From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Subject: Re: MSR_SPEC_CTRL intercept
Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 11:13:50 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <a2d33841-8159-fb72-0049-765dae4c18fc@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5B06742B02000078001C570A@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com>
On 24/05/18 09:13, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 24.05.18 at 00:09, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>> It is, as documented, not completely strictly true (according to the
>> latest revision of the spec), but is there deliberately to simply so we
>> don't give the guest implausible configurations. There is not a
>> processor with STIBP but without IBRSB, nor is there one with SSBD
>> without STIBP or IBRSB, and it is unlikely that future processors would
>> change this arrangement.
> As pointed out elsewhere I believe this is a wrong dependency to make,
> even if perhaps current or past Intel docs suggest so (AMD ones don't
> for their versions of the features). Wile it may be the case that there's
> currently no case in practice with SSBD but no IBRSB, I don't see why
> this would need to remain that way. The two things are strictly
> independent.
Features will never disappear. x86, more than most, maintains its
backwards compatibility.
> I very much think there should be an indicator of the MSR itself
> existing, set to the OR of any of the bits in the MSR that are valid.
> Shouldn't such a mask anyway be part of struct msr_domain_policy
> (as a companion to the current value of the MSR per vCPU)?
The only think this gets you is the ability to create implausible
combinations.
I don't think it is a useful or sensible use of time trying to support
combinations which will, most likely, never exist. Certainly not for
combinations without a plausible usecase, as these will go stale very
quickly, given the churn in this area.
~Andrew
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-24 10:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-23 21:40 MSR_SPEC_CTRL intercept Boris Ostrovsky
2018-05-23 21:49 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-23 21:59 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-05-23 22:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-23 22:27 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-05-23 22:34 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-23 22:53 ` Boris Ostrovsky
2018-05-23 22:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-24 8:13 ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-24 10:13 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-05-24 10:23 ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-25 15:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-25 15:42 ` Jan Beulich
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