* [PATCH] x86/bugs: Apply misc stylistic touchups
2025-05-16 14:46 [tip: x86/core] x86/bugs: Fix indentation due to ITS merge tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD)
@ 2025-05-16 15:38 ` Ingo Molnar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Ingo Molnar @ 2025-05-16 15:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: linux-tip-commits, Borislav Petkov (AMD), x86
* tip-bot2 for Borislav Petkov (AMD) <tip-bot2@linutronix.de> wrote:
> The following commit has been merged into the x86/core branch of tip:
>
> Commit-ID: ff8f7a889abd9741abde6e83d33a3a7d9d6e7d83
> Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ff8f7a889abd9741abde6e83d33a3a7d9d6e7d83
> Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> AuthorDate: Fri, 16 May 2025 16:31:38 +02:00
> Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> CommitterDate: Fri, 16 May 2025 16:31:38 +02:00
>
> x86/bugs: Fix indentation due to ITS merge
>
> No functional changes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index dd8b50b..d1a03ff 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -2975,10 +2975,10 @@ static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
>
> if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
> - set_return_thunk(srso_alias_return_thunk);
> + set_return_thunk(srso_alias_return_thunk);
> } else {
> setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
> - set_return_thunk(srso_return_thunk);
> + set_return_thunk(srso_return_thunk);
> }
> break;
> case SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB:
This reminded me of this bugs.c housekeeping patch I have stashed:
===================================>
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH] x86/bugs: Apply misc stylistic touchups
- s/its/it's
- Use the pr_fmt 'RETBleed' string consistently in other messages as well
- Use the pr_fmt 'Spectre V2' string consistently in other messages as well
- Use 'user space' consistently. (vs. 'userspace')
- Capitalize 'SWAPGS' consistently.
- Capitalize 'L1D' consistently.
- Spell '44 bits' consistently.
- Consistently use empty lines before final 'return' statements where justified.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
/*
- * Controls whether l1d flush based mitigations are enabled,
+ * Controls whether L1D flush based mitigations are enabled,
* based on hw features and admin setting via boot parameter
* defaults to false
*/
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
/*
* If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
- * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+ * virtual MSR value. If it's not permanently enabled, evaluate
* current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
*/
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
@@ -1028,13 +1028,13 @@ static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
- [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
- [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no SWAPGS barriers",
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/SWAPGS barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
};
/*
* Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
- * userspace?
+ * user space?
*/
static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
{
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
/*
* With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
- * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+ * path of a conditional SWAPGS with a user-controlled GS
* value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
*
* If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
@@ -1085,16 +1085,16 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_apply_mitigation(void)
* is serializing.
*
* If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
- * stop speculation through swapgs.
+ * stop speculation through SWAPGS.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
/*
- * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-SWAPGS)
* paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
- * skipping swapgs.
+ * skipping SWAPGS.
*/
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
}
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
-#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre V2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -1415,7 +1415,7 @@ static void __init its_select_mitigation(void)
goto out;
}
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE) {
- pr_err("WARNING: Spectre-v2 mitigation is off, disabling ITS\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: Spectre V2 mitigation is off, disabling ITS\n");
its_mitigation = ITS_MITIGATION_OFF;
goto out;
}
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ static void __init its_select_mitigation(void)
set_return_thunk(call_depth_return_thunk);
if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE) {
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
- pr_info("Retbleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n");
+ pr_info("RETBleed mitigation updated to stuffing\n");
}
break;
}
@@ -1490,8 +1490,9 @@ bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
return true;
- pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
+ pr_err("System may be vulnerable to Spectre V2\n");
spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+
return false;
}
@@ -1504,8 +1505,8 @@ static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
#endif
#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
-#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
-#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre V2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre V2 BHB attacks!\n"
#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n"
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
@@ -1537,7 +1538,7 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
}
-/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
+/* The kernel command line selection for Spectre V2 */
enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
@@ -1697,7 +1698,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void)
* injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
* implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
* mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
- * to userspace. AMD Automatic IBRS also does not protect userspace.
+ * to user space. AMD Automatic IBRS also does not protect user space.
* These modes therefore disable the implicit cross-thread protection,
* so allow for STIBP to be selected in those cases.
*/
@@ -1714,7 +1715,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_user_update_mitigation(void)
retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB)) {
if (spectre_v2_user_stibp != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
spectre_v2_user_stibp != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
- pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n");
+ pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement RETBleed mitigation\n");
spectre_v2_user_stibp = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
}
pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[spectre_v2_user_stibp]);
@@ -1923,7 +1924,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation m
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
- pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre V2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
}
break;
@@ -1931,13 +1932,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation m
case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
- pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB: Filling RSB on context switch and VMEXIT\n");
+ pr_info("Spectre V2 / SpectreRSB: Filling RSB on context switch and VMEXIT\n");
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
break;
default:
- pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation\n");
+ pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre V2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation\n");
dump_stack();
break;
}
@@ -1945,7 +1946,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation m
/*
* Set BHI_DIS_S to prevent indirect branches in kernel to be influenced by
- * branch history in userspace. Not needed if BHI_NO is set.
+ * branch history in user space. Not needed if BHI_NO is set.
*/
static bool __init spec_ctrl_bhi_dis(void)
{
@@ -2696,7 +2697,7 @@ enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
/*
- * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
+ * These CPUs all support 44 bits physical address space internally in the
* cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
*
* The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
@@ -2705,9 +2706,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
* which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
* then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
* This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
- * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
+ * the fact that the cache uses 44 bits internally. Use the cache bits
* instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
- * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
+ * machines to 44 bits if the reported bits are less than 44.
*/
static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
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