From: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Marek Marczykowski <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/hvm: fix write emulation of RO ranges
Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 09:02:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Z_ds9nW2FE3S2wDr@macbook.lan> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d0d6cdf2-e436-4a72-8a02-5ec331cc950d@suse.com>
On Thu, Apr 10, 2025 at 08:27:49AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 09.04.2025 17:33, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > On Wed, Apr 09, 2025 at 04:08:47PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> On 09.04.2025 16:01, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> >>> As I understand the checks done in
> >>> mmio_ro_emulated_write() are to ensure correctness, but carrying the
> >>> access even when the %cr2 check fail wouldn't cause issues to Xen
> >>> itself?
> >>
> >> Well, "wouldn't" is too strong for my taste, "shouldn't" would fit. The
> >> checking is there to avoid guests playing games. Whether that prevents
> >> merely in-guest just-bugs or actual XSAs we can't know until we find a
> >> case where the game playing might make us do something wrong. I expect
> >> it's unlikely for Xen itself to be affected. But an in-guest privilege
> >> escalation would already be bad enough.
> >
> > I see. That was kind of my understanding of the checks. At least on
> > HVM it feels a bit weird to handle r/o regions this way. It would IMO
> > be more natural to use an hvm_io_handler, but that's maybe because I'm
> > more familiar with those.
>
> I guess this would be an option; I assume it's the way it is because PVHv1
> inherited it from PV, and PVHv2 inherited it from PVHv1.
I have a draft with this approach, and it seems quite better, as it
allows to get rid of hvm_emulate_one_mmio() and the special casing
done in hvm_hap_nested_page_fault().
Thanks, Roger.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-10 7:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-08 9:31 [PATCH 0/2] x86/hvm: fixes for RO MMIO emulation Roger Pau Monne
2025-04-08 9:31 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86/hvm: remove unreachable MMCFG write emulation Roger Pau Monne
2025-04-08 13:42 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-08 9:31 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86/hvm: fix write emulation of RO ranges Roger Pau Monne
2025-04-08 13:57 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-09 9:07 ` Roger Pau Monné
2025-04-09 10:00 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-09 10:39 ` Roger Pau Monné
2025-04-09 12:59 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-09 13:33 ` Roger Pau Monné
2025-04-09 13:50 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-09 14:01 ` Roger Pau Monné
2025-04-09 14:08 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-09 15:33 ` Roger Pau Monné
2025-04-10 6:27 ` Jan Beulich
2025-04-10 7:02 ` Roger Pau Monné [this message]
2025-04-09 14:27 ` Marek Marczykowski
2025-04-08 14:00 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-04-09 9:47 ` Roger Pau Monné
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