* CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
@ 2024-03-02 21:52 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-03-11 10:32 ` Michal Hocko
2024-03-11 16:11 ` REJECTED: " Lee Jones
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2024-03-02 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-cve-announce; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
VMCLEAR active VMCSes before any emergency reboot, not just if the kernel
may kexec into a new kernel after a crash. Per Intel's SDM, the VMX
architecture doesn't require the CPU to flush the VMCS cache on INIT. If
an emergency reboot doesn't RESET CPUs, cached VMCSes could theoretically
be kept and only be written back to memory after the new kernel is booted,
i.e. could effectively corrupt memory after reboot.
Opportunistically remove the setting of the global pointer to NULL to make
checkpatch happy.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52514 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Fixed in 6.1.56 with commit 1375d9600c38
Fixed in 6.5.6 with commit 65edea77d700
Fixed in 6.6 with commit b23c83ad2c63
Please see https://www.kernel.org or a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2023-52514
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h
arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1375d9600c38c231163de584656b07aef9a27b0d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65edea77d7006140c6290e7f46009d75e02d3273
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b23c83ad2c638420ec0608a9de354507c41bec29
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
2024-03-02 21:52 CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2024-03-11 10:32 ` Michal Hocko
2024-03-11 13:42 ` Lee Jones
2024-03-11 16:11 ` REJECTED: " Lee Jones
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Michal Hocko @ 2024-03-11 10:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: cve, linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Juergen Gross, Sean Christopherson,
Andrew Cooper
On Sat 02-03-24 22:52:59, Greg KH wrote:
> Description
> ===========
>
> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
>
> x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
>
> VMCLEAR active VMCSes before any emergency reboot, not just if the kernel
> may kexec into a new kernel after a crash. Per Intel's SDM, the VMX
> architecture doesn't require the CPU to flush the VMCS cache on INIT. If
> an emergency reboot doesn't RESET CPUs, cached VMCSes could theoretically
> be kept and only be written back to memory after the new kernel is booted,
> i.e. could effectively corrupt memory after reboot.
>
> Opportunistically remove the setting of the global pointer to NULL to make
> checkpatch happy.
>
> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52514 to this issue.
I do not really see the security aspect of this fix. Guests systems
shouldn't be able to trigger host reboot nor any untrusted entity should
on the host either or this would be a serious security hole.
Or am I missing something?
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
2024-03-11 10:32 ` Michal Hocko
@ 2024-03-11 13:42 ` Lee Jones
2024-03-11 16:07 ` Sean Christopherson
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Lee Jones @ 2024-03-11 13:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Michal Hocko
Cc: cve, linux-kernel, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Juergen Gross,
Sean Christopherson, Andrew Cooper
On Mon, 11 Mar 2024, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Sat 02-03-24 22:52:59, Greg KH wrote:
> > Description
> > ===========
> >
> > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> >
> > x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
> >
> > VMCLEAR active VMCSes before any emergency reboot, not just if the kernel
> > may kexec into a new kernel after a crash. Per Intel's SDM, the VMX
> > architecture doesn't require the CPU to flush the VMCS cache on INIT. If
> > an emergency reboot doesn't RESET CPUs, cached VMCSes could theoretically
> > be kept and only be written back to memory after the new kernel is booted,
> > i.e. could effectively corrupt memory after reboot.
> >
> > Opportunistically remove the setting of the global pointer to NULL to make
> > checkpatch happy.
> >
> > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52514 to this issue.
>
> I do not really see the security aspect of this fix. Guests systems
> shouldn't be able to trigger host reboot nor any untrusted entity should
> on the host either or this would be a serious security hole.
>
> Or am I missing something?
Thanks for reporting.
If Sean and/or Paolo agree, we can revoke the CVE for you.
--
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
2024-03-11 13:42 ` Lee Jones
@ 2024-03-11 16:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 16:15 ` Lee Jones
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sean Christopherson @ 2024-03-11 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lee Jones
Cc: Michal Hocko, cve, linux-kernel, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Juergen Gross, Andrew Cooper
On Mon, Mar 11, 2024, Lee Jones wrote:
> On Mon, 11 Mar 2024, Michal Hocko wrote:
>
> > On Sat 02-03-24 22:52:59, Greg KH wrote:
> > > Description
> > > ===========
> > >
> > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > >
> > > x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
> > >
> > > VMCLEAR active VMCSes before any emergency reboot, not just if the kernel
> > > may kexec into a new kernel after a crash. Per Intel's SDM, the VMX
> > > architecture doesn't require the CPU to flush the VMCS cache on INIT. If
> > > an emergency reboot doesn't RESET CPUs, cached VMCSes could theoretically
> > > be kept and only be written back to memory after the new kernel is booted,
> > > i.e. could effectively corrupt memory after reboot.
> > >
> > > Opportunistically remove the setting of the global pointer to NULL to make
> > > checkpatch happy.
> > >
> > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52514 to this issue.
> >
> > I do not really see the security aspect of this fix. Guests systems
> > shouldn't be able to trigger host reboot nor any untrusted entity should
> > on the host either or this would be a serious security hole.
And not just any reboot either, this only comes into play with something like
`reboot -f`. Not to mention the impact of the bug is ridiculously theroetical
(I didn't tag the patch for stable@ for a reason).
> > Or am I missing something?
>
> Thanks for reporting.
>
> If Sean and/or Paolo agree, we can revoke the CVE for you.
Please do.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
2024-03-11 16:07 ` Sean Christopherson
@ 2024-03-11 16:15 ` Lee Jones
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Lee Jones @ 2024-03-11 16:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Christopherson
Cc: Michal Hocko, cve, linux-kernel, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Juergen Gross, Andrew Cooper
On Mon, 11 Mar 2024, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 11, 2024, Lee Jones wrote:
> > On Mon, 11 Mar 2024, Michal Hocko wrote:
> >
> > > On Sat 02-03-24 22:52:59, Greg KH wrote:
> > > > Description
> > > > ===========
> > > >
> > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > > >
> > > > x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
> > > >
> > > > VMCLEAR active VMCSes before any emergency reboot, not just if the kernel
> > > > may kexec into a new kernel after a crash. Per Intel's SDM, the VMX
> > > > architecture doesn't require the CPU to flush the VMCS cache on INIT. If
> > > > an emergency reboot doesn't RESET CPUs, cached VMCSes could theoretically
> > > > be kept and only be written back to memory after the new kernel is booted,
> > > > i.e. could effectively corrupt memory after reboot.
> > > >
> > > > Opportunistically remove the setting of the global pointer to NULL to make
> > > > checkpatch happy.
> > > >
> > > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52514 to this issue.
> > >
> > > I do not really see the security aspect of this fix. Guests systems
> > > shouldn't be able to trigger host reboot nor any untrusted entity should
> > > on the host either or this would be a serious security hole.
>
> And not just any reboot either, this only comes into play with something like
> `reboot -f`. Not to mention the impact of the bug is ridiculously theroetical
> (I didn't tag the patch for stable@ for a reason).
>
> > > Or am I missing something?
> >
> > Thanks for reporting.
> >
> > If Sean and/or Paolo agree, we can revoke the CVE for you.
>
> Please do.
No problem. All done for you:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240311161318.1290374-2-lee@kernel.org/
Thanks again for the report.
--
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* REJECTED: CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot
2024-03-02 21:52 CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-03-11 10:32 ` Michal Hocko
@ 2024-03-11 16:11 ` Lee Jones
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Lee Jones @ 2024-03-11 16:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-cve-announce; +Cc: Lee Jones
CVE-2023-52514 has now been rejected and is no longer a valid CVE.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-03-11 16:15 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2024-03-02 21:52 CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-03-11 10:32 ` Michal Hocko
2024-03-11 13:42 ` Lee Jones
2024-03-11 16:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-03-11 16:15 ` Lee Jones
2024-03-11 16:11 ` REJECTED: " Lee Jones
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