From: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Silviu Vlasceanu <silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: IMA appraisal master plan?
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 21:05:19 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1711212102370.6690@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511189976.4729.110.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Mon, 20 Nov 2017, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-11-20 at 11:20 +0100, Patrick Ohly wrote:
> > On Mon, 2017-11-20 at 07:47 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > > On Fri, 17 Nov 2017, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > >
> > > > LSMs are responsible to enforce a security policy at run-time,
> > > > while IMA/EVM protect data and metadata against offline attacks.
> > >
> > > In my view, IMA can also protect against making an online attack
> > > persistent across boots, and that would be the most compelling use of
> > > it for many general purpose applications.
> >
> > I do not quite buy that interpretation. If the online attack succeeds
> > in bypassing the run-time checks, for example with a full root exploit,
> > then he has pretty much the same capabilities to make persistent file
> > changes as during an offline attack.
>
> In the face of a full root exploit, there is not much that one can do,
> "other" than to detect it. This is why remote attestation is so
> important.
Right, although the consensus seems to be that RA is essential rather than
simply important.
--
James Morris
<james.l.morris@oracle.com>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: james.l.morris@oracle.com (James Morris)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: IMA appraisal master plan?
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2017 21:05:19 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LFD.2.20.1711212102370.6690@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1511189976.4729.110.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Mon, 20 Nov 2017, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2017-11-20 at 11:20 +0100, Patrick Ohly wrote:
> > On Mon, 2017-11-20 at 07:47 +1100, James Morris wrote:
> > > On Fri, 17 Nov 2017, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> > >
> > > > LSMs are responsible to enforce a security policy at run-time,
> > > > while IMA/EVM protect data and metadata against offline attacks.
> > >
> > > In my view, IMA can also protect against making an online attack?
> > > persistent across boots, and that would be the most compelling use of
> > > it?for many general purpose applications.
> >
> > I do not quite buy that interpretation. If the online attack succeeds
> > in bypassing the run-time checks, for example with a full root exploit,
> > then he has pretty much the same capabilities to make persistent file
> > changes as during an offline attack.
>
> In the face of a full root exploit, there is not much that one can do,
> "other" than to detect it. ?This is why remote attestation is so
> important.
Right, although the consensus seems to be that RA is essential rather than
simply important.
--
James Morris
<james.l.morris@oracle.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-21 10:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-07 15:17 [PATCH V6] EVM: Add support for portable signature format Matthew Garrett
2017-11-08 19:37 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-15 17:26 ` IMA appraisal master plan? (was: Re: [PATCH V6] EVM: Add support for portable signature format) Patrick Ohly
2017-11-15 17:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-15 18:21 ` Patrick Ohly
2017-11-15 18:28 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-16 0:02 ` James Morris
2017-11-16 0:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2017-11-16 2:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-16 9:23 ` IMA appraisal master plan? Roberto Sassu
2017-11-16 10:20 ` Patrick Ohly
2017-11-16 13:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-16 14:18 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-16 13:06 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-17 12:20 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-17 12:20 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-17 13:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-17 13:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-17 14:32 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-17 14:32 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-17 15:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-17 17:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-11-17 20:09 ` Safford, David (GE Global Research, US)
2017-11-18 19:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2017-11-19 20:47 ` James Morris
2017-11-19 20:47 ` James Morris
2017-11-20 10:20 ` Patrick Ohly
2017-11-20 10:20 ` Patrick Ohly
2017-11-20 14:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-20 14:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-20 16:15 ` Patrick Ohly
2017-11-20 16:15 ` Patrick Ohly
2017-11-21 10:05 ` James Morris [this message]
2017-11-21 10:05 ` James Morris
2017-11-21 9:33 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-21 9:33 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-21 14:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-21 14:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-21 15:25 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-21 15:25 ` Roberto Sassu
2017-11-21 15:53 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-11-21 15:53 ` Mimi Zohar
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