* [PATCH v2 for-4.19 0/3] x86/EPT: avoid undue forcing of MMIO accesses to UC
@ 2024-06-12 13:15 Jan Beulich
2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, Oleksii Kurochko
..., getting in the way of, in particular, PVH Dom0 accessing its video
frame buffer (if it has a console).
While especially the 1st one may not appear to be so, both of the earlier
patches are strictly prereqs to the last one.
1: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt()
2: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring
3: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt()
Jan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 13:15 [PATCH v2 for-4.19 0/3] x86/EPT: avoid undue forcing of MMIO accesses to UC Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:16 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 14:11 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-13 14:38 ` Oleksii K. 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 13:17 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich 2 siblings, 2 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw) To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, Oleksii Kurochko mfn_valid() granularity is (currently) 256Mb. Therefore the start of a 1Gb page passing the test doesn't necessarily mean all parts of such a range would also pass. Yet using the result of mfn_to_page() on an MFN which doesn't pass mfn_valid() checking is liable to result in a crash (the invocation of mfn_to_page() alone is presumably "just" UB in such a case). Fixes: ca24b2ffdbd9 ("x86/hvm: set 'ipat' in EPT for special pages") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- Of course we could leverage mfn_valid() granularity here to do an increment by more than 1 if mfn_valid() returned false. Yet doing so likely would want a suitable helper to be introduced first, rather than open-coding such logic here. --- v2: New. --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c @@ -519,8 +519,12 @@ int epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain *d, } for ( special_pgs = i = 0; i < (1ul << order); i++ ) - if ( is_special_page(mfn_to_page(mfn_add(mfn, i))) ) + { + mfn_t cur = mfn_add(mfn, i); + + if ( mfn_valid(cur) && is_special_page(mfn_to_page(cur)) ) special_pgs++; + } if ( special_pgs ) { ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 14:11 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 14:47 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-13 14:38 ` Oleksii K. 1 sibling, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:16:37PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > mfn_valid() granularity is (currently) 256Mb. Therefore the start of a > 1Gb page passing the test doesn't necessarily mean all parts of such a > range would also pass. How would such a superpage end up in the EPT? I would assume this can only happen when adding a superpage MMIO that has part of it return success from mfn_valid()? > Yet using the result of mfn_to_page() on an MFN > which doesn't pass mfn_valid() checking is liable to result in a crash > (the invocation of mfn_to_page() alone is presumably "just" UB in such a > case). > > Fixes: ca24b2ffdbd9 ("x86/hvm: set 'ipat' in EPT for special pages") > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> > --- > Of course we could leverage mfn_valid() granularity here to do an > increment by more than 1 if mfn_valid() returned false. Yet doing so > likely would want a suitable helper to be introduced first, rather than > open-coding such logic here. We would still need to call is_special_page() on each 4K chunk, at which point taking advantage of the mfn_valid() granularity is likely to make the code more complicated to follow IMO. Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 14:11 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 14:47 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:02 ` Roger Pau Monné 0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 14:47 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Roger Pau Monné Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On 12.06.2024 16:11, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:16:37PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> mfn_valid() granularity is (currently) 256Mb. Therefore the start of a >> 1Gb page passing the test doesn't necessarily mean all parts of such a >> range would also pass. > > How would such a superpage end up in the EPT? > > I would assume this can only happen when adding a superpage MMIO that > has part of it return success from mfn_valid()? Yes, that's the only way I can think of. >> Yet using the result of mfn_to_page() on an MFN >> which doesn't pass mfn_valid() checking is liable to result in a crash >> (the invocation of mfn_to_page() alone is presumably "just" UB in such a >> case). >> >> Fixes: ca24b2ffdbd9 ("x86/hvm: set 'ipat' in EPT for special pages") >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > > Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Thanks. >> --- >> Of course we could leverage mfn_valid() granularity here to do an >> increment by more than 1 if mfn_valid() returned false. Yet doing so >> likely would want a suitable helper to be introduced first, rather than >> open-coding such logic here. > > We would still need to call is_special_page() on each 4K chunk, Why? Within any block for which mfn_valid() returns false, there can be no RAM pages and hence also no special ones. It's only blocks where mfn_valid() returns true that we'd need to iterate through page-by-page. > at > which point taking advantage of the mfn_valid() granularity is likely > to make the code more complicated to follow IMO. Right, this making it more complicated is the main counter argument. Hence why I think that if to go such a route at all, it would need some new helper(s) such that at the use sites things still would remain reasonably clear. Jan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 14:47 ` Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 15:02 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 15:06 ` Jan Beulich 0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 15:02 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 04:47:12PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 12.06.2024 16:11, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:16:37PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> mfn_valid() granularity is (currently) 256Mb. Therefore the start of a > >> 1Gb page passing the test doesn't necessarily mean all parts of such a > >> range would also pass. > > > > How would such a superpage end up in the EPT? > > > > I would assume this can only happen when adding a superpage MMIO that > > has part of it return success from mfn_valid()? > > Yes, that's the only way I can think of. > > >> Yet using the result of mfn_to_page() on an MFN > >> which doesn't pass mfn_valid() checking is liable to result in a crash > >> (the invocation of mfn_to_page() alone is presumably "just" UB in such a > >> case). > >> > >> Fixes: ca24b2ffdbd9 ("x86/hvm: set 'ipat' in EPT for special pages") > >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > > > > Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> > > Thanks. > > >> --- > >> Of course we could leverage mfn_valid() granularity here to do an > >> increment by more than 1 if mfn_valid() returned false. Yet doing so > >> likely would want a suitable helper to be introduced first, rather than > >> open-coding such logic here. > > > > We would still need to call is_special_page() on each 4K chunk, > > Why? Within any block for which mfn_valid() returns false, there can be > no RAM pages and hence also no special ones. It's only blocks where > mfn_valid() returns true that we'd need to iterate through page-by-page. Oh right, I was thinking the other way around (mfn_valid() returning true), never mind. > > at > > which point taking advantage of the mfn_valid() granularity is likely > > to make the code more complicated to follow IMO. > > Right, this making it more complicated is the main counter argument. Hence > why I think that if to go such a route at all, it would need some new > helper(s) such that at the use sites things still would remain reasonably > clear. We could also add an extra check to exit the loop early if special pages have been found but don't match the current loop index, as it's all special pages or none. Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 15:02 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 15:06 ` Jan Beulich 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 15:06 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Roger Pau Monné Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On 12.06.2024 17:02, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > We could also add an extra check to exit the loop early if special > pages have been found but don't match the current loop index, as it's > all special pages or none. I was actually considering to make such a change, but then concluded that in the common case there'll be no special pages anyway, and hence we need to run the loop to completion anyway. Jan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 14:11 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-13 14:38 ` Oleksii K. 1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Oleksii K. @ 2024-06-13 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné On Wed, 2024-06-12 at 15:16 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > mfn_valid() granularity is (currently) 256Mb. Therefore the start of > a > 1Gb page passing the test doesn't necessarily mean all parts of such > a > range would also pass. Yet using the result of mfn_to_page() on an > MFN > which doesn't pass mfn_valid() checking is liable to result in a > crash > (the invocation of mfn_to_page() alone is presumably "just" UB in > such a > case). > > Fixes: ca24b2ffdbd9 ("x86/hvm: set 'ipat' in EPT for special pages") > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> ~ Oleksii > --- > Of course we could leverage mfn_valid() granularity here to do an > increment by more than 1 if mfn_valid() returned false. Yet doing so > likely would want a suitable helper to be introduced first, rather > than > open-coding such logic here. > --- > v2: New. > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > @@ -519,8 +519,12 @@ int epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain *d, > } > > for ( special_pgs = i = 0; i < (1ul << order); i++ ) > - if ( is_special_page(mfn_to_page(mfn_add(mfn, i))) ) > + { > + mfn_t cur = mfn_add(mfn, i); > + > + if ( mfn_valid(cur) && is_special_page(mfn_to_page(cur)) ) > special_pgs++; > + } > > if ( special_pgs ) > { > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring 2024-06-12 13:15 [PATCH v2 for-4.19 0/3] x86/EPT: avoid undue forcing of MMIO accesses to UC Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:16 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 14:38 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-13 14:39 ` Oleksii K. 2024-06-12 13:17 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich 2 siblings, 2 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw) To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, Oleksii Kurochko For non-present entries EMT, like most other fields, is meaningless to hardware. Make the logic in ept_set_entry() setting the field (and iPAT) conditional upon dealing with a present entry, leaving the value at 0 otherwise. This has two effects for epte_get_entry_emt() which we'll want to leverage subsequently: 1) The call moved here now won't be issued with INVALID_MFN anymore (a respective BUG_ON() is being added). 2) Neither of the other two calls could now be issued with a truncated form of INVALID_MFN anymore (as long as there's no bug anywhere marking an entry present when that was populated using INVALID_MFN). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- v2: New. --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c @@ -650,6 +650,8 @@ static int cf_check resolve_misconfig(st if ( e.emt != MTRR_NUM_TYPES ) break; + ASSERT(is_epte_present(&e)); + if ( level == 0 ) { for ( gfn -= i, i = 0; i < EPT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i ) @@ -915,17 +917,6 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf if ( mfn_valid(mfn) || p2m_allows_invalid_mfn(p2mt) ) { - bool ipat; - int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, - i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, - p2mt); - - if ( emt >= 0 ) - new_entry.emt = emt; - else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of this. */ - new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; - - new_entry.ipat = ipat; new_entry.sp = !!i; new_entry.sa_p2mt = p2mt; new_entry.access = p2ma; @@ -941,6 +932,22 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf need_modify_vtd_table = 0; ept_p2m_type_to_flags(p2m, &new_entry); + + if ( is_epte_present(&new_entry) ) + { + bool ipat; + int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, + i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, + p2mt); + + BUG_ON(mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN)); + + if ( emt >= 0 ) + new_entry.emt = emt; + else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of this. */ + new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; + new_entry.ipat = ipat; + } } if ( sve != -1 ) ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 14:38 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 14:53 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-13 14:39 ` Oleksii K. 1 sibling, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 14:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:16:59PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > For non-present entries EMT, like most other fields, is meaningless to > hardware. Make the logic in ept_set_entry() setting the field (and iPAT) > conditional upon dealing with a present entry, leaving the value at 0 > otherwise. This has two effects for epte_get_entry_emt() which we'll > want to leverage subsequently: > 1) The call moved here now won't be issued with INVALID_MFN anymore (a > respective BUG_ON() is being added). > 2) Neither of the other two calls could now be issued with a truncated > form of INVALID_MFN anymore (as long as there's no bug anywhere > marking an entry present when that was populated using INVALID_MFN). > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > --- > v2: New. > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > @@ -650,6 +650,8 @@ static int cf_check resolve_misconfig(st > if ( e.emt != MTRR_NUM_TYPES ) > break; > > + ASSERT(is_epte_present(&e)); If this is added here, then there's a condition further below: if ( !is_epte_valid(&e) || !is_epte_present(&e) ) That needs adjusting AFAICT. However, in ept_set_entry() we seem to unconditionally call resolve_misconfig() against the new entry to be populated, won't this possibly cause resolve_misconfig() to be called against non-present EPT entries? I think this is fine because such non-present entries will have emt == 0, and hence will take the break just ahead of the added ASSERT(). > + > if ( level == 0 ) > { > for ( gfn -= i, i = 0; i < EPT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; ++i ) > @@ -915,17 +917,6 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf > > if ( mfn_valid(mfn) || p2m_allows_invalid_mfn(p2mt) ) > { > - bool ipat; > - int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, > - i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, > - p2mt); > - > - if ( emt >= 0 ) > - new_entry.emt = emt; > - else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of this. */ > - new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; > - > - new_entry.ipat = ipat; > new_entry.sp = !!i; > new_entry.sa_p2mt = p2mt; > new_entry.access = p2ma; > @@ -941,6 +932,22 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf > need_modify_vtd_table = 0; > > ept_p2m_type_to_flags(p2m, &new_entry); > + > + if ( is_epte_present(&new_entry) ) > + { > + bool ipat; > + int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, > + i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, > + p2mt); > + > + BUG_ON(mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN)); > + > + if ( emt >= 0 ) > + new_entry.emt = emt; > + else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of this. */ > + new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; > + new_entry.ipat = ipat; > + } Should we assert that if new_entry.emt == MTRR_NUM_TYPES the entry must have the present bit set before the atomic_write_ept_entry() call? Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring 2024-06-12 14:38 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 14:53 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:23 ` Roger Pau Monné 0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 14:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Roger Pau Monné Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On 12.06.2024 16:38, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:16:59PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> For non-present entries EMT, like most other fields, is meaningless to >> hardware. Make the logic in ept_set_entry() setting the field (and iPAT) >> conditional upon dealing with a present entry, leaving the value at 0 >> otherwise. This has two effects for epte_get_entry_emt() which we'll >> want to leverage subsequently: >> 1) The call moved here now won't be issued with INVALID_MFN anymore (a >> respective BUG_ON() is being added). >> 2) Neither of the other two calls could now be issued with a truncated >> form of INVALID_MFN anymore (as long as there's no bug anywhere >> marking an entry present when that was populated using INVALID_MFN). >> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> >> --- >> v2: New. >> >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c >> @@ -650,6 +650,8 @@ static int cf_check resolve_misconfig(st >> if ( e.emt != MTRR_NUM_TYPES ) >> break; >> >> + ASSERT(is_epte_present(&e)); > > If this is added here, then there's a condition further below: > > if ( !is_epte_valid(&e) || !is_epte_present(&e) ) > > That needs adjusting AFAICT. I don't think so, because e was re-fetched in between. > However, in ept_set_entry() we seem to unconditionally call > resolve_misconfig() against the new entry to be populated, won't this > possibly cause resolve_misconfig() to be called against non-present > EPT entries? I think this is fine because such non-present entries > will have emt == 0, and hence will take the break just ahead of the > added ASSERT(). Right, hence how I placed this assertion. >> @@ -941,6 +932,22 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf >> need_modify_vtd_table = 0; >> >> ept_p2m_type_to_flags(p2m, &new_entry); >> + >> + if ( is_epte_present(&new_entry) ) >> + { >> + bool ipat; >> + int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, >> + i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, >> + p2mt); >> + >> + BUG_ON(mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN)); >> + >> + if ( emt >= 0 ) >> + new_entry.emt = emt; >> + else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of this. */ >> + new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; >> + new_entry.ipat = ipat; >> + } > > Should we assert that if new_entry.emt == MTRR_NUM_TYPES the entry > must have the present bit set before the atomic_write_ept_entry() > call? This would feel excessive to me. All writing to new_entry is close together, immediately ahead of that atomic_write_ept_entry(). And we're (now) writing MTRR_NUM_TYPES only when is_epte_present() is true (note that it's not "the present bit"). Jan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring 2024-06-12 14:53 ` Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 15:23 ` Roger Pau Monné 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 15:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 04:53:14PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 12.06.2024 16:38, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:16:59PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> For non-present entries EMT, like most other fields, is meaningless to > >> hardware. Make the logic in ept_set_entry() setting the field (and iPAT) > >> conditional upon dealing with a present entry, leaving the value at 0 > >> otherwise. This has two effects for epte_get_entry_emt() which we'll > >> want to leverage subsequently: > >> 1) The call moved here now won't be issued with INVALID_MFN anymore (a > >> respective BUG_ON() is being added). > >> 2) Neither of the other two calls could now be issued with a truncated > >> form of INVALID_MFN anymore (as long as there's no bug anywhere > >> marking an entry present when that was populated using INVALID_MFN). > >> > >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> > >> --- > >> v2: New. > >> > >> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > >> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > >> @@ -650,6 +650,8 @@ static int cf_check resolve_misconfig(st > >> if ( e.emt != MTRR_NUM_TYPES ) > >> break; > >> > >> + ASSERT(is_epte_present(&e)); > > > > If this is added here, then there's a condition further below: > > > > if ( !is_epte_valid(&e) || !is_epte_present(&e) ) > > > > That needs adjusting AFAICT. > > I don't think so, because e was re-fetched in between. Oh, I see, we take the opportunity to do the recalculation for all the EPT entries that share the same page table. > > However, in ept_set_entry() we seem to unconditionally call > > resolve_misconfig() against the new entry to be populated, won't this > > possibly cause resolve_misconfig() to be called against non-present > > EPT entries? I think this is fine because such non-present entries > > will have emt == 0, and hence will take the break just ahead of the > > added ASSERT(). > > Right, hence how I placed this assertion. OK, just wanted to double check. > >> @@ -941,6 +932,22 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf > >> need_modify_vtd_table = 0; > >> > >> ept_p2m_type_to_flags(p2m, &new_entry); > >> + > >> + if ( is_epte_present(&new_entry) ) > >> + { > >> + bool ipat; > >> + int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, > >> + i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, > >> + p2mt); > >> + > >> + BUG_ON(mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN)); > >> + > >> + if ( emt >= 0 ) > >> + new_entry.emt = emt; > >> + else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of this. */ > >> + new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; > >> + new_entry.ipat = ipat; > >> + } > > > > Should we assert that if new_entry.emt == MTRR_NUM_TYPES the entry > > must have the present bit set before the atomic_write_ept_entry() > > call? > > This would feel excessive to me. All writing to new_entry is close together, > immediately ahead of that atomic_write_ept_entry(). And we're (now) writing > MTRR_NUM_TYPES only when is_epte_present() is true (note that it's not "the > present bit"). Fair enough. Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 14:38 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-13 14:39 ` Oleksii K. 1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Oleksii K. @ 2024-06-13 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné On Wed, 2024-06-12 at 15:16 +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > For non-present entries EMT, like most other fields, is meaningless > to > hardware. Make the logic in ept_set_entry() setting the field (and > iPAT) > conditional upon dealing with a present entry, leaving the value at 0 > otherwise. This has two effects for epte_get_entry_emt() which we'll > want to leverage subsequently: > 1) The call moved here now won't be issued with INVALID_MFN anymore > (a > respective BUG_ON() is being added). > 2) Neither of the other two calls could now be issued with a > truncated > form of INVALID_MFN anymore (as long as there's no bug anywhere > marking an entry present when that was populated using > INVALID_MFN). > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Release-Acked-By: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> ~ Oleksii > --- > v2: New. > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > @@ -650,6 +650,8 @@ static int cf_check resolve_misconfig(st > if ( e.emt != MTRR_NUM_TYPES ) > break; > > + ASSERT(is_epte_present(&e)); > + > if ( level == 0 ) > { > for ( gfn -= i, i = 0; i < EPT_PAGETABLE_ENTRIES; > ++i ) > @@ -915,17 +917,6 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf > > if ( mfn_valid(mfn) || p2m_allows_invalid_mfn(p2mt) ) > { > - bool ipat; > - int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), mfn, > - i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, > - p2mt); > - > - if ( emt >= 0 ) > - new_entry.emt = emt; > - else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of > this. */ > - new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; > - > - new_entry.ipat = ipat; > new_entry.sp = !!i; > new_entry.sa_p2mt = p2mt; > new_entry.access = p2ma; > @@ -941,6 +932,22 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gf > need_modify_vtd_table = 0; > > ept_p2m_type_to_flags(p2m, &new_entry); > + > + if ( is_epte_present(&new_entry) ) > + { > + bool ipat; > + int emt = epte_get_entry_emt(p2m->domain, _gfn(gfn), > mfn, > + i * EPT_TABLE_ORDER, &ipat, > + p2mt); > + > + BUG_ON(mfn_eq(mfn, INVALID_MFN)); > + > + if ( emt >= 0 ) > + new_entry.emt = emt; > + else /* ept_handle_misconfig() will need to take care of > this. */ > + new_entry.emt = MTRR_NUM_TYPES; > + new_entry.ipat = ipat; > + } > } > > if ( sve != -1 ) > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 13:15 [PATCH v2 for-4.19 0/3] x86/EPT: avoid undue forcing of MMIO accesses to UC Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:17 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:00 ` Roger Pau Monné 2 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw) To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, Oleksii Kurochko mfn_valid() is RAM-focused; it will often return false for MMIO. Yet access to actual MMIO space should not generally be restricted to UC only; especially video frame buffer accesses are unduly affected by such a restriction. Since, as of ???????????? ("x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring"), the function won't be called with INVALID_MFN or, worse, truncated forms thereof anymore, we call fully drop that check. Fixes: 81fd0d3ca4b2 ("x86/hvm: simplify 'mmio_direct' check in epte_get_entry_emt()") Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> --- Considering that we've just declared PVH Dom0 "supported", this may well qualify for 4.19. The issue was specifically very noticeable there. --- v2: Different approach (and hence different title and description). --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c @@ -501,12 +501,6 @@ int epte_get_entry_emt(struct domain *d, return -1; } - if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) - { - *ipat = true; - return X86_MT_UC; - } - /* * Conditional must be kept in sync with the code in * {iomem,ioports}_{permit,deny}_access(). ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 13:17 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 15:00 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 15:14 ` Jan Beulich 0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 15:00 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:17:38PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > mfn_valid() is RAM-focused; it will often return false for MMIO. Yet > access to actual MMIO space should not generally be restricted to UC > only; especially video frame buffer accesses are unduly affected by such > a restriction. > > Since, as of ???????????? ("x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries > for re-configuring"), the function won't be called with INVALID_MFN or, > worse, truncated forms thereof anymore, we call fully drop that check. > > Fixes: 81fd0d3ca4b2 ("x86/hvm: simplify 'mmio_direct' check in epte_get_entry_emt()") > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> I do think this is the way to go (removing quirks from epte_get_entry_emt()), however it's a risky change to make at this point in the release. If this turns out to cause some unexpected damage, it would only affect HVM guests with PCI passthrough and PVH dom0, which I consider not great, but tolerable. I would be more comfortable with making the change just not so close to the release, but that's where we are. Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> I wonder if you should explicitly mention that if adding the mfn_valid() check was done to ensure all mappings to MMIO are created with effective UC caching attribute it won't be fully correct either. Xen could map those using a different effective caching attribute by virtue of host MTRRs being in effect plus Xen chosen PAT attributes. Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 15:00 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 15:14 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:27 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-13 7:32 ` Roger Pau Monné 0 siblings, 2 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Roger Pau Monné Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On 12.06.2024 17:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:17:38PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> mfn_valid() is RAM-focused; it will often return false for MMIO. Yet >> access to actual MMIO space should not generally be restricted to UC >> only; especially video frame buffer accesses are unduly affected by such >> a restriction. >> >> Since, as of ???????????? ("x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries >> for re-configuring"), the function won't be called with INVALID_MFN or, >> worse, truncated forms thereof anymore, we call fully drop that check. >> >> Fixes: 81fd0d3ca4b2 ("x86/hvm: simplify 'mmio_direct' check in epte_get_entry_emt()") >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> >> Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> > > I do think this is the way to go (removing quirks from > epte_get_entry_emt()), however it's a risky change to make at this > point in the release. > > If this turns out to cause some unexpected damage, it would only > affect HVM guests with PCI passthrough and PVH dom0, which I consider > not great, but tolerable. > > I would be more comfortable with making the change just not so close > to the release, but that's where we are. Certainly, and I could live with Oleksii revoking his R-a-b (or simply not offering it for either of the two prereq changes). Main thing for me is - PVH Dom0 finally isn't so horribly slow anymore. However, if it doesn't go into the release, then I'd also be unsure about eventual backporting. > Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Thanks. > I wonder if you should explicitly mention that if adding the > mfn_valid() check was done to ensure all mappings to MMIO are created > with effective UC caching attribute it won't be fully correct either. > Xen could map those using a different effective caching attribute by > virtue of host MTRRs being in effect plus Xen chosen PAT attributes. Well, the mfn_valid() can't have been there to cover _all_ MMIO. It was maybe a flawed initial attempt at doing so, and then wasn't properly adjusted / dropped. So overall - no, I don't think extending the description with anything along the lines of the above would make a lot of sense. Jan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 15:14 ` Jan Beulich @ 2024-06-12 15:27 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-13 7:32 ` Roger Pau Monné 1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-12 15:27 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 05:14:37PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 12.06.2024 17:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > I wonder if you should explicitly mention that if adding the > > mfn_valid() check was done to ensure all mappings to MMIO are created > > with effective UC caching attribute it won't be fully correct either. > > Xen could map those using a different effective caching attribute by > > virtue of host MTRRs being in effect plus Xen chosen PAT attributes. > > Well, the mfn_valid() can't have been there to cover _all_ MMIO. It was > maybe a flawed initial attempt at doing so, and then wasn't properly > adjusted / dropped. So overall - no, I don't think extending the > description with anything along the lines of the above would make a lot > of sense. I realized myself when writing the paragraph that I wouldn't even know how to word it properly, neither it would be much helpful without knowing the exact intention the mfn_valid() check was added for. Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() 2024-06-12 15:14 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:27 ` Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-13 7:32 ` Roger Pau Monné 1 sibling, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Roger Pau Monné @ 2024-06-13 7:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Andrew Cooper, Oleksii Kurochko On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 05:14:37PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 12.06.2024 17:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > > On Wed, Jun 12, 2024 at 03:17:38PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> mfn_valid() is RAM-focused; it will often return false for MMIO. Yet > >> access to actual MMIO space should not generally be restricted to UC > >> only; especially video frame buffer accesses are unduly affected by such > >> a restriction. > >> > >> Since, as of ???????????? ("x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries > >> for re-configuring"), the function won't be called with INVALID_MFN or, > >> worse, truncated forms thereof anymore, we call fully drop that check. > >> > >> Fixes: 81fd0d3ca4b2 ("x86/hvm: simplify 'mmio_direct' check in epte_get_entry_emt()") > >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> > >> Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> > > > > I do think this is the way to go (removing quirks from > > epte_get_entry_emt()), however it's a risky change to make at this > > point in the release. > > > > If this turns out to cause some unexpected damage, it would only > > affect HVM guests with PCI passthrough and PVH dom0, which I consider > > not great, but tolerable. > > > > I would be more comfortable with making the change just not so close > > to the release, but that's where we are. > > Certainly, and I could live with Oleksii revoking his R-a-b (or simply > not offering it for either of the two prereq changes). Main thing for > me is - PVH Dom0 finally isn't so horribly slow anymore. However, if it > doesn't go into the release, then I'd also be unsure about eventual > backporting. Thinking about this, it's also likely to fix issues with PCI passthrough to HVM guests, so I'm quite sure we would need to backport it. David Woodhouse already had to fix it once: https://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=commit;h=30921dc2df3665ca1b2593595aa6725ff013d386 And I'm quite sure this fix was not related to PVH dom0. Thanks, Roger. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-06-13 14:40 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 17+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2024-06-12 13:15 [PATCH v2 for-4.19 0/3] x86/EPT: avoid undue forcing of MMIO accesses to UC Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 1/3] x86/EPT: correct special page checking in epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 14:11 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 14:47 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:02 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 15:06 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-13 14:38 ` Oleksii K. 2024-06-12 13:16 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 2/3] x86/EPT: avoid marking non-present entries for re-configuring Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 14:38 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 14:53 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:23 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-13 14:39 ` Oleksii K. 2024-06-12 13:17 ` [PATCH v2 for-4.19 3/3] x86/EPT: drop questionable mfn_valid() from epte_get_entry_emt() Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:00 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-12 15:14 ` Jan Beulich 2024-06-12 15:27 ` Roger Pau Monné 2024-06-13 7:32 ` Roger Pau Monné
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.