Re: [PATCH v3 00/29] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode

[Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>]

On Wed, Apr 03, 2024 at 04:34:48PM -0700, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> Sending out v3 for cpu assisted riscv user mode control flow integrity.
> 
> v2 [9] was sent a week ago for this riscv usermode control flow integrity
> enabling. RFC patchset was (v1) early this year (January) [7].
> 
> changes in v3
> --------------
> envcfg:
> logic to pick up base envcfg had a bug where `ENVCFG_CBZE` could have been
> picked on per task basis, even though CPU didn't implement it. Fixed in
> this series.
> 
> dt-bindings:
> As suggested, split into separate commit. fixed the messaging that spec is
> in public review
> 
> arch_is_shadow_stack change:
> arch_is_shadow_stack changed to vma_is_shadow_stack
> 
> hwprobe:
> zicfiss / zicfilp if present will get enumerated in hwprobe
> 
> selftests:
> As suggested, added object and binary filenames to .gitignore
> Selftest binary anyways need to be compiled with cfi enabled compiler which
> will make sure that landing pad and shadow stack are enabled. Thus removed
> separate enable/disable tests. Cleaned up tests a bit.
> 
> changes in v2
> ---------------
> As part of testing effort, compiled a rootfs with shadow stack and landing
> pad enabled (libraries and binaries) and booted to shell. As part of long
> running tests, I have been able to run some spec 2006 benchmarks [8] (here
> link is provided only for list of benchmarks that were tested for long
> running tests, excel sheet provided here actually is for some static stats
> like code size growth on spec binaries). Thus converting from RFC to
> regular patchset.
> 
> Securing control-flow integrity for usermode requires following
> 
>     - Securing forward control flow : All callsites must reach
>       reach a target that they actually intend to reach.
> 
>     - Securing backward control flow : All function returns must
>       return to location where they were called from.
> 
> This patch series use riscv cpu extension `zicfilp` [2] to secure forward
> control flow and `zicfiss` [2] to secure backward control flow. `zicfilp`
> enforces that all indirect calls or jmps must land on a landing pad instr
> and label embedded in landing pad instr must match a value programmed in
> `x7` register (at callsite via compiler). `zicfiss` introduces shadow stack
> which can only be writeable via shadow stack instructions (sspush and
> ssamoswap) and thus can't be tampered with via inadvertent stores. More
> details about extension can be read from [2] and there are details in
> documentation as well (in this patch series).
> 
> Using config `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`, kernel support for riscv control flow
> integrity for user mode programs can be compiled in the kernel.
> 
> Enabling of control flow integrity for user programs is left to user runtime
> (specifically expected from dynamic loader). There has been a lot of earlier
> discussion on the enabling topic around x86 shadow stack enabling [3, 4, 5] and
> overall consensus had been to let dynamic loader (or usermode) to decide for
> enabling the feature.
> 
> This patch series introduces arch agnostic `prctls` to enable shadow stack
> and indirect branch tracking. And implements them on riscv. arm64 is expected
> to implement shadow stack part of these arch agnostic `prctls` [6]
> 
> Changes since last time
> ***********************
> 
> Spec changes
> ------------
> - Forward cfi spec has become much simpler. `lpad` instruction is pseudo for
>   `auipc rd, <20bit_imm>`. `lpad` checks x7 against 20bit embedded in instr.
>   Thus label width is 20bit.
> 
> - Shadow stack management instructions are reduced to
>     sspush - to push x1/x5 on shadow stack
>     sspopchk - pops from shadow stack and comapres with x1/x5.
>     ssamoswap - atomically swap value on shadow stack.
>     rdssp - reads current shadow stack pointer
> 
> - Shadow stack accesses on readonly memory always raise AMO/store page fault.
>   `sspopchk` is load but if underlying page is readonly, it'll raise a store
>   page fault. It simplifies hardware and kernel for COW handling for shadow
>   stack pages.
> 
> - riscv defines a new exception type `software check exception` and control flow
>   violations raise software check exception.
> 
> - enabling controls for shadow stack and landing are in xenvcfg CSR and controls
>   lower privilege mode enabling. As an example senvcfg controls enabling for U and
>   menvcfg controls enabling for S mode.
> 
> core mm shadow stack enabling
> -----------------------------
> Shadow stack for x86 usermode are now in mainline and thus this patch
> series builds on top of that for arch-agnostic mm related changes. Big
> thanks and shout out to Rick Edgecombe for that.
> 
> selftests
> ---------
> Created some minimal selftests to test the patch series.
> 
> 
> [1] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
> [2] - https://github.com/riscv/riscv-cfi
> [3] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZWHcBq0bJ+15eeKs@finisterre.sirena.org.uk/T/#mb121cd8b33d564e64234595a0ec52211479cf474
> [4] - https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
> [5] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wgP5mk3poVeejw16Asbid0ghDt4okHnWaWKLBkRhQntRA@mail.gmail.com/
> [6] - https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20231122-arm64-gcs-v7-2-201c483bd775@kernel.org/
> [7] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240125062739.1339782-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
> [8] - https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1_cHGH4ctNVvFRiS7hW9dEGKtXLAJ3aX4Z_iTSa3Tw2U/edit#gid=0
> [9] - https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240329044459.3990638-1-debug@rivosinc.com/
> 

This is a note for people wanting to test this series.

1. Need a toolchain that has CFI support

$ git clone git@github.com:sifive/riscv-gnu-toolchain.git -b cfi-dev
$ riscv-gnu-toolchain/configure --prefix=<path-to-where-to-build> --with-arch=rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss --enable-linux --disable-gdb  --with-extra-multilib-test="rv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss-lp64d:-static"
$ make -j$(nproc)

2. QEMU

$ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/qemu.git -b zicfilp_zicfiss_mar24_spec_v8.1.1
$ cd qemu
$ mkdir build
$ cd build
$ ../configure --target-list=riscv64-softmmu
$ make -j$(nproc)

3. OpenSBI

$ git clone git@github.com:deepak0414/opensbi.git -b cfi_spec_split_opensbi
$ make CROSS_COMPILE=<your riscv toolchain> -j$(nproc) PLATFORM=generic

4. Linux

Running defconfig is fine. CFI is enabled by default if the toolchain
supports it.

$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc) defconfig
$ make ARCH=riscv CROSS_COMPILE=<path-to-cfi-riscv-gnu-toolchain>/build/bin/riscv64-unknown-linux-gnu- -j$(nproc)

5. Running

Modify your qemu command to have:
-bios <path-to-cfi-opensbi>/build/platform/generic/firmware/fw_dynamic.bin
-cpu rv64,zicfilp=true,zicfiss=true

- Charlie