All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
	"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
	"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
	"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
	"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
	"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 17:50:15 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmLX15YJIhUG/XP3@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240523050451.788754-6-coxu@redhat.com>

On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
......
> +ssize_t __weak dm_crypt_keys_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
> +{
> +	struct kvec kvec = { .iov_base = buf, .iov_len = count };
> +	struct iov_iter iter;
> +
> +	iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ, &kvec, 1, count);
> +	return read_from_oldmem(&iter, count, ppos, false);
Do we need create a x86 specific version to cope with the confidential
computing thing, e.g sme/tdx?

> +}
> +


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
	"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
	"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
	"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
	"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
	"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	"Vivek Goyal" <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 17:50:15 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZmLX15YJIhUG/XP3@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240523050451.788754-6-coxu@redhat.com>

On 05/23/24 at 01:04pm, Coiby Xu wrote:
......
> +ssize_t __weak dm_crypt_keys_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos)
> +{
> +	struct kvec kvec = { .iov_base = buf, .iov_len = count };
> +	struct iov_iter iter;
> +
> +	iov_iter_kvec(&iter, READ, &kvec, 1, count);
> +	return read_from_oldmem(&iter, count, ppos, false);
Do we need create a x86 specific version to cope with the confidential
computing thing, e.g sme/tdx?

> +}
> +


  reply	other threads:[~2024-06-07  9:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-23  5:04 [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-04  7:41   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-04  7:41     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26       ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  7:21   ` Greg KH
2024-05-23  7:21     ` Greg KH
2024-05-25  7:57     ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-25  7:57       ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-04  8:51   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-04  8:51     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:27       ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10  2:00       ` Baoquan He
2024-06-10  2:00         ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18  1:44         ` Coiby Xu
2024-10-18  1:44           ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-05  8:22   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-05  8:22     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:27       ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-10  1:18       ` Baoquan He
2024-06-10  1:18         ` Baoquan He
2024-10-18  1:02         ` Coiby Xu
2024-10-18  1:02           ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-06  3:11   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-06  3:11     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26       ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] crash_dump: store dm keys in kdump reserved memory Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-24  3:17   ` kernel test robot
2024-05-24  3:17     ` kernel test robot
2024-06-04 13:54     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-04 13:54       ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26       ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26         ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-04 13:52   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-04 13:52     ` Baoquan He
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07  9:50   ` Baoquan He [this message]
2024-06-07  9:50     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:27       ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to " Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07  9:57   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07  9:57     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:27       ` Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible Coiby Xu
2024-05-23  5:04   ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:00   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 10:00     ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:27     ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:27       ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 10:06 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Baoquan He
2024-06-07 10:06   ` Baoquan He
2024-06-07 12:26   ` Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26     ` Coiby Xu

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ZmLX15YJIhUG/XP3@MiWiFi-R3L-srv \
    --to=bhe@redhat.com \
    --cc=berrange@redhat.com \
    --cc=coxu@redhat.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=gmazyland@gmail.com \
    --cc=jpazdziora@redhat.com \
    --cc=kernelfans@gmail.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=okozina@redhat.com \
    --cc=ryncsn@gmail.com \
    --cc=tstaudt@de.ibm.com \
    --cc=vgoyal@redhat.com \
    --cc=vkuznets@redhat.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.