;
+ unsigned int adjacent_fixmap;
ASSERT(r->type == IOREQ_TYPE_COPY);
rcu_read_lock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
- desc = msixtbl_addr_to_desc(msixtbl_find_entry(curr, addr), addr);
+ entry = msixtbl_find_entry(curr, addr);
+ adjacent_fixmap = adjacent_handle(entry, addr, false);
+ if ( adjacent_fixmap == ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE )
+ desc = msixtbl_addr_to_desc(entry, addr);
rcu_read_unlock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
+ if ( adjacent_fixmap != ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE )
+ return 1;
+
if ( desc )
return 1;
@@ -622,12 +788,15 @@ void msix_write_completion(struct vcpu *v)
v->arch.hvm.hvm_io.msix_snoop_gpa )
{
unsigned int token = hvmemul_cache_disable(v);
- const struct msi_desc *desc;
+ const struct msi_desc *desc = NULL;
+ const struct msixtbl_entry *entry;
uint32_t data;
rcu_read_lock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
- desc = msixtbl_addr_to_desc(msixtbl_find_entry(v, snoop_addr),
- snoop_addr);
+ entry = msixtbl_find_entry(v, snoop_addr);
+ if ( entry && snoop_addr >= entry->gtable &&
+ snoop_addr < entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
+ desc = msixtbl_addr_to_desc(entry, snoop_addr);
rcu_read_unlock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
if ( desc &&
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h
index c1ece2786e01..6d12f9dac0db 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h
@@ -207,6 +207,10 @@ struct msg_address {
PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE + \
(~PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
+/* indexes in adj_access_idx[] below */
+#define ADJ_IDX_FIRST 0
+#define ADJ_IDX_LAST 1
+
struct arch_msix {
unsigned int nr_entries, used_entries;
struct {
@@ -214,6 +218,7 @@ struct arch_msix {
} table, pba;
int table_refcnt[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
int table_idx[MAX_MSIX_TABLE_PAGES];
+ unsigned int adj_access_idx[2];
spinlock_t table_lock;
bool host_maskall, guest_maskall;
domid_t warned;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
index 7f8e79425452..86fbe7f2e143 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -916,6 +916,36 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &dev->msi_list);
*desc = entry;
}
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * If the MSI-X table doesn't start at the page boundary, map the first page for
+ * passthrough accesses.
+ */
+ if ( PAGE_OFFSET(table_paddr) )
+ {
+ int idx = msix_get_fixmap(msix, table_paddr, table_paddr);
+
+ if ( idx > 0 )
+ msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST] = idx;
+ else
+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Failed to map first MSI-X table page: %d\n", idx);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the MSI-X table doesn't end on the page boundary, map the last page
+ * for passthrough accesses.
+ */
+ if ( PAGE_OFFSET(table_paddr + msix->nr_entries * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE) )
+ {
+ uint64_t entry_paddr = table_paddr + msix->nr_entries * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
+ int idx = msix_get_fixmap(msix, table_paddr, entry_paddr);
+
+ if ( idx > 0 )
+ msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST] = idx;
+ else
+ gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Failed to map last MSI-X table page: %d\n", idx);
+ }
+ }
if ( !msix->used_entries )
{
@@ -1078,6 +1108,16 @@ static void _pci_cleanup_msix(struct arch_msix *msix)
WARN();
msix->table.first = 0;
msix->table.last = 0;
+ if ( msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST] )
+ {
+ msix_put_fixmap(msix, msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST]);
+ msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST] = 0;
+ }
+ if ( msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST] )
+ {
+ msix_put_fixmap(msix, msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST]);
+ msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST] = 0;
+ }
if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, msix->pba.first,
msix->pba.last) )
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 3/6] automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-30 3:28 ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Doug Goldstein,
Stefano Stabellini
/dev/mem access doesn't work in dom0 in lockdown and in stubdomain.
Simulate this environment with removing /dev/mem device node. Full test
for lockdown and stubdomain will come later, when all requirements will
be in place.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
---
This can be applied only after QEMU change is committed. Otherwise the
test will fail.
---
automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
index d81ed7b931cf..7eabc1bd6ad4 100755
--- a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
+++ b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
@@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ ifconfig eth0 up
ifconfig xenbr0 up
ifconfig xenbr0 192.168.0.1
+# ensure QEMU wont have access /dev/mem
+rm -f /dev/mem
# get domU console content into test log
tail -F /var/log/xen/console/guest-domU.log 2>/dev/null | sed -e \"s/^/(domU) /\" &
xl create /etc/xen/domU.cfg
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 4/6] automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-30 3:30 ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to qemu fork Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to alternative artifact repo Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
5 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Doug Goldstein,
Stefano Stabellini
Switch to a wifi card that has registers on a MSI-X page. This tests the
"x86/hvm: Allow writes to registers on the same page as MSI-X table"
feature. Switch it only for HVM test, because MSI-X adjacent write is
not supported on PV.
This requires also including drivers and firmware in system for tests.
Remove firmware unrelated to the test, to not increase initrd size too
much (all firmware takes over 100MB compressed).
And finally adjusts test script to handle not only eth0 as a test device,
but also wlan0 and connect it to the wifi network.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
---
This needs two new gitlab variables: WIFI_HW2_SSID and WIFI_HW2_PSK. I'll
provide them in private.
This change requires rebuilding test containers.
This can be applied only after QEMU change is committed. Otherwise the
test will fail.
---
automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml | 4 ++++
automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh | 7 +++++++
automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile | 7 +++++++
automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile | 2 ++
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml
index 6aabdb9d156f..931a8fb28e1d 100644
--- a/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml
+++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml
@@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ adl-pci-pv-x86-64-gcc-debug:
adl-pci-hvm-x86-64-gcc-debug:
extends: .adl-x86-64
+ variables:
+ PCIDEV: "00:14.3"
+ WIFI_SSID: "$WIFI_HW2_SSID"
+ WIFI_PSK: "$WIFI_HW2_PSK"
script:
- ./automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh pci-hvm 2>&1 | tee ${LOGFILE}
needs:
diff --git a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
index 7eabc1bd6ad4..60498ef1e89a 100755
--- a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
+++ b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
@@ -94,6 +94,13 @@ on_reboot = "destroy"
domU_check="
set -x -e
interface=eth0
+if [ -e /sys/class/net/wlan0 ]; then
+ interface=wlan0
+ set +x
+ wpa_passphrase "$WIFI_SSID" "$WIFI_PSK" > /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf
+ set -x
+ wpa_supplicant -B -iwlan0 -c /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf
+fi
ip link set \"\$interface\" up
timeout 30s udhcpc -i \"\$interface\"
pingip=\$(ip -o -4 r show default|cut -f 3 -d ' ')
diff --git a/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile b/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile
index f1b4a8b7a191..b821a291fed3 100644
--- a/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile
+++ b/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile
@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ RUN \
apk add curl && \
apk add udev && \
apk add pciutils && \
+ apk add wpa_supplicant && \
+ # Select firmware for hardware tests
+ apk add linux-firmware-other && \
+ mkdir /lib/firmware-preserve && \
+ mv /lib/firmware/iwlwifi-so-a0-gf-a0* /lib/firmware-preserve/ && \
+ rm -rf /lib/firmware && \
+ mv /lib/firmware-preserve /lib/firmware && \
\
# Xen
cd / && \
diff --git a/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile b/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile
index 3a4096780d20..84ed5dff23ae 100644
--- a/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile
+++ b/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ RUN curl -fsSLO https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/linux-"$LINUX_VERSI
make xen.config && \
scripts/config --enable BRIDGE && \
scripts/config --enable IGC && \
+ scripts/config --enable IWLWIFI && \
+ scripts/config --enable IWLMVM && \
cp .config .config.orig && \
cat .config.orig | grep XEN | grep =m |sed 's/=m/=y/g' >> .config && \
make -j$(nproc) bzImage && \
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 5/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to qemu fork
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to alternative artifact repo Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
5 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Andrew Cooper, George Dunlap,
Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu
This makes tests to use patched QEMU, to actually test the new behavior.
---
Config.mk | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Config.mk b/Config.mk
index 2c43702958eb..dd2687c0e9e7 100644
--- a/Config.mk
+++ b/Config.mk
@@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ endif
OVMF_UPSTREAM_URL ?= https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/ovmf.git
OVMF_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= ba91d0292e593df8528b66f99c1b0b14fadc8e16
-QEMU_UPSTREAM_URL ?= https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/qemu-xen.git
-QEMU_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= master
+QEMU_UPSTREAM_URL ?= https://github.com/marmarek/qemu
+QEMU_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= origin/msix
MINIOS_UPSTREAM_URL ?= https://xenbits.xen.org/git-http/mini-os.git
MINIOS_UPSTREAM_REVISION ?= b08019f0b2fbc30c75169a160acb9fd9af5d68f4
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4 6/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to alternative artifact repo
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to qemu fork Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-24 1:47 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
5 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-11-24 1:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Doug Goldstein,
Stefano Stabellini
For testing, switch to my containers registry that includes containers
rebuilt with changes in this series.
---
automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
index 32af30ccedc9..52abb12bce48 100644
--- a/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
+++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/build.yaml
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ qemu-system-ppc64-8.1.0-ppc64-export:
alpine-3.18-rootfs-export:
extends: .test-jobs-artifact-common
- image: registry.gitlab.com/xen-project/xen/tests-artifacts/alpine:3.18
+ image: registry.gitlab.com/xen-project/people/marmarek/xen/tests-artifacts/alpine:3.18
script:
- mkdir binaries && cp /initrd.tar.gz binaries/initrd.tar.gz
artifacts:
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ alpine-3.18-rootfs-export:
kernel-6.1.19-export:
extends: .test-jobs-artifact-common
- image: registry.gitlab.com/xen-project/xen/tests-artifacts/kernel:6.1.19
+ image: registry.gitlab.com/xen-project/people/marmarek/xen/tests-artifacts/kernel:6.1.19
script:
- mkdir binaries && cp /bzImage binaries/bzImage
artifacts:
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-27 16:18 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2023-11-27 16:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu, George Dunlap,
Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel
On 24.11.2023 02:47, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> @@ -357,7 +356,17 @@ static int cf_check _msixtbl_write(
> const struct hvm_io_handler *handler, uint64_t address, uint32_t len,
> uint64_t val)
> {
> - return msixtbl_write(current, address, len, val);
> + /* ignore invalid length or unaligned writes */
Nit: Style (capital first letter).
> + if ( len != 4 && len != 8 || !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
Please parenthesize the && as an operand of ||.
> --- a/xen/common/kernel.c
> +++ b/xen/common/kernel.c
> @@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ long do_xen_version(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
> fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_direct_mapped);
> else
> fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_not_direct_mapped);
> + fi.submap |= (1U << XENFEAT_dm_msix_all_writes);
This probably wants to move up into the x86-only section?
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-27 17:00 ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-02 3:07 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2023-11-27 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Cc: Andrew Cooper, xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu
On 24.11.2023 02:47, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> Some devices (notably Intel Wifi 6 AX210 card) keep auxiliary registers
> on the same page as MSI-X table. Device model (especially one in
> stubdomain) cannot really handle those, as direct writes to that page is
> refused (page is on the mmio_ro_ranges list). Instead, extend
> msixtbl_mmio_ops to handle such accesses too.
>
> Doing this, requires correlating read/write location with guest
> of MSI-X table address. Since QEMU doesn't map MSI-X table to the guest,
> it requires msixtbl_entry->gtable, which is HVM-only. Similar feature
> for PV would need to be done separately.
>
> This will be also used to read Pending Bit Array, if it lives on the same
> page, making QEMU not needing /dev/mem access at all (especially helpful
> with lockdown enabled in dom0). If PBA lives on another page, QEMU will
> map it to the guest directly.
> If PBA lives on the same page, discard writes and log a message.
> Technically, writes outside of PBA could be allowed, but at this moment
> the precise location of PBA isn't saved, and also no known device abuses
> the spec in this way (at least yet).
>
> To access those registers, msixtbl_mmio_ops need the relevant page
> mapped. MSI handling already has infrastructure for that, using fixmap,
> so try to map first/last page of the MSI-X table (if necessary) and save
> their fixmap indexes. Note that msix_get_fixmap() does reference
> counting and reuses existing mapping, so just call it directly, even if
> the page was mapped before. Also, it uses a specific range of fixmap
> indexes which doesn't include 0, so use 0 as default ("not mapped")
> value - which simplifies code a bit.
>
> GCC gets confused about 'desc' variable:
>
> arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c: In function ‘msixtbl_range’:
> arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c:553:8: error: ‘desc’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
> 553 | if ( desc )
> | ^
> arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c:537:28: note: ‘desc’ was declared here
> 537 | const struct msi_desc *desc;
> | ^~~~
This could do with also indicating the gcc version. Issues like this
tend to get fixed over time.
> It's conditional initialization is actually correct (in the case where
> it isn't initialized, function returns early), but to avoid
> build failure initialize it explicitly to NULL anyway.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Logic looks okay to me now (albeit I'm still not overly happy that we need
to gain such code), but there are a couple of cosmetic issues.
> @@ -213,6 +217,131 @@ static struct msi_desc *msixtbl_addr_to_desc(
> return NULL;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Returns:
> + * - UINT_MAX if no handling should be done
> + * - UINT_MAX-1 if write should be discarded
> + * - a fixmap idx to use for handling
> + */
> +#define ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE UINT_MAX
> +#define ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE (UINT_MAX - 1)
The comment would imo better talk in terms of the two constants you
define here.
> +static unsigned int adjacent_handle(
> + const struct msixtbl_entry *entry, unsigned long addr, bool write)
> +{
> + unsigned int adj_type;
> + const struct arch_msix *msix;
> +
> + if ( !entry || !entry->pdev )
> + return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
> +
> + if ( PFN_DOWN(addr) == PFN_DOWN(entry->gtable) && addr < entry->gtable )
> + adj_type = ADJ_IDX_FIRST;
> + else if ( PFN_DOWN(addr) == PFN_DOWN(entry->gtable + entry->table_len - 1) &&
> + addr >= entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
> + adj_type = ADJ_IDX_LAST;
> + else
> + return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
> +
> + msix = entry->pdev->msix;
> + ASSERT(msix);
> +
> + if ( !msix->adj_access_idx[adj_type] )
> + {
> + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
> + "Page for adjacent(%d) MSI-X table access not initialized for %pp (addr %#lx, gtable %#lx\n",
> + adj_type, &entry->pdev->sbdf, addr, entry->gtable);
> +
> + return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
> + }
> +
> + /* If PBA lives on the same page too, discard writes. */
> + if ( write &&
> + ((adj_type == ADJ_IDX_LAST &&
> + msix->table.last == msix->pba.first) ||
> + (adj_type == ADJ_IDX_FIRST &&
> + msix->table.first == msix->pba.last)) )
> + {
> + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
> + "MSI-X table and PBA of %pp live on the same page, "
> + "writing to other registers there is not implemented\n",
> + &entry->pdev->sbdf);
Here and above I think verbosity needs limiting to the first instance per
device per domain.
> + return ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE;
> + }
> +
> + return msix->adj_access_idx[adj_type];
> +}
> +
> +static int adjacent_read(
> + unsigned int fixmap_idx,
> + paddr_t address, unsigned int len, uint64_t *pval)
> +{
> + const void __iomem *hwaddr;
> +
> + *pval = ~0UL;
> +
> + ASSERT(fixmap_idx != ADJACENT_DISCARD_WRITE);
> +
> + hwaddr = fix_to_virt(fixmap_idx) + PAGE_OFFSET(address);
> +
> + switch ( len )
> + {
> + case 1:
> + *pval = readb(hwaddr);
> + break;
> +
> + case 2:
> + *pval = readw(hwaddr);
> + break;
> +
> + case 4:
> + *pval = readl(hwaddr);
> + break;
> +
> + case 8:
> + *pval = readq(hwaddr);
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
> + }
> + return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> +}
> +
> +static int adjacent_write(
> + unsigned int fixmap_idx,
> + uint64_t address, uint32_t len, uint64_t val)
This uses indentation different from the two cases further up. Types
used also don't match adjacent_read()'s.
> @@ -220,16 +349,31 @@ static int cf_check msixtbl_read(
> unsigned long offset;
> struct msixtbl_entry *entry;
> unsigned int nr_entry, index;
> + unsigned int adjacent_fixmap;
> int r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>
> - if ( (len != 4 && len != 8) || (address & (len - 1)) )
> + if ( !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
> return r;
>
> rcu_read_lock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
> -
> entry = msixtbl_find_entry(current, address);
> if ( !entry )
> goto out;
> +
> + adjacent_fixmap = adjacent_handle(entry, address, false);
> + if ( adjacent_fixmap != ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE )
> + {
> + r = adjacent_read(adjacent_fixmap, address, len, pval);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if ( address < entry->gtable ||
> + address >= entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
> + goto out;
> +
> + if ( len != 4 && len != 8 )
> + goto out;
> +
> offset = address & (PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE - 1);
>
> if ( offset != PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL_OFFSET )
> @@ -282,6 +426,7 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address,
> int r = X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
> unsigned long flags;
> struct irq_desc *desc;
> + unsigned int adjacent_fixmap;
>
> if ( !IS_ALIGNED(address, len) )
> return X86EMUL_OKAY;
> @@ -291,6 +436,19 @@ static int msixtbl_write(struct vcpu *v, unsigned long address,
> entry = msixtbl_find_entry(v, address);
> if ( !entry )
> goto out;
> +
> + adjacent_fixmap = adjacent_handle(entry, address, true);
> + if ( adjacent_fixmap != ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE )
> + {
> + r = adjacent_write(adjacent_fixmap, address, len, val);
> + goto out;
> + }
> + if ( address < entry->gtable ||
> + address >= entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
> + goto out;
> + if ( len != 4 && len != 8 )
> + goto out;
> +
Can this please follow the read side as far as use of blank lines goes?
> @@ -622,12 +788,15 @@ void msix_write_completion(struct vcpu *v)
> v->arch.hvm.hvm_io.msix_snoop_gpa )
> {
> unsigned int token = hvmemul_cache_disable(v);
> - const struct msi_desc *desc;
> + const struct msi_desc *desc = NULL;
> + const struct msixtbl_entry *entry;
> uint32_t data;
>
> rcu_read_lock(&msixtbl_rcu_lock);
> - desc = msixtbl_addr_to_desc(msixtbl_find_entry(v, snoop_addr),
> - snoop_addr);
> + entry = msixtbl_find_entry(v, snoop_addr);
> + if ( entry && snoop_addr >= entry->gtable &&
> + snoop_addr < entry->gtable + entry->table_len )
Nit: Too deep indentation.
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msi.h
> @@ -207,6 +207,10 @@ struct msg_address {
> PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE + \
> (~PCI_MSIX_BIRMASK & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
>
> +/* indexes in adj_access_idx[] below */
Nit: Comment style again.
> @@ -1078,6 +1108,16 @@ static void _pci_cleanup_msix(struct arch_msix *msix)
> WARN();
> msix->table.first = 0;
> msix->table.last = 0;
> + if ( msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST] )
> + {
> + msix_put_fixmap(msix, msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST]);
> + msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_FIRST] = 0;
> + }
> + if ( msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST] )
> + {
> + msix_put_fixmap(msix, msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST]);
> + msix->adj_access_idx[ADJ_IDX_LAST] = 0;
> + }
>
> if ( rangeset_remove_range(mmio_ro_ranges, msix->pba.first,
> msix->pba.last) )
This could probably do with another blank line at the head of the
addition.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 3/6] automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-30 3:28 ` Stefano Stabellini
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Stefano Stabellini @ 2023-11-30 3:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Cc: xen-devel, Doug Goldstein, Stefano Stabellini
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1288 bytes --]
On Fri, 24 Nov 2023, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> /dev/mem access doesn't work in dom0 in lockdown and in stubdomain.
> Simulate this environment with removing /dev/mem device node. Full test
> for lockdown and stubdomain will come later, when all requirements will
> be in place.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Nice! I was going to suggest to do the same for other PCI Passthrough
tests but this is the only one I believe?
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
> ---
> This can be applied only after QEMU change is committed. Otherwise the
> test will fail.
> ---
> automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
> index d81ed7b931cf..7eabc1bd6ad4 100755
> --- a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
> +++ b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
> @@ -163,6 +163,8 @@ ifconfig eth0 up
> ifconfig xenbr0 up
> ifconfig xenbr0 192.168.0.1
>
> +# ensure QEMU wont have access /dev/mem
> +rm -f /dev/mem
> # get domU console content into test log
> tail -F /var/log/xen/console/guest-domU.log 2>/dev/null | sed -e \"s/^/(domU) /\" &
> xl create /etc/xen/domU.cfg
> --
> git-series 0.9.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 4/6] automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-11-30 3:30 ` Stefano Stabellini
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Stefano Stabellini @ 2023-11-30 3:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Cc: xen-devel, Doug Goldstein, Stefano Stabellini
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3998 bytes --]
On Fri, 24 Nov 2023, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> Switch to a wifi card that has registers on a MSI-X page. This tests the
> "x86/hvm: Allow writes to registers on the same page as MSI-X table"
> feature. Switch it only for HVM test, because MSI-X adjacent write is
> not supported on PV.
>
> This requires also including drivers and firmware in system for tests.
> Remove firmware unrelated to the test, to not increase initrd size too
> much (all firmware takes over 100MB compressed).
> And finally adjusts test script to handle not only eth0 as a test device,
> but also wlan0 and connect it to the wifi network.
>
> Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
> ---
> This needs two new gitlab variables: WIFI_HW2_SSID and WIFI_HW2_PSK. I'll
> provide them in private.
>
> This change requires rebuilding test containers.
>
> This can be applied only after QEMU change is committed. Otherwise the
> test will fail.
> ---
> automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml | 4 ++++
> automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh | 7 +++++++
> automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile | 7 +++++++
> automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile | 2 ++
> 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml b/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml
> index 6aabdb9d156f..931a8fb28e1d 100644
> --- a/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml
> +++ b/automation/gitlab-ci/test.yaml
> @@ -195,6 +195,10 @@ adl-pci-pv-x86-64-gcc-debug:
>
> adl-pci-hvm-x86-64-gcc-debug:
> extends: .adl-x86-64
> + variables:
> + PCIDEV: "00:14.3"
> + WIFI_SSID: "$WIFI_HW2_SSID"
> + WIFI_PSK: "$WIFI_HW2_PSK"
> script:
> - ./automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh pci-hvm 2>&1 | tee ${LOGFILE}
> needs:
> diff --git a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
> index 7eabc1bd6ad4..60498ef1e89a 100755
> --- a/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
> +++ b/automation/scripts/qubes-x86-64.sh
> @@ -94,6 +94,13 @@ on_reboot = "destroy"
> domU_check="
> set -x -e
> interface=eth0
> +if [ -e /sys/class/net/wlan0 ]; then
> + interface=wlan0
> + set +x
> + wpa_passphrase "$WIFI_SSID" "$WIFI_PSK" > /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf
> + set -x
> + wpa_supplicant -B -iwlan0 -c /etc/wpa_supplicant.conf
> +fi
> ip link set \"\$interface\" up
> timeout 30s udhcpc -i \"\$interface\"
> pingip=\$(ip -o -4 r show default|cut -f 3 -d ' ')
> diff --git a/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile b/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile
> index f1b4a8b7a191..b821a291fed3 100644
> --- a/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile
> +++ b/automation/tests-artifacts/alpine/3.18.dockerfile
> @@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ RUN \
> apk add curl && \
> apk add udev && \
> apk add pciutils && \
> + apk add wpa_supplicant && \
> + # Select firmware for hardware tests
> + apk add linux-firmware-other && \
> + mkdir /lib/firmware-preserve && \
> + mv /lib/firmware/iwlwifi-so-a0-gf-a0* /lib/firmware-preserve/ && \
> + rm -rf /lib/firmware && \
> + mv /lib/firmware-preserve /lib/firmware && \
> \
> # Xen
> cd / && \
> diff --git a/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile b/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile
> index 3a4096780d20..84ed5dff23ae 100644
> --- a/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile
> +++ b/automation/tests-artifacts/kernel/6.1.19.dockerfile
> @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ RUN curl -fsSLO https://cdn.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/linux-"$LINUX_VERSI
> make xen.config && \
> scripts/config --enable BRIDGE && \
> scripts/config --enable IGC && \
> + scripts/config --enable IWLWIFI && \
> + scripts/config --enable IWLMVM && \
> cp .config .config.orig && \
> cat .config.orig | grep XEN | grep =m |sed 's/=m/=y/g' >> .config && \
> make -j$(nproc) bzImage && \
> --
> git-series 0.9.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table
2023-11-27 17:00 ` Jan Beulich
@ 2023-12-02 3:07 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-12-04 7:52 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 1 reply; 13+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2023-12-02 3:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Beulich; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2032 bytes --]
On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 06:00:57PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 24.11.2023 02:47, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> > GCC gets confused about 'desc' variable:
> >
> > arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c: In function ‘msixtbl_range’:
> > arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c:553:8: error: ‘desc’ may be used uninitialized [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
> > 553 | if ( desc )
> > | ^
> > arch/x86/hvm/vmsi.c:537:28: note: ‘desc’ was declared here
> > 537 | const struct msi_desc *desc;
> > | ^~~~
>
> This could do with also indicating the gcc version. Issues like this
> tend to get fixed over time.
Sure, I'll add it's GCC 12.2.1.
And indeed, GCC 13.2.1 does not complain anymore.
> > +
> > + if ( !msix->adj_access_idx[adj_type] )
> > + {
> > + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
> > + "Page for adjacent(%d) MSI-X table access not initialized for %pp (addr %#lx, gtable %#lx\n",
> > + adj_type, &entry->pdev->sbdf, addr, entry->gtable);
> > +
> > + return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
> > + }
> > +
> > + /* If PBA lives on the same page too, discard writes. */
> > + if ( write &&
> > + ((adj_type == ADJ_IDX_LAST &&
> > + msix->table.last == msix->pba.first) ||
> > + (adj_type == ADJ_IDX_FIRST &&
> > + msix->table.first == msix->pba.last)) )
> > + {
> > + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
> > + "MSI-X table and PBA of %pp live on the same page, "
> > + "writing to other registers there is not implemented\n",
> > + &entry->pdev->sbdf);
>
> Here and above I think verbosity needs limiting to the first instance per
> device per domain.
Is there some clever API for that already, or do I need to introduce
extra variable in some of those structures (msixtbl_entry? pci_dev?) ?
(other requested changes ok)
--
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
[-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --]
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table
2023-12-02 3:07 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
@ 2023-12-04 7:52 ` Jan Beulich
0 siblings, 0 replies; 13+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2023-12-04 7:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Cc: Andrew Cooper, xen-devel, Roger Pau Monné, Wei Liu
On 02.12.2023 04:07, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2023 at 06:00:57PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 24.11.2023 02:47, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>>> + if ( !msix->adj_access_idx[adj_type] )
>>> + {
>>> + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
>>> + "Page for adjacent(%d) MSI-X table access not initialized for %pp (addr %#lx, gtable %#lx\n",
>>> + adj_type, &entry->pdev->sbdf, addr, entry->gtable);
>>> +
>>> + return ADJACENT_DONT_HANDLE;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /* If PBA lives on the same page too, discard writes. */
>>> + if ( write &&
>>> + ((adj_type == ADJ_IDX_LAST &&
>>> + msix->table.last == msix->pba.first) ||
>>> + (adj_type == ADJ_IDX_FIRST &&
>>> + msix->table.first == msix->pba.last)) )
>>> + {
>>> + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING,
>>> + "MSI-X table and PBA of %pp live on the same page, "
>>> + "writing to other registers there is not implemented\n",
>>> + &entry->pdev->sbdf);
>>
>> Here and above I think verbosity needs limiting to the first instance per
>> device per domain.
>
> Is there some clever API for that already, or do I need to introduce
> extra variable in some of those structures (msixtbl_entry? pci_dev?) ?
Sadly there isn't, and to be honest I also can't really see how one would
go about generalizing / abstracting this.
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 13+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2023-12-04 7:53 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2023-11-24 1:47 [PATCH v4 0/6] MSI-X support with qemu in stubdomain, and other related changes Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] x86/msi: passthrough all MSI-X vector ctrl writes to device model Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-27 16:18 ` Jan Beulich
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] x86/hvm: Allow access to registers on the same page as MSI-X table Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-27 17:00 ` Jan Beulich
2023-12-02 3:07 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-12-04 7:52 ` Jan Beulich
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] automation: prevent QEMU access to /dev/mem in PCI passthrough tests Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-30 3:28 ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] automation: switch to a wifi card on ADL system Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-30 3:30 ` Stefano Stabellini
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to qemu fork Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2023-11-24 1:47 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] [DO NOT APPLY] switch to alternative artifact repo Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
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