* [PATCH v5 0/3] Add API for making parts of a MMIO page R/O and use it in XHCI console
@ 2024-07-19 2:33 Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
On older systems, XHCI xcap had a layout that no other (interesting) registers
were placed on the same page as the debug capability, so Linux was fine with
making the whole page R/O. But at least on Tiger Lake and Alder Lake, Linux
needs to write to some other registers on the same page too.
Add a generic API for making just parts of an MMIO page R/O and use it to fix
USB3 console with share=yes or share=hwdom options. More details in commit
messages.
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (3):
xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT
x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only
drivers/char: Use sub-page ro API to make just xhci dbc cap RO
xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 4 +-
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h | 23 +++-
xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 262 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c | 6 +-
xen/drivers/char/xhci-dbc.c | 36 +++--
xen/include/xen/list.h | 3 +-
7 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
base-commit: a99f25f7ac60544e9af4b3b516d7566ba8841cc4
--
git-series 0.9.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT 2024-07-19 2:33 [PATCH v5 0/3] Add API for making parts of a MMIO page R/O and use it in XHCI console Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-22 11:03 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] drivers/char: Use sub-page ro API to make just xhci dbc cap RO Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw) To: xen-devel Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Andrew Cooper, Jan Beulich, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini Similar to LIST_HEAD_READ_MOSTLY. Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> --- New in v5 --- xen/include/xen/list.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/xen/include/xen/list.h b/xen/include/xen/list.h index 6506ac40893b..62169f46742e 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/list.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/list.h @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ struct list_head { #define LIST_HEAD_READ_MOSTLY(name) \ struct list_head __read_mostly name = LIST_HEAD_INIT(name) +#define LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT(name) \ + struct list_head __ro_after_init name = LIST_HEAD_INIT(name) + static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list) { list->next = list; -- git-series 0.9.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-22 11:03 ` Jan Beulich 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-07-22 11:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Cc: Andrew Cooper, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, xen-devel On 19.07.2024 04:33, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > Similar to LIST_HEAD_READ_MOSTLY. > > Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only 2024-07-19 2:33 [PATCH v5 0/3] Add API for making parts of a MMIO page R/O and use it in XHCI console Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-22 12:09 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] drivers/char: Use sub-page ro API to make just xhci dbc cap RO Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw) To: xen-devel Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné In some cases, only few registers on a page needs to be write-protected. Examples include USB3 console (64 bytes worth of registers) or MSI-X's PBA table (which doesn't need to span the whole table either), although in the latter case the spec forbids placing other registers on the same page. Current API allows only marking whole pages pages read-only, which sometimes may cover other registers that guest may need to write into. Currently, when a guest tries to write to an MMIO page on the mmio_ro_ranges, it's either immediately crashed on EPT violation - if that's HVM, or if PV, it gets #PF. In case of Linux PV, if access was from userspace (like, /dev/mem), it will try to fixup by updating page tables (that Xen again will force to read-only) and will hit that #PF again (looping endlessly). Both behaviors are undesirable if guest could actually be allowed the write. Introduce an API that allows marking part of a page read-only. Since sub-page permissions are not a thing in page tables (they are in EPT, but not granular enough), do this via emulation (or simply page fault handler for PV) that handles writes that are supposed to be allowed. The new subpage_mmio_ro_add() takes a start physical address and the region size in bytes. Both start address and the size need to be 8-byte aligned, as a practical simplification (allows using smaller bitmask, and a smaller granularity isn't really necessary right now). It will internally add relevant pages to mmio_ro_ranges, but if either start or end address is not page-aligned, it additionally adds that page to a list for sub-page R/O handling. The list holds a bitmask which qwords are supposed to be read-only and an address where page is mapped for write emulation - this mapping is done only on the first access. A plain list is used instead of more efficient structure, because there isn't supposed to be many pages needing this precise r/o control. The mechanism this API is plugged in is slightly different for PV and HVM. For both paths, it's plugged into mmio_ro_emulated_write(). For PV, it's already called for #PF on read-only MMIO page. For HVM however, EPT violation on p2m_mmio_direct page results in a direct domain_crash() for non hardware domains. To reach mmio_ro_emulated_write(), change how write violations for p2m_mmio_direct are handled - specifically, check if they relate to such partially protected page via subpage_mmio_write_accept() and if so, call hvm_emulate_one_mmio() for them too. This decodes what guest is trying write and finally calls mmio_ro_emulated_write(). The EPT write violation is detected as npfec.write_access and npfec.present both being true (similar to other places), which may cover some other (future?) cases - if that happens, emulator might get involved unnecessarily, but since it's limited to pages marked with subpage_mmio_ro_add() only, the impact is minimal. Both of those paths need an MFN to which guest tried to write (to check which part of the page is supposed to be read-only, and where the page is mapped for writes). This information currently isn't available directly in mmio_ro_emulated_write(), but in both cases it is already resolved somewhere higher in the call tree. Pass it down to mmio_ro_emulated_write() via new mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt.mfn field. This may give a bit more access to the instruction emulator to HVM guests (the change in hvm_hap_nested_page_fault()), but only for pages explicitly marked with subpage_mmio_ro_add() - so, if the guest has a passed through a device partially used by Xen. As of the next patch, it applies only configuration explicitly documented as not security supported. The subpage_mmio_ro_add() function cannot be called with overlapping ranges, and on pages already added to mmio_ro_ranges separately. Successful calls would result in correct handling, but error paths may result in incorrect state (like pages removed from mmio_ro_ranges too early). Debug build has asserts for relevant cases. Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> --- Shadow mode is not tested, but I don't expect it to work differently than HAP in areas related to this patch. Changes in v5: - use subpage_mmio_find_page helper, simplifying several functions - use LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT - don't use subpage_ro_lock in __init - drop #ifdef in mm.h - return error on unaligned size in subpage_mmio_ro_add() instead of extending the size (in release build) Changes in v4: - rename SUBPAGE_MMIO_RO_ALIGN to MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN - guard subpage_mmio_write_accept with CONFIG_HVM, as it's used only there - rename ro_qwords to ro_elems - use unsigned arguments for subpage_mmio_ro_remove_page() - use volatile for __iomem - do not set mmio_ro_ctxt.mfn for mmcfg case - comment where fields of mmio_ro_ctxt are used - use bool for result of __test_and_set_bit - do not open-code mfn_to_maddr() - remove leftover RCU - mention hvm_hap_nested_page_fault() explicitly in the commit message Changes in v3: - use unsigned int for loop iterators - use __set_bit/__clear_bit when under spinlock - avoid ioremap() under spinlock - do not cast away const - handle unaligned parameters in release build - comment fixes - remove RCU - the add functions are __init and actual usage is only much later after domains are running - add checks overlapping ranges in debug build and document the limitations - change subpage_mmio_ro_add() so the error path doesn't potentially remove pages from mmio_ro_ranges - move printing message to avoid one goto in subpage_mmio_write_emulate() Changes in v2: - Simplify subpage_mmio_ro_add() parameters - add to mmio_ro_ranges from within subpage_mmio_ro_add() - use ioremap() instead of caller-provided fixmap - use 8-bytes granularity (largest supported single write) and a bitmap instead of a rangeset - clarify commit message - change how it's plugged in for HVM domain, to not change the behavior for read-only parts (keep it hitting domain_crash(), instead of ignoring write) - remove unused subpage_mmio_ro_remove() --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c | 2 +- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 4 +- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h | 23 +++- xen/arch/x86/mm.c | 262 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c | 6 +- 5 files changed, 292 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c index 02e378365b40..7253a87032dd 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c @@ -2734,7 +2734,7 @@ int hvm_emulate_one_mmio(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long gla) .write = mmio_ro_emulated_write, .validate = hvmemul_validate, }; - struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = { .cr2 = gla }; + struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt mmio_ro_ctxt = { .cr2 = gla, .mfn = _mfn(mfn) }; struct hvm_emulate_ctxt ctxt; const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops; unsigned int seg, bdf; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index 7f4b627b1f5f..a108870558bf 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -2016,8 +2016,8 @@ int hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, goto out_put_gfn; } - if ( (p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct) && is_hardware_domain(currd) && - npfec.write_access && npfec.present && + if ( (p2mt == p2m_mmio_direct) && npfec.write_access && npfec.present && + (is_hardware_domain(currd) || subpage_mmio_write_accept(mfn, gla)) && (hvm_emulate_one_mmio(mfn_x(mfn), gla) == X86EMUL_OKAY) ) { rc = 1; diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h index 98b66edaca5e..a457f0d2b1b3 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/mm.h @@ -522,9 +522,32 @@ extern struct rangeset *mmio_ro_ranges; void memguard_guard_stack(void *p); void memguard_unguard_stack(void *p); +/* + * Add more precise r/o marking for a MMIO page. Range specified here + * will still be R/O, but the rest of the page (not marked as R/O via another + * call) will have writes passed through. + * The start address and the size must be aligned to MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN. + * + * This API cannot be used for overlapping ranges, nor for pages already added + * to mmio_ro_ranges separately. + * + * Since there is currently no subpage_mmio_ro_remove(), relevant device should + * not be hot-unplugged. + * + * Return values: + * - negative: error + * - 0: success + */ +#define MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN 8 +int subpage_mmio_ro_add(paddr_t start, size_t size); +bool subpage_mmio_write_accept(mfn_t mfn, unsigned long gla); + struct mmio_ro_emulate_ctxt { unsigned long cr2; + /* Used only for mmcfg case */ unsigned int seg, bdf; + /* Used only for non-mmcfg case */ + mfn_t mfn; }; int cf_check mmio_ro_emulated_write( diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c index 648d6dd475ba..7f0ac537e86c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c @@ -150,6 +150,17 @@ bool __read_mostly machine_to_phys_mapping_valid; struct rangeset *__read_mostly mmio_ro_ranges; +/* Handling sub-page read-only MMIO regions */ +struct subpage_ro_range { + struct list_head list; + mfn_t mfn; + void __iomem *mapped; + DECLARE_BITMAP(ro_elems, PAGE_SIZE / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN); +}; + +static LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT(subpage_ro_ranges); +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(subpage_ro_lock); + static uint32_t base_disallow_mask; /* Global bit is allowed to be set on L1 PTEs. Intended for user mappings. */ #define L1_DISALLOW_MASK ((base_disallow_mask | _PAGE_GNTTAB) & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL) @@ -4910,6 +4921,254 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) return rc; } +static void __iomem *subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn_t mfn) +{ + struct subpage_ro_range *entry; + + list_for_each_entry(entry, &subpage_ro_ranges, list) + if ( mfn_eq(entry->mfn, mfn) ) + return entry; + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Mark part of the page as R/O. + * Returns: + * - 0 on success - first range in the page + * - 1 on success - subsequent range in the page + * - <0 on error + */ +static int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add_page( + mfn_t mfn, + unsigned int offset_s, + unsigned int offset_e) +{ + struct subpage_ro_range *entry = NULL, *iter; + unsigned int i; + + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); + if ( !entry ) + { + /* iter == NULL marks it was a newly allocated entry */ + iter = NULL; + entry = xzalloc(struct subpage_ro_range); + if ( !entry ) + return -ENOMEM; + entry->mfn = mfn; + } + + for ( i = offset_s; i <= offset_e; i += MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN ) + { + bool oldbit = __test_and_set_bit(i / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, + entry->ro_elems); + ASSERT(!oldbit); + } + + if ( !iter ) + list_add(&entry->list, &subpage_ro_ranges); + + return iter ? 1 : 0; +} + +static void __init subpage_mmio_ro_remove_page( + mfn_t mfn, + unsigned int offset_s, + unsigned int offset_e) +{ + struct subpage_ro_range *entry = NULL; + unsigned int i; + + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); + if ( !entry ) + return; + + for ( i = offset_s; i <= offset_e; i += MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN ) + __clear_bit(i / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, entry->ro_elems); + + if ( !bitmap_empty(entry->ro_elems, PAGE_SIZE / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN) ) + return; + + list_del(&entry->list); + if ( entry->mapped ) + iounmap(entry->mapped); + xfree(entry); +} + +int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add( + paddr_t start, + size_t size) +{ + mfn_t mfn_start = maddr_to_mfn(start); + paddr_t end = start + size - 1; + mfn_t mfn_end = maddr_to_mfn(end); + unsigned int offset_end = 0; + int rc; + bool subpage_start, subpage_end; + + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); + if ( !IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN) ) + return -EINVAL; + + if ( !size ) + return 0; + + if ( mfn_eq(mfn_start, mfn_end) ) + { + /* Both starting and ending parts handled at once */ + subpage_start = PAGE_OFFSET(start) || PAGE_OFFSET(end) != PAGE_SIZE - 1; + subpage_end = false; + } + else + { + subpage_start = PAGE_OFFSET(start); + subpage_end = PAGE_OFFSET(end) != PAGE_SIZE - 1; + } + + if ( subpage_start ) + { + offset_end = mfn_eq(mfn_start, mfn_end) ? + PAGE_OFFSET(end) : + (PAGE_SIZE - 1); + rc = subpage_mmio_ro_add_page(mfn_start, + PAGE_OFFSET(start), + offset_end); + if ( rc < 0 ) + goto err_unlock; + /* Check if not marking R/W part of a page intended to be fully R/O */ + ASSERT(rc || !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, + mfn_x(mfn_start))); + } + + if ( subpage_end ) + { + rc = subpage_mmio_ro_add_page(mfn_end, 0, PAGE_OFFSET(end)); + if ( rc < 0 ) + goto err_unlock_remove; + /* Check if not marking R/W part of a page intended to be fully R/O */ + ASSERT(rc || !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, + mfn_x(mfn_end))); + } + + rc = rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn_start), mfn_x(mfn_end)); + if ( rc ) + goto err_remove; + + return 0; + + err_remove: + if ( subpage_end ) + subpage_mmio_ro_remove_page(mfn_end, 0, PAGE_OFFSET(end)); + err_unlock_remove: + if ( subpage_start ) + subpage_mmio_ro_remove_page(mfn_start, PAGE_OFFSET(start), offset_end); + err_unlock: + return rc; +} + +static void __iomem *subpage_mmio_map_page( + struct subpage_ro_range *entry) +{ + void __iomem *mapped_page; + + if ( entry->mapped ) + return entry->mapped; + + mapped_page = ioremap(mfn_to_maddr(entry->mfn), PAGE_SIZE); + + spin_lock(&subpage_ro_lock); + /* Re-check under the lock */ + if ( entry->mapped ) + { + spin_unlock(&subpage_ro_lock); + if ( mapped_page ) + iounmap(mapped_page); + return entry->mapped; + } + + entry->mapped = mapped_page; + spin_unlock(&subpage_ro_lock); + return entry->mapped; +} + +static void subpage_mmio_write_emulate( + mfn_t mfn, + unsigned int offset, + const void *data, + unsigned int len) +{ + struct subpage_ro_range *entry; + volatile void __iomem *addr; + + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); + if ( !entry ) + /* Do not print message for pages without any writable parts. */ + return; + + if ( test_bit(offset / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, entry->ro_elems) ) + { +write_ignored: + gprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, + "ignoring write to R/O MMIO 0x%"PRI_mfn"%03x len %u\n", + mfn_x(mfn), offset, len); + return; + } + + addr = subpage_mmio_map_page(entry); + if ( !addr ) + { + gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, + "Failed to map page for MMIO write at 0x%"PRI_mfn"%03x\n", + mfn_x(mfn), offset); + return; + } + + switch ( len ) + { + case 1: + writeb(*(const uint8_t*)data, addr); + break; + case 2: + writew(*(const uint16_t*)data, addr); + break; + case 4: + writel(*(const uint32_t*)data, addr); + break; + case 8: + writeq(*(const uint64_t*)data, addr); + break; + default: + /* mmio_ro_emulated_write() already validated the size */ + ASSERT_UNREACHABLE(); + goto write_ignored; + } +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_HVM +bool subpage_mmio_write_accept(mfn_t mfn, unsigned long gla) +{ + unsigned int offset = PAGE_OFFSET(gla); + const struct subpage_ro_range *entry; + + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); + if ( !entry ) + return false; + + if ( !test_bit(offset / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, entry->ro_elems) ) + { + /* + * We don't know the write size at this point yet, so it could be + * an unaligned write, but accept it here anyway and deal with it + * later. + */ + return true; + } + + return false; +} +#endif + int cf_check mmio_ro_emulated_write( enum x86_segment seg, unsigned long offset, @@ -4928,6 +5187,9 @@ int cf_check mmio_ro_emulated_write( return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE; } + subpage_mmio_write_emulate(mmio_ro_ctxt->mfn, PAGE_OFFSET(offset), + p_data, bytes); + return X86EMUL_OKAY; } diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c index cad28ef928ad..2ea1a6ad489c 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/ro-page-fault.c @@ -333,8 +333,10 @@ static int mmio_ro_do_page_fault(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ctxt->data = &mmio_ro_ctxt; if ( pci_ro_mmcfg_decode(mfn_x(mfn), &mmio_ro_ctxt.seg, &mmio_ro_ctxt.bdf) ) return x86_emulate(ctxt, &mmcfg_intercept_ops); - else - return x86_emulate(ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops); + + mmio_ro_ctxt.mfn = mfn; + + return x86_emulate(ctxt, &mmio_ro_emulate_ops); } int pv_ro_page_fault(unsigned long addr, struct cpu_user_regs *regs) -- git-series 0.9.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-22 12:09 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-22 12:36 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-07-22 12:09 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, xen-devel On 19.07.2024 04:33, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > @@ -4910,6 +4921,254 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) > return rc; > } > > +static void __iomem *subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn_t mfn) > +{ > + struct subpage_ro_range *entry; With the function returning void*, my first reaction was to ask why this isn't pointer-to-const. Yet then ... > + list_for_each_entry(entry, &subpage_ro_ranges, list) > + if ( mfn_eq(entry->mfn, mfn) ) > + return entry; ... you're actually returning entry here, just with its type zapped for no apparent reason. I also question the __iomem in the return type. > +static int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add_page( > + mfn_t mfn, > + unsigned int offset_s, > + unsigned int offset_e) > +{ > + struct subpage_ro_range *entry = NULL, *iter; > + unsigned int i; > + > + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); > + if ( !entry ) > + { > + /* iter == NULL marks it was a newly allocated entry */ > + iter = NULL; Yet you don't use "iter" for other purposes anymore. I think the variable wants renaming and shrinking to e.g. a simple bool. > + entry = xzalloc(struct subpage_ro_range); > + if ( !entry ) > + return -ENOMEM; > + entry->mfn = mfn; > + } > + > + for ( i = offset_s; i <= offset_e; i += MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN ) > + { > + bool oldbit = __test_and_set_bit(i / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, > + entry->ro_elems); Nit: Indentation looks to be off by 1 here. > + ASSERT(!oldbit); > + } > + > + if ( !iter ) > + list_add(&entry->list, &subpage_ro_ranges); What's wrong with doing this right in the earlier conditional? > +int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add( > + paddr_t start, > + size_t size) > +{ > + mfn_t mfn_start = maddr_to_mfn(start); > + paddr_t end = start + size - 1; > + mfn_t mfn_end = maddr_to_mfn(end); > + unsigned int offset_end = 0; > + int rc; > + bool subpage_start, subpage_end; > + > + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); > + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); > + if ( !IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN) ) > + return -EINVAL; I think I had asked before: Why is misaligned size something that wants a release build fallback to the assertion, but not misaligned start? > +static void subpage_mmio_write_emulate( > + mfn_t mfn, > + unsigned int offset, > + const void *data, > + unsigned int len) > +{ > + struct subpage_ro_range *entry; > + volatile void __iomem *addr; > + > + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); > + if ( !entry ) > + /* Do not print message for pages without any writable parts. */ > + return; > + > + if ( test_bit(offset / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, entry->ro_elems) ) > + { > +write_ignored: Nit: Like you have it further up, labels indented by at least one blank please. Jan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only 2024-07-22 12:09 ` Jan Beulich @ 2024-07-22 12:36 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-22 13:01 ` Jan Beulich 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-22 12:36 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, xen-devel [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2984 bytes --] On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 02:09:15PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 19.07.2024 04:33, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > > @@ -4910,6 +4921,254 @@ long arch_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg) > > return rc; > > } > > > > +static void __iomem *subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn_t mfn) > > +{ > > + struct subpage_ro_range *entry; > > With the function returning void*, my first reaction was to ask why this > isn't pointer-to-const. Yet then ... > > > + list_for_each_entry(entry, &subpage_ro_ranges, list) > > + if ( mfn_eq(entry->mfn, mfn) ) > > + return entry; > > ... you're actually returning entry here, just with its type zapped for > no apparent reason. I also question the __iomem in the return type. Right, a leftover from some earlier version. > > +static int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add_page( > > + mfn_t mfn, > > + unsigned int offset_s, > > + unsigned int offset_e) > > +{ > > + struct subpage_ro_range *entry = NULL, *iter; > > + unsigned int i; > > + > > + entry = subpage_mmio_find_page(mfn); > > + if ( !entry ) > > + { > > + /* iter == NULL marks it was a newly allocated entry */ > > + iter = NULL; > > Yet you don't use "iter" for other purposes anymore. I think the variable > wants renaming and shrinking to e.g. a simple bool. +1 > > + entry = xzalloc(struct subpage_ro_range); > > + if ( !entry ) > > + return -ENOMEM; > > + entry->mfn = mfn; > > + } > > + > > + for ( i = offset_s; i <= offset_e; i += MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN ) > > + { > > + bool oldbit = __test_and_set_bit(i / MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN, > > + entry->ro_elems); > > Nit: Indentation looks to be off by 1 here. > > > + ASSERT(!oldbit); > > + } > > + > > + if ( !iter ) > > + list_add(&entry->list, &subpage_ro_ranges); > > What's wrong with doing this right in the earlier conditional? > > > +int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add( > > + paddr_t start, > > + size_t size) > > +{ > > + mfn_t mfn_start = maddr_to_mfn(start); > > + paddr_t end = start + size - 1; > > + mfn_t mfn_end = maddr_to_mfn(end); > > + unsigned int offset_end = 0; > > + int rc; > > + bool subpage_start, subpage_end; > > + > > + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); > > + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); > > + if ( !IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN) ) > > + return -EINVAL; > > I think I had asked before: Why is misaligned size something that wants a > release build fallback to the assertion, but not misaligned start? Misaligned start will lead to protecting larger area, not smaller, so it is not unsafe thing to do. But I can also make it return an error, it shouldn't happen after all. -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab [-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only 2024-07-22 12:36 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-22 13:01 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-22 13:38 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread From: Jan Beulich @ 2024-07-22 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, xen-devel On 22.07.2024 14:36, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 02:09:15PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 19.07.2024 04:33, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: >>> +int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add( >>> + paddr_t start, >>> + size_t size) >>> +{ >>> + mfn_t mfn_start = maddr_to_mfn(start); >>> + paddr_t end = start + size - 1; >>> + mfn_t mfn_end = maddr_to_mfn(end); >>> + unsigned int offset_end = 0; >>> + int rc; >>> + bool subpage_start, subpage_end; >>> + >>> + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); >>> + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); >>> + if ( !IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN) ) >>> + return -EINVAL; >> >> I think I had asked before: Why is misaligned size something that wants a >> release build fallback to the assertion, but not misaligned start? > > Misaligned start will lead to protecting larger area, not smaller, so it > is not unsafe thing to do. But I can also make it return an error, it > shouldn't happen after all. Well, I wouldn't mind if you kept what you have, just with a (brief) comment making clear why there is a difference in treatment. After all you could treat mis-aligned size similarly, making the protected area larger, too. Jan ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only 2024-07-22 13:01 ` Jan Beulich @ 2024-07-22 13:38 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-22 13:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Jan Beulich; +Cc: Andrew Cooper, Roger Pau Monné, xen-devel [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1487 bytes --] On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 03:01:45PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 22.07.2024 14:36, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 02:09:15PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote: > >> On 19.07.2024 04:33, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > >>> +int __init subpage_mmio_ro_add( > >>> + paddr_t start, > >>> + size_t size) > >>> +{ > >>> + mfn_t mfn_start = maddr_to_mfn(start); > >>> + paddr_t end = start + size - 1; > >>> + mfn_t mfn_end = maddr_to_mfn(end); > >>> + unsigned int offset_end = 0; > >>> + int rc; > >>> + bool subpage_start, subpage_end; > >>> + > >>> + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(start, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); > >>> + ASSERT(IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN)); > >>> + if ( !IS_ALIGNED(size, MMIO_RO_SUBPAGE_GRAN) ) > >>> + return -EINVAL; > >> > >> I think I had asked before: Why is misaligned size something that wants a > >> release build fallback to the assertion, but not misaligned start? > > > > Misaligned start will lead to protecting larger area, not smaller, so it > > is not unsafe thing to do. But I can also make it return an error, it > > shouldn't happen after all. > > Well, I wouldn't mind if you kept what you have, just with a (brief) comment > making clear why there is a difference in treatment. After all you could > treat mis-aligned size similarly, making the protected area larger, too. Ok. -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab [-- Attachment #2: signature.asc --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 488 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 3/3] drivers/char: Use sub-page ro API to make just xhci dbc cap RO 2024-07-19 2:33 [PATCH v5 0/3] Add API for making parts of a MMIO page R/O and use it in XHCI console Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread From: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki @ 2024-07-19 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw) To: xen-devel Cc: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki, Jan Beulich, Andrew Cooper, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini Not the whole page, which may contain other registers too. The XHCI specification describes DbC as designed to be controlled by a different driver, but does not mandate placing registers on a separate page. In fact on Tiger Lake and newer (at least), this page do contain other registers that Linux tries to use. And with share=yes, a domU would use them too. Without this patch, PV dom0 would fail to initialize the controller, while HVM would be killed on EPT violation. With `share=yes`, this patch gives domU more access to the emulator (although a HVM with any emulated device already has plenty of it). This configuration is already documented as unsafe with untrusted guests and not security supported. Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- Changes in v4: - restore mmio_ro_ranges in the fallback case - set XHCI_SHARE_NONE in the fallback case Changes in v3: - indentation fix - remove stale comment - fallback to pci_ro_device() if subpage_mmio_ro_add() fails - extend commit message Changes in v2: - adjust for simplified subpage_mmio_ro_add() API --- xen/drivers/char/xhci-dbc.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/drivers/char/xhci-dbc.c b/xen/drivers/char/xhci-dbc.c index 8e2037f1a5f7..c45e4b6825cc 100644 --- a/xen/drivers/char/xhci-dbc.c +++ b/xen/drivers/char/xhci-dbc.c @@ -1216,20 +1216,28 @@ static void __init cf_check dbc_uart_init_postirq(struct serial_port *port) break; } #ifdef CONFIG_X86 - /* - * This marks the whole page as R/O, which may include other registers - * unrelated to DbC. Xen needs only DbC area protected, but it seems - * Linux's XHCI driver (as of 5.18) works without writting to the whole - * page, so keep it simple. - */ - if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, - PFN_DOWN((uart->dbc.bar_val & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_MASK) + - uart->dbc.xhc_dbc_offset), - PFN_UP((uart->dbc.bar_val & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_MASK) + - uart->dbc.xhc_dbc_offset + - sizeof(*uart->dbc.dbc_reg)) - 1) ) - printk(XENLOG_INFO - "Error while adding MMIO range of device to mmio_ro_ranges\n"); + if ( subpage_mmio_ro_add( + (uart->dbc.bar_val & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_MASK) + + uart->dbc.xhc_dbc_offset, + sizeof(*uart->dbc.dbc_reg)) ) + { + printk(XENLOG_WARNING + "Error while marking MMIO range of XHCI console as R/O, " + "making the whole device R/O (share=no)\n"); + uart->dbc.share = XHCI_SHARE_NONE; + if ( pci_ro_device(0, uart->dbc.sbdf.bus, uart->dbc.sbdf.devfn) ) + printk(XENLOG_WARNING + "Failed to mark read-only %pp used for XHCI console\n", + &uart->dbc.sbdf); + if ( rangeset_add_range(mmio_ro_ranges, + PFN_DOWN((uart->dbc.bar_val & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_MASK) + + uart->dbc.xhc_dbc_offset), + PFN_UP((uart->dbc.bar_val & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_MASK) + + uart->dbc.xhc_dbc_offset + + sizeof(*uart->dbc.dbc_reg)) - 1) ) + printk(XENLOG_INFO + "Error while adding MMIO range of device to mmio_ro_ranges\n"); + } #endif } -- git-series 0.9.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-07-22 13:39 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2024-07-19 2:33 [PATCH v5 0/3] Add API for making parts of a MMIO page R/O and use it in XHCI console Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] xen/list: add LIST_HEAD_RO_AFTER_INIT Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-22 11:03 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/mm: add API for marking only part of a MMIO page read only Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-22 12:09 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-22 12:36 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-22 13:01 ` Jan Beulich 2024-07-22 13:38 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki 2024-07-19 2:33 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] drivers/char: Use sub-page ro API to make just xhci dbc cap RO Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
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