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From: Hsia-Jun Li <Randy.Li@synaptics.com>
To: Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas@ndufresne.ca>
Cc: daniels@collabora.com, ayaka <ayaka@soulik.info>,
	hughd@google.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Linux Media Mailing List <linux-media@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC]: shmem fd for non-DMA buffer sharing cross drivers
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 11:49:11 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a319c436-a9e7-e817-e18a-72fceb7984e5@synaptics.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9e3c7a11ed1d50c4afdf4f181aae7d4a6a425329.camel@ndufresne.ca>



On 8/23/23 03:55, Nicolas Dufresne wrote:
> CAUTION: Email originated externally, do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Le mardi 22 août 2023 à 19:14 +0800, Hsia-Jun Li a écrit :
>> Hello
>>
>> I would like to introduce a usage of SHMEM slimier to DMA-buf, the major
>> purpose of that is sharing metadata or just a pure container for cross
>> drivers.
>>
>> We need to exchange some sort of metadata between drivers, likes dynamic
>> HDR data between video4linux2 and DRM. Or the graphics frame buffer is
>> too complex to be described with plain plane's DMA-buf fd.
>> An issue between DRM and V4L2 is that DRM could only support 4 planes
>> while it is 8 for V4L2. It would be pretty hard for DRM to expend its
>> interface to support that 4 more planes which would lead to revision of
>> many standard likes Vulkan, EGL.
>>
>> Also, there is no reason to consume a device's memory for the content
>> that device can't read it, or wasting an entry of IOMMU for such data.
>> Usually, such a metadata would be the value should be written to a
>> hardware's registers, a 4KiB page would be 1024 items of 32 bits registers.
>>
>> Still, I have some problems with SHMEM:
>> 1. I don't want thhe userspace modify the context of the SHMEM allocated
>> by the kernel, is there a way to do so?
>> 2. Should I create a helper function for installing the SHMEM file as a fd?
> 
> Please have a look at memfd and the seal feature, it does cover the reason why

That is the implement I need, it would affact the userspace not the 
kernel space. Should I expand a kAPI for memfd or just take the 
implement for the SHMEM?
This interfaces need to offer three things:
1. a fd for userspace to exchange between drivers
2. a kernel virtual address for accessing
3. userspace SEAL

Meanwhile, I am thinking whether we should offer a generic context 
header for such usage. Or we need another fields in a driver to describe it.
struct shmem_generic_container {
	u64 format; /* use DRM modifier vendor bits but */
	u32 size; /* size of the payload */
	u8 payload[];
};
/* format linear for nesting dolls context */
struct shmem_nesting_container {
	u32 num;
	u64 formats[num];
	u32 sizes[num];
	u32 offsets[num]; /* offset from the payload below */
	u8 payload[];
};
> unsealed shared memory require full trust. For controls, the SEAL_WRITE is even
> needed, as with appropriate timing, a malicous process can modify the data in-
> between validation and allocation, causing possible memory overflow.
> 
> https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/memfd_create.2.html
> File sealing
>         In the absence of file sealing, processes that communicate via
>         shared memory must either trust each other, or take measures to
>         deal with the possibility that an untrusted peer may manipulate
>         the shared memory region in problematic ways.  For example, an
>         untrusted peer might modify the contents of the shared memory at
>         any time, or shrink the shared memory region.  The former
>         possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to time-of-check-
>         to-time-of-use race conditions (typically dealt with by copying
>         data from the shared memory region before checking and using it).
>         The latter possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to
>         SIGBUS signals when an attempt is made to access a now-
>         nonexistent location in the shared memory region.  (Dealing with
>         this possibility necessitates the use of a handler for the SIGBUS
>         signal.)
> 
>         Dealing with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on code
>         that employs shared memory.  Memory sealing enables that extra
>         complexity to be eliminated, by allowing a process to operate
>         secure in the knowledge that its peer can't modify the shared
>         memory in an undesired fashion.
> 
>         [...]
> 
> regards,
> Nicolas

-- 
Hsia-Jun(Randy) Li

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Hsia-Jun Li <Randy.Li@synaptics.com>
To: Nicolas Dufresne <nicolas@ndufresne.ca>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
	Linux Media Mailing List <linux-media@vger.kernel.org>,
	hughd@google.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>,
	Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>,
	Tomasz Figa <tfiga@chromium.org>,
	daniels@collabora.com, ayaka <ayaka@soulik.info>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [RFC]: shmem fd for non-DMA buffer sharing cross drivers
Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2023 11:49:11 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a319c436-a9e7-e817-e18a-72fceb7984e5@synaptics.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9e3c7a11ed1d50c4afdf4f181aae7d4a6a425329.camel@ndufresne.ca>



On 8/23/23 03:55, Nicolas Dufresne wrote:
> CAUTION: Email originated externally, do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe.
> 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Le mardi 22 août 2023 à 19:14 +0800, Hsia-Jun Li a écrit :
>> Hello
>>
>> I would like to introduce a usage of SHMEM slimier to DMA-buf, the major
>> purpose of that is sharing metadata or just a pure container for cross
>> drivers.
>>
>> We need to exchange some sort of metadata between drivers, likes dynamic
>> HDR data between video4linux2 and DRM. Or the graphics frame buffer is
>> too complex to be described with plain plane's DMA-buf fd.
>> An issue between DRM and V4L2 is that DRM could only support 4 planes
>> while it is 8 for V4L2. It would be pretty hard for DRM to expend its
>> interface to support that 4 more planes which would lead to revision of
>> many standard likes Vulkan, EGL.
>>
>> Also, there is no reason to consume a device's memory for the content
>> that device can't read it, or wasting an entry of IOMMU for such data.
>> Usually, such a metadata would be the value should be written to a
>> hardware's registers, a 4KiB page would be 1024 items of 32 bits registers.
>>
>> Still, I have some problems with SHMEM:
>> 1. I don't want thhe userspace modify the context of the SHMEM allocated
>> by the kernel, is there a way to do so?
>> 2. Should I create a helper function for installing the SHMEM file as a fd?
> 
> Please have a look at memfd and the seal feature, it does cover the reason why

That is the implement I need, it would affact the userspace not the 
kernel space. Should I expand a kAPI for memfd or just take the 
implement for the SHMEM?
This interfaces need to offer three things:
1. a fd for userspace to exchange between drivers
2. a kernel virtual address for accessing
3. userspace SEAL

Meanwhile, I am thinking whether we should offer a generic context 
header for such usage. Or we need another fields in a driver to describe it.
struct shmem_generic_container {
	u64 format; /* use DRM modifier vendor bits but */
	u32 size; /* size of the payload */
	u8 payload[];
};
/* format linear for nesting dolls context */
struct shmem_nesting_container {
	u32 num;
	u64 formats[num];
	u32 sizes[num];
	u32 offsets[num]; /* offset from the payload below */
	u8 payload[];
};
> unsealed shared memory require full trust. For controls, the SEAL_WRITE is even
> needed, as with appropriate timing, a malicous process can modify the data in-
> between validation and allocation, causing possible memory overflow.
> 
> https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/memfd_create.2.html
> File sealing
>         In the absence of file sealing, processes that communicate via
>         shared memory must either trust each other, or take measures to
>         deal with the possibility that an untrusted peer may manipulate
>         the shared memory region in problematic ways.  For example, an
>         untrusted peer might modify the contents of the shared memory at
>         any time, or shrink the shared memory region.  The former
>         possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to time-of-check-
>         to-time-of-use race conditions (typically dealt with by copying
>         data from the shared memory region before checking and using it).
>         The latter possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to
>         SIGBUS signals when an attempt is made to access a now-
>         nonexistent location in the shared memory region.  (Dealing with
>         this possibility necessitates the use of a handler for the SIGBUS
>         signal.)
> 
>         Dealing with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on code
>         that employs shared memory.  Memory sealing enables that extra
>         complexity to be eliminated, by allowing a process to operate
>         secure in the knowledge that its peer can't modify the shared
>         memory in an undesired fashion.
> 
>         [...]
> 
> regards,
> Nicolas

-- 
Hsia-Jun(Randy) Li

  reply	other threads:[~2023-08-23  3:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-22 11:14 [RFC]: shmem fd for non-DMA buffer sharing cross drivers Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-22 11:14 ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-22 19:55 ` Nicolas Dufresne
2023-08-22 19:55   ` Nicolas Dufresne
2023-08-23  3:49   ` Hsia-Jun Li [this message]
2023-08-23  3:49     ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-23  4:46 ` Tomasz Figa
2023-08-23  4:46   ` Tomasz Figa
2023-08-23  7:11   ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-23  7:11     ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-23 13:15     ` Tomasz Figa
2023-08-23 13:15       ` Tomasz Figa
2023-08-25  7:30       ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-25  7:30         ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-25  7:40     ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-08-25  7:40       ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-08-25  7:56       ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-25  7:56         ` Hsia-Jun Li
2023-08-25 11:41         ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-08-25 11:41           ` Pekka Paalanen
2023-08-25 12:20         ` Daniel Stone
2023-08-25 12:20           ` Daniel Stone

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