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From: "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	"Anthony PERARD" <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
	"Michal Orzel" <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
	"Julien Grall" <julien@xen.org>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Trammell Hudson" <hudson@trmm.net>,
	"Ross Lagerwall" <ross.lagerwall@cloud.com>,
	"Frediano Ziglio" <frediano.ziglio@cloud.com>,
	"Gerald Elder-Vass" <gerald.elder-vass@cloud.com>,
	"Kevin Lampis" <kevin.lampis@cloud.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: UEFI Secure Boot security policy
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 15:12:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aEwjwqlmOvdp9G2H@mail-itl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <608cf9c5-f057-4d3b-8833-8ef040064fec@suse.com>

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On Fri, Jun 13, 2025 at 08:35:26AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 12.06.2025 23:32, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Thu, 12 Jun 2025, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> >> +Support in Xen
> >> +--------------
> >> +
> >> +There are multiple ways to achieve this security goal, with differing
> >> +tradeoffs for the eventual system.
> >> +
> >> +On one end of the spectrum is the Unified Kernel Image.  e.g. Xen is bundled
> >> +with the dom0 kernel and init-ramdisk, with an embedded command line, and with
> >> +livepatching and kexec compiled out, and suitably signed.  The signature is
> >> +checked by the bootloader and, as this covers all the privileged code, Xen
> >> +doesn't need to perform further checks itself.
> >> +
> >> +On the other end of the spectrum is maintaining the features of existing
> >> +deployments.  e.g. Xen needs signature checking capabilities for the dom0
> >> +kernel, livepatches and kexec kernels, and needs to allow the use of safe
> >> +command line options while disallowing unsafe ones.
> > 
> > I just wanted to mention that there is one more option which I used in
> > the past: the firmware/bootloader loads Xen, the Dom0 kernel, and other
> > binaries, check their signatures, then boot Xen.
> > 
> > This is similar to the "Unified Kernel Image" approach in the sense that
> > Xen doesn't need to do any signature checking for the dom0 kernel, but
> > it doesn't require all the binaries to be glued together.
> > 
> > Assuming that the firmware/bootloader is capable of loading multiple
> > binaries and checking the signature of multiple binaries before booting
> > the next element, it works fine.
> 
> How would an initrd, a ucode blob, or an XSM policy blob be signed?

At least grub supports gpg detached signatures, and can be configured to
require them.

-- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab

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  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-13 13:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-11 23:58 [PATCH] docs: UEFI Secure Boot security policy Andrew Cooper
2025-06-12  0:02 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-06-12  7:50 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2025-06-12  9:43   ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-12 10:06 ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-12 12:21   ` Teddy Astie
2025-06-19 14:05     ` Ross Lagerwall
2025-06-12 15:22   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2025-06-12 20:29     ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2025-06-12 13:15 ` Tu Dinh
2025-06-12 13:22   ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-12 13:29     ` Tu Dinh
2025-06-12 21:32 ` Stefano Stabellini
2025-06-13  6:35   ` Jan Beulich
2025-06-13 13:12     ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki [this message]
2025-06-13 20:14       ` Stefano Stabellini
2025-06-19 14:16 ` Ross Lagerwall
2025-06-19 14:36   ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2025-06-19 19:56     ` Stefano Stabellini
2025-06-19 22:06       ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
2025-06-20 17:00         ` Ross Lagerwall

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