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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>,
	"moderated list:XEN HYPERVISOR INTERFACE"
	<xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	David Vrabel <dvrabel@cantab.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xen-pciback: Consider MSI-X enabled only when MASKALL bit is cleared
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 14:33:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a84234d8-9f48-4b8f-e171-599c34840581@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y3YzY0aUc42cQGk/@mail-itl>

On 17.11.2022 14:13, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 17, 2022 at 12:54:51PM +0000, David Vrabel wrote:
>> On 17/11/2022 11:41, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote:
>>> Linux enables MSI-X before disabling INTx, but keeps MSI-X masked until
>>> the table is filled. Then it disables INTx just before clearing MASKALL
>>> bit. Currently this approach is rejected by xen-pciback.
>>> Allow setting PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE while INTx is still enabled as long
>>> as PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL is set too.
>>
>> The use of MSI-X interrupts is conditional on only the MSI-X Enable bit.
>> Setting MSI-X Enable effectively overrides the Interrupt Disable bit in the
>> Command register.
> 
> That means the second chunk of the patch may even drop the '(new_value &
> PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_MASKALL)' part, right? 
> 
>> PCIe 6.0.1 section 7.7.2.2. "MSI-X Enable ... is prohibited from using INTx
>> interrupts (if implemented)." And there is similar wording for MSI Enable.
> 
> And this would mean the 'field_config->int_type == INTERRUPT_TYPE_MSIX'
> part isn't necessary either.
> 
> Jan in another thread pointed out that disabling INTx explicitly is
> still a useful workaround for a flawed hardware. But if that isn't
> mandated by the spec, maybe it doesn't need to be enforced by pciback
> either?

Well, allowing a device to go into a mode exhibiting undefined behavior
is what we ought to prevent when it comes to a DomU doing so vs overall
host safety.

Jan


  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-17 13:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-17 11:41 [PATCH] xen-pciback: Consider MSI-X enabled only when MASKALL bit is cleared Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-17 12:28 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-11-17 13:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-11-17 12:54 ` David Vrabel
2022-11-17 13:13   ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-17 13:33     ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2022-11-17 14:32       ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2022-11-17 13:50 ` Jan Beulich

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