Landstrip

Landstrip

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

I played with an idea could Landlock LSM be used to do conceptually a
better fit sandbox for programs such as Anthropic Sandbox Runtime [1].

After some missteps at first I got it pulled together quite well:

https://crates.io/crates/landstrip

To see it in action I also have a fork of pi-hashline-readmap plugin,
which was a cherry-picked test case I wanted to try out given it already
hooks the bash tool command for compressed output.

I just thought that this might interest some as Landlock is not really
over-used kernel feature in "application sense".

This is a more lower barrier and more failure tolerant to deploy than
Bubblewrap based container for this use and purpose in my opinion
at least.

[1] https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime/issues/291
[2] https://github.com/jarkkojs/pi-hashline-readmap

BR, Jarkko

Re: Landstrip

[Justin Suess]

On Tue, Jun 02, 2026 at 04:42:51AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> I played with an idea could Landlock LSM be used to do conceptually a
> better fit sandbox for programs such as Anthropic Sandbox Runtime [1].
> 
> After some missteps at first I got it pulled together quite well:
> 
> https://crates.io/crates/landstrip
> 
> To see it in action I also have a fork of pi-hashline-readmap plugin,
> which was a cherry-picked test case I wanted to try out given it already
> hooks the bash tool command for compressed output.
> 
> I just thought that this might interest some as Landlock is not really
> over-used kernel feature in "application sense".
> 
> This is a more lower barrier and more failure tolerant to deploy than
> Bubblewrap based container for this use and purpose in my opinion
> at least.
> 
Very cool! Landlock is great for this usecase of application driven
sandboxing.

(just a quick note, the linux-security-module/linux-integrity
mailing lists mostly for kernel development patches, the
landlock.lists.linux.dev list is more for
userspace Landlock topics like this. so I removed the cc for
linux-security-module/linux-integrity and added that list)

I notice there is a seccomp policy for unix sockets in this application.
Although it might not be in your kernel yet, support for sandboxing
named unix sockets with Landlock was recently merged. :)

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260327164838.38231-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com/

Justin

> [1] https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime/issues/291
> [2] https://github.com/jarkkojs/pi-hashline-readmap
> 
> BR, Jarkko
>