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From: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
	Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>,
	Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>,
	Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-4.22? 7/9] domctl: restrict permission check for XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping's remove form
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:06:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ajEgLtu95rxjRSoX@macbook.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ccc5bc2c-8331-4624-a5be-a5b1d649b1a6@suse.com>

On Tue, Jun 16, 2026 at 11:51:54AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 16.06.2026 11:08, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 15, 2026 at 04:15:36PM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
> >> Like is already done for I/O ports on x86 and for IRQ unbinding, check
> >> only the requesting domain's permissions (for it to not interfere with
> >> MMIO backed by another stubdom DM), but not the target domain's: Removal
> >> should be okay even (perhaps: especially) when permissions were already
> >> revoked.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> >>
> >> --- a/xen/common/domctl.c
> >> +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c
> >> @@ -436,11 +436,15 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xe
> >>              goto domctl_out_unlock_rcuonly;
> >>  #endif
> >>  
> >> +        /*
> >> +         * NB: The double lock isn't really needed when !add, but is used anyway
> >> +         * to keep things simple.
> >> +         */
> >>          iocaps_double_lock(d, false);
> >>  
> >>          ret = -EPERM;
> >>          if ( !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) ||
> >> -             !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end) )
> >> +             (add && !iomem_access_permitted(d, mfn, mfn_end)) )
> > 
> > You seem to be doing the opposite of what the commit message states
> > here, and checking for permissions on the target domain, not
> > permissions of the requesting domain?
> 
> I'm always checking permissions of the requesting domain, while the
> target's are now checked only for "add". That's what the description
> also says.
> 
> What's wrong with the description is ...
> 
> > XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping does check against current->domain, and not
> > against d.
> 
> ... that it suggests this to be the behavior at the point of this patch,
> when it really is moved to that only in patch 8. The patches used to be
> ordered differently earlier on. I guess I should change the wording to
> be closer to what's used in "x86/domctl: don't imply I/O port permissions
> from I/O port mapping".

Yeah, I've noticed after looking at the next patch.

> 
> > FWIW, we could also remove one branch here by doing:
> > 
> > ret = -EPERM
> > if ( add && iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn_end) )
> > {
> >     /* add logic. */
> > }
> > else if ( !add )
> > {
> >     /* remove logic. */
> > }
> 
> Indeed I was wondering whether something like this would be worthwhile,
> but I opted for the variant with less overall churn.

Since you have to adjust the commit message, I wouldn't mind if you
also want to adjust the logic to remove the extra branch.


  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-16 10:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-15 14:11 [PATCH for-4.22? 0/9] domctl: XSA-492 and -491 follow-on Jan Beulich
2026-06-15 14:12 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 1/9] sched: introduce specialization of "running only" vcpu_runstate_get() Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  8:41   ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-16  8:48     ` Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  9:21   ` Jürgen Groß
2026-06-15 14:12 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 2/9] domctl: move XEN_DOMCTL_irq_permission handling to x86 code Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  7:22   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-06-15 14:13 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 3/9] domctl: rename a label Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  7:23   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-06-16  8:43   ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-15 14:13 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 4/9] domctl: error code adjustment for unpriv callers Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  7:27   ` Oleksii Kurochko
2026-06-15 14:13 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 5/9] domctl/XSM: avoid XSM_OTHER with xsm_domctl() Jan Beulich
2026-06-15 20:57   ` Daniel P. Smith
2026-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 6/9] domctl: handle XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuinfo without acquiring domctl lock Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  8:56   ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-16  9:08     ` Jan Beulich
2026-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 7/9] domctl: restrict permission check for XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping's remove form Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  9:08   ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-16  9:51     ` Jan Beulich
2026-06-16 10:06       ` Roger Pau Monné [this message]
2026-06-15 14:16 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 8/9] x86/domctl: don't imply I/O port permissions from I/O port mapping Jan Beulich
2026-06-16  9:21   ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-16  9:36     ` Jan Beulich
2026-06-16 10:09       ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-15 14:16 ` [PATCH for-4.22? 9/9] x86/HVM: more checking for XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping Jan Beulich
2026-06-16 10:01   ` Roger Pau Monné
2026-06-16 10:07     ` Jan Beulich

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