From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
To: Nick Hu <nick.hu@sifive.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org>, Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com,
charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com,
cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com,
samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 24/29] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 17:25:00 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZzVRbCZP9N4Os8Bj@debug.ba.rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKddAkDbGYeONaksq6fzLzx47BHZo3Ar7Sog3MOgf7Y+Birovw@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 09:20:14AM +0800, Nick Hu wrote:
>Hi Deepak
>
>On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 9:06 AM Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 12:13:38AM +0800, Nick Hu wrote:
>> >Hi Deepak
>> >
>> >On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 5:08 AM Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Kernel will have to perform shadow stack operations on user shadow stack.
>> >> Like during signal delivery and sigreturn, shadow stack token must be
>> >> created and validated respectively. Thus shadow stack access for kernel
>> >> must be enabled.
>> >>
>> >> In future when kernel shadow stacks are enabled for linux kernel, it must
>> >> be enabled as early as possible for better coverage and prevent imbalance
>> >> between regular stack and shadow stack. After `relocate_enable_mmu` has
>> >> been done, this is as early as possible it can enabled.
>> >>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
>> >> ---
>> >> arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 4 ++++
>> >> arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 12 ++++++++++++
>> >> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
>> >>
>> >> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> >> index 766bd33f10cb..a22ab8a41672 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> >> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> >> @@ -517,4 +517,8 @@ void asm_offsets(void)
>> >> DEFINE(FREGS_A6, offsetof(struct ftrace_regs, a6));
>> >> DEFINE(FREGS_A7, offsetof(struct ftrace_regs, a7));
>> >> #endif
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_EXT_FWFT, SBI_EXT_FWFT);
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET);
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK);
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK);
>> >> }
>> >> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
>> >> index 356d5397b2a2..6244408ca917 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
>> >> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
>> >> @@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ secondary_start_sbi:
>> >> call relocate_enable_mmu
>> >> #endif
>> >> call .Lsetup_trap_vector
>> >> + li a7, SBI_EXT_FWFT
>> >> + li a6, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET
>> >> + li a0, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK
>> >> + li a1, 1 /* enable supervisor to access shadow stack access */
>> >> + li a2, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK
>> >> + ecall
>> >> scs_load_current
>> >> call smp_callin
>> >> #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
>> >> @@ -320,6 +326,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(_start_kernel)
>> >> la tp, init_task
>> >> la sp, init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE
>> >> addi sp, sp, -PT_SIZE_ON_STACK
>> >> + li a7, SBI_EXT_FWFT
>> >> + li a6, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET
>> >> + li a0, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK
>> >> + li a1, 1 /* enable supervisor to access shadow stack access */
>> >> + li a2, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK
>> >> + ecall
>> >> scs_load_current
>> >>
>> >> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> 2.45.0
>> >>
>> >Should we clear the SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK before the cpu hotplug
>> >otherwise the menvcfg.sse won't be set by the fwft set sbi call when
>> >the hotplug cpu back to kernel?
>>
>> Hmm...
>>
>> An incoming hotplug CPU has no features setup on it.
>> I see that `sbi_cpu_start` will supply `secondary_start_sbi` as start
>> up code for incoming CPU. `secondary_start_sbi` is in head.S which converges
>> in `.Lsecondary_start_common`. And thus hotplugged CPU should be
>> issuing shadow stack set FWFT sbi as well.
>>
>> Am I missing something ?
>>
>This is the correct flow. However the opensbi will deny it due to the
>SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK already being set.
>So the menvcfg.sse will not set by this flow.
>
>if (conf->flags & SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK)
> return SBI_EDENIED;
>
hmm... Why?
`conf` is pointing to per-hart state in firmware.
On this incoming cpu, opensbi (or equivalent) firmware must have
ensured that this per-hart state doesn't have lock set.
Am I missing something?
>Regards,
>Nick
>> >
>> >Regards,
>> >Nick
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> linux-riscv mailing list
>> >> linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
>> >> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
To: Nick Hu <nick.hu@sifive.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>,
Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Conor Dooley <conor@kernel.org>, Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>,
Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org,
jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com,
charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com,
cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com,
samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 24/29] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call
Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2024 17:25:00 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZzVRbCZP9N4Os8Bj@debug.ba.rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKddAkDbGYeONaksq6fzLzx47BHZo3Ar7Sog3MOgf7Y+Birovw@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 09:20:14AM +0800, Nick Hu wrote:
>Hi Deepak
>
>On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 9:06 AM Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 14, 2024 at 12:13:38AM +0800, Nick Hu wrote:
>> >Hi Deepak
>> >
>> >On Tue, Nov 12, 2024 at 5:08 AM Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Kernel will have to perform shadow stack operations on user shadow stack.
>> >> Like during signal delivery and sigreturn, shadow stack token must be
>> >> created and validated respectively. Thus shadow stack access for kernel
>> >> must be enabled.
>> >>
>> >> In future when kernel shadow stacks are enabled for linux kernel, it must
>> >> be enabled as early as possible for better coverage and prevent imbalance
>> >> between regular stack and shadow stack. After `relocate_enable_mmu` has
>> >> been done, this is as early as possible it can enabled.
>> >>
>> >> Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
>> >> ---
>> >> arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 4 ++++
>> >> arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 12 ++++++++++++
>> >> 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
>> >>
>> >> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> >> index 766bd33f10cb..a22ab8a41672 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> >> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c
>> >> @@ -517,4 +517,8 @@ void asm_offsets(void)
>> >> DEFINE(FREGS_A6, offsetof(struct ftrace_regs, a6));
>> >> DEFINE(FREGS_A7, offsetof(struct ftrace_regs, a7));
>> >> #endif
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_EXT_FWFT, SBI_EXT_FWFT);
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET);
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK);
>> >> + DEFINE(SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK);
>> >> }
>> >> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
>> >> index 356d5397b2a2..6244408ca917 100644
>> >> --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
>> >> +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S
>> >> @@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ secondary_start_sbi:
>> >> call relocate_enable_mmu
>> >> #endif
>> >> call .Lsetup_trap_vector
>> >> + li a7, SBI_EXT_FWFT
>> >> + li a6, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET
>> >> + li a0, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK
>> >> + li a1, 1 /* enable supervisor to access shadow stack access */
>> >> + li a2, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK
>> >> + ecall
>> >> scs_load_current
>> >> call smp_callin
>> >> #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
>> >> @@ -320,6 +326,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(_start_kernel)
>> >> la tp, init_task
>> >> la sp, init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE
>> >> addi sp, sp, -PT_SIZE_ON_STACK
>> >> + li a7, SBI_EXT_FWFT
>> >> + li a6, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET
>> >> + li a0, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK
>> >> + li a1, 1 /* enable supervisor to access shadow stack access */
>> >> + li a2, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK
>> >> + ecall
>> >> scs_load_current
>> >>
>> >> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> 2.45.0
>> >>
>> >Should we clear the SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK before the cpu hotplug
>> >otherwise the menvcfg.sse won't be set by the fwft set sbi call when
>> >the hotplug cpu back to kernel?
>>
>> Hmm...
>>
>> An incoming hotplug CPU has no features setup on it.
>> I see that `sbi_cpu_start` will supply `secondary_start_sbi` as start
>> up code for incoming CPU. `secondary_start_sbi` is in head.S which converges
>> in `.Lsecondary_start_common`. And thus hotplugged CPU should be
>> issuing shadow stack set FWFT sbi as well.
>>
>> Am I missing something ?
>>
>This is the correct flow. However the opensbi will deny it due to the
>SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK already being set.
>So the menvcfg.sse will not set by this flow.
>
>if (conf->flags & SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK)
> return SBI_EDENIED;
>
hmm... Why?
`conf` is pointing to per-hart state in firmware.
On this incoming cpu, opensbi (or equivalent) firmware must have
ensured that this per-hart state doesn't have lock set.
Am I missing something?
>Regards,
>Nick
>> >
>> >Regards,
>> >Nick
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> linux-riscv mailing list
>> >> linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
>> >> http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-11-14 1:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 78+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-11 20:53 [PATCH v8 00/29] riscv control-flow integrity for usermode Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 01/29] mm: Introduce ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 02/29] mm: helper `is_shadow_stack_vma` to check shadow stack vma Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 03/29] dt-bindings: riscv: zicfilp and zicfiss in dt-bindings (extensions.yaml) Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 04/29] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 05/29] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp extension csr and bit definitions Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 06/29] riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 07/29] riscv/mm : ensure PROT_WRITE leads to VM_READ | VM_WRITE Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 08/29] riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 09/29] riscv mmu: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 10/29] riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 11/29] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 12/29] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-12 9:47 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-12 9:47 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 13/29] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` [PATCH v8 14/29] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:53 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 15/29] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 16/29] riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 17/29] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 18/29] riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 19/29] riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 20/29] riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 21/29] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 22/29] riscv/hwprobe: zicfilp / zicfiss enumeration in hwprobe Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 23/29] riscv: Add Firmware Feature SBI extensions definitions Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 24/29] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-13 3:15 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-13 3:15 ` kernel test robot
2024-11-13 16:13 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-13 16:13 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-14 1:06 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-14 1:06 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-14 1:20 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-14 1:20 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-14 1:25 ` Deepak Gupta [this message]
2024-11-14 1:25 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-14 6:17 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-14 6:17 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-14 15:50 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-14 15:50 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-15 3:19 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-15 3:19 ` Nick Hu
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 25/29] riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 26/29] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 27/29] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 28/29] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` [PATCH v8 29/29] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi Deepak Gupta
2024-11-11 20:54 ` Deepak Gupta
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