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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
	Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>,
	Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>,
	Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/39] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:12:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZsdjbsDrMWgBU9Hj@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-19-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org>

On Thu, Aug 22, 2024 at 02:15:22AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> index 451ba7cbd5ad..3ada31c2ac12 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> @@ -486,6 +486,14 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static bool is_gcs_fault(unsigned long esr)
> +{
> +	if (!esr_is_data_abort(esr))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr) & ESR_ELx_GCS;
> +}
> +
>  static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr)
>  {
>  	return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
> @@ -500,6 +508,23 @@ static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
>  	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
>  }
>  
> +static bool is_invalid_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr)
> +{
> +	if (!system_supports_gcs())
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(is_gcs_fault(esr))) {
> +		/* GCS accesses must be performed on a GCS page */
> +		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
> +			return true;

This first check covers the GCSPOPM/RET etc. permission faults on
non-GCS vmas. It looks correct.

> +	} else if (unlikely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
> +		/* Only GCS operations can write to a GCS page */
> +		return is_write_abort(esr);
> +	}

I don't think that's right. The ESR on this path may not even indicate a
data abort and ESR.WnR bit check wouldn't make sense.

I presume we want to avoid an infinite loop on a (writeable) GCS page
when the user does a normal STR but the CPU raises a permission fault. I
think this function needs to just return false if !esr_is_data_abort().

> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  				   struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
> @@ -535,6 +560,14 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  		/* It was exec fault */
>  		vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
>  		mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
> +	} else if (is_gcs_fault(esr)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * The GCS permission on a page implies both read and
> +		 * write so always handle any GCS fault as a write fault,
> +		 * we need to trigger CoW even for GCS reads.
> +		 */
> +		vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
> +		mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
>  	} else if (is_write_abort(esr)) {
>  		/* It was write fault */
>  		vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
> @@ -568,6 +601,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  	if (!vma)
>  		goto lock_mmap;
>  
> +	if (is_invalid_gcs_access(vma, esr)) {
> +		vma_end_read(vma);
> +		fault = 0;
> +		si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
> +		goto bad_area;
> +	}

Here there's a risk that the above function returns true for some
unrelated fault that happens to have bit 6 in ESR set.

-- 
Catalin

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"Rick P. Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>,
	Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>,
	Yury Khrustalev <yury.khrustalev@arm.com>,
	Wilco Dijkstra <wilco.dijkstra@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 19/39] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:12:30 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZsdjbsDrMWgBU9Hj@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240822-arm64-gcs-v11-19-41b81947ecb5@kernel.org>

On Thu, Aug 22, 2024 at 02:15:22AM +0100, Mark Brown wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> index 451ba7cbd5ad..3ada31c2ac12 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
> @@ -486,6 +486,14 @@ static void do_bad_area(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static bool is_gcs_fault(unsigned long esr)
> +{
> +	if (!esr_is_data_abort(esr))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return ESR_ELx_ISS2(esr) & ESR_ELx_GCS;
> +}
> +
>  static bool is_el0_instruction_abort(unsigned long esr)
>  {
>  	return ESR_ELx_EC(esr) == ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW;
> @@ -500,6 +508,23 @@ static bool is_write_abort(unsigned long esr)
>  	return (esr & ESR_ELx_WNR) && !(esr & ESR_ELx_CM);
>  }
>  
> +static bool is_invalid_gcs_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, u64 esr)
> +{
> +	if (!system_supports_gcs())
> +		return false;
> +
> +	if (unlikely(is_gcs_fault(esr))) {
> +		/* GCS accesses must be performed on a GCS page */
> +		if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK))
> +			return true;

This first check covers the GCSPOPM/RET etc. permission faults on
non-GCS vmas. It looks correct.

> +	} else if (unlikely(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK)) {
> +		/* Only GCS operations can write to a GCS page */
> +		return is_write_abort(esr);
> +	}

I don't think that's right. The ESR on this path may not even indicate a
data abort and ESR.WnR bit check wouldn't make sense.

I presume we want to avoid an infinite loop on a (writeable) GCS page
when the user does a normal STR but the CPU raises a permission fault. I
think this function needs to just return false if !esr_is_data_abort().

> +
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  				   struct pt_regs *regs)
>  {
> @@ -535,6 +560,14 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  		/* It was exec fault */
>  		vm_flags = VM_EXEC;
>  		mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION;
> +	} else if (is_gcs_fault(esr)) {
> +		/*
> +		 * The GCS permission on a page implies both read and
> +		 * write so always handle any GCS fault as a write fault,
> +		 * we need to trigger CoW even for GCS reads.
> +		 */
> +		vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
> +		mm_flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
>  	} else if (is_write_abort(esr)) {
>  		/* It was write fault */
>  		vm_flags = VM_WRITE;
> @@ -568,6 +601,13 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr,
>  	if (!vma)
>  		goto lock_mmap;
>  
> +	if (is_invalid_gcs_access(vma, esr)) {
> +		vma_end_read(vma);
> +		fault = 0;
> +		si_code = SEGV_ACCERR;
> +		goto bad_area;
> +	}

Here there's a risk that the above function returns true for some
unrelated fault that happens to have bit 6 in ESR set.

-- 
Catalin

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  reply	other threads:[~2024-08-22 16:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 130+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-22  1:15 [PATCH v11 00/39] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 01/39] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 02/39] arm64/mm: Restructure arch_validate_flags() for extensibility Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 03/39] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 04/39] mman: Add map_shadow_stack() flags Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 05/39] arm64: Document boot requirements for Guarded Control Stacks Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  8:58   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  8:58     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 06/39] arm64/gcs: Document the ABI " Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:04   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 10:04     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 07/39] arm64/sysreg: Add definitions for architected GCS caps Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 08/39] arm64/gcs: Add manual encodings of GCS instructions Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 09/39] arm64/gcs: Provide put_user_gcs() Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 10/39] arm64/gcs: Provide basic EL2 setup to allow GCS usage at EL0 and EL1 Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 11/39] arm64/cpufeature: Runtime detection of Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 12/39] arm64/mm: Allocate PIE slots for EL0 guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 13/39] mm: Define VM_SHADOW_STACK for arm64 when we support GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:14   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 10:14     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 14/39] arm64/mm: Map pages for guarded control stack Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 10:19   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 10:19     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 15/39] KVM: arm64: Manage GCS access and registers for guests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 16/39] arm64/idreg: Add overrride for GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:30   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 11:30     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 17/39] arm64/hwcap: Add hwcap " Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 11:31     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 18/39] arm64/traps: Handle GCS exceptions Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 11:31   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 11:31     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 15:44   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 15:44     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:31     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:31       ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 19/39] arm64/mm: Handle GCS data aborts Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:12   ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2024-08-22 16:12     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:44     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:44       ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 17:19       ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 17:19         ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 17:30         ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 17:30           ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 20/39] arm64/gcs: Context switch GCS state for EL0 Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:15   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:15     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 21/39] arm64/gcs: Ensure that new threads have a GCS Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:17   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:17     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22 16:24     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22 16:24       ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 22/39] arm64/gcs: Implement shadow stack prctl() interface Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 23/39] arm64/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 24/39] arm64/signal: Set up and restore the GCS context for signal handlers Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:11   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23  9:11     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 25/39] arm64/signal: Expose GCS state in signal frames Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:37   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23  9:37     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 10:25     ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23 10:25       ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23 15:59       ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 15:59         ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23 22:01         ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23 22:01           ` Mark Brown
2024-08-26 10:00           ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-26 10:00             ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-28 17:32             ` Mark Brown
2024-08-28 17:32               ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 26/39] arm64/ptrace: Expose GCS via ptrace and core files Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:41   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23  9:41     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 27/39] arm64: Add Kconfig for Guarded Control Stack (GCS) Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-23  9:48   ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-23  9:48     ` Catalin Marinas
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 28/39] kselftest/arm64: Verify the GCS hwcap Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 29/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS as a detected feature in the signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 30/39] kselftest/arm64: Add framework support for GCS to signal handling tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 31/39] kselftest/arm64: Allow signals tests to specify an expected si_code Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 32/39] kselftest/arm64: Always run signals tests with GCS enabled Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 33/39] kselftest/arm64: Add very basic GCS test program Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 34/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS test program built with the system libc Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 35/39] kselftest/arm64: Add test coverage for GCS mode locking Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 36/39] kselftest/arm64: Add GCS signal tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 37/39] kselftest/arm64: Add a GCS stress test Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 38/39] kselftest/arm64: Enable GCS for the FP stress tests Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15 ` [PATCH v11 39/39] KVM: selftests: arm64: Add GCS registers to get-reg-list Mark Brown
2024-08-22  1:15   ` Mark Brown

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