From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
ankita@nvidia.com, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>,
Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>,
Saravana Kannan <saravanak@google.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
"Fontenot, Nathan" <Nathan.Fontenot@amd.com>,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, yilun.xu@intel.com,
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/15] Device Evidence and Trust for PCI Security Protocol (TDISP)
Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2026 13:22:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <arzr32ZDComnfmny@FV6GYCPJ69> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <apqSAQykEK3MF9AO@FV6GYCPJ69>
Fri, Sep 04, 2026 at 11:52:12AM +0200, jiri@resnulli.us wrote:
>Thu, Sep 03, 2026 at 03:36:54PM +0200, lukas@wunner.de wrote:
>>[+cc Jonathan, start of thread is here:
>>https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260902150125.GD2890729@ziepe.ca/
>>]
>>
>>On Wed, Sep 02, 2026 at 12:01:25PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
>
>
>[..]
>
>
>>
>>> I've asked Jiri Pirko to work on
>>> the PCI evidence uAPI based on his deep netlink experience
>>
>>netlink isn't well suited to transport large blobs because the nlattr
>>len is u16. (The len of the enclosing nlmsg is u32, which is sufficient.)
>>
>>Previous approaches, including the one proposed by Dan in this series,
>>work around the problem by splitting the blob into a sequence of nlattrs.
>>I think we should instead extend the netlink protocol with 32-bit "jumbo"
>>attributes.
>>
>>I suggest we reserve bit 13 of nla_type as NLA_F_JUMBO and use the
>>the first 4 bytes after the struct nlattr header as length (if the
>>jumbo flag is set).
>>
>>
>>A second problem is that the size of a socket buffer's linear data
>>is limited. Also, copying the blob into the nlmsg is a bit wasteful
>>and we'd want zero copy instead. The solution I've come up with is
>>to attach the pages backing the blob as fragments to the skb.
>>It's very simple, overcomes the skb size limitation and allows for
>>zero-copy:
>>
>>https://github.com/l1k/linux/commit/6e73bb999128
>>
>>That commit is from January and the time I've been able to devote
>>to this has since been limited as my employer prioritized various
>>AER feature gaps and fixes.
>>
>>I worked on this for native PCI device authentication, which faces
>>the same netlink blob issue as TSM-mediated authentication.
>>Both should use the same uABI for evidence exposure. Additionally,
>>native device authentication may be used by non-PCI buses such as
>>ATA or SCSI. The uABI should work for those use cases as well.
>
>Not sure if netlink as actually the best fit for this purpose,
>for large blob transfers ioctl-based iface is probably much more
>convenient. I'm working on a uapi framework that make the best of
>netlink and takes it over to a fd-based ioctl. I call it CTLV, here's
>a link to an early pre-RFC draft:
>
>https://github.com/jpirko/linux_mlxsw/commits/wip_ctlv_pre_rfc_draft1/
>
[..]
Following up on this, I have a very early draft of an attestation
framework here:
https://github.com/jpirko/linux_mlxsw/commits/wip_attestation_pre_rfc_draft1/
It introduces a provider-neutral, fd-based interface for evidence
retrieval, userspace verdicts tied to exact device/evidence generations,
measurement registers and their journal, events, and device-security
state transitions. Large evidence is written directly to referenced
buffers instead of being split across Netlink messages.
For this series, the intent is to replace the device-evidence
Generic Netlink UAPI and the draft PCI/TSM evidence-accept UAPI.
It does not replace PCI/TSM connect/disconnect or lock/unlock,
nor the underlying device-trust, SPDM/IDE/TDISP, MMIO, or
DMA machinery.
The branch currently contains the core, a simulation provider with
tests, and a TDX provider demonstrating the provider boundary.
The PCI/TSM provider is not implemented yet.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-30 11:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 91+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-05 22:08 [PATCH 00/15] Device Evidence and Trust for PCI Security Protocol (TDISP) Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 01/15] netlink: specs: Introduce multi-message blobs for SPDM Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:13 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 11:13 ` Donald Hunter
2026-07-11 1:43 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-08 13:23 ` Donald Hunter
2026-07-22 1:20 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-08-02 17:58 ` Ankit Agrawal
2026-08-03 16:35 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 02/15] tools: ynl: Teach pyynl to handle blobs Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 13:48 ` Donald Hunter
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 03/15] tools: ynl: Teach ynl_gen_c to validate and dump 'blob' attributes Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 04/15] device core: Introduce "device evidence" over netlink Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 13:22 ` Donald Hunter
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 05/15] device core: Add "device evidence" 'validate' command Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 06/15] PCI/TSM: Add device evidence support Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:16 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 5:00 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-08 18:25 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 07/15] modules: Document the global async_probe parameter Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-17 13:44 ` Nikolay Borisov
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 08/15] device core: Initial device trust infrastructure Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:17 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 13:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 09/15] PCI, device core: Move "untrusted" concept to DEVICE_TRUST_ADVERSARY Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 13:49 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-07 13:04 ` Robin Murphy
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 10/15] PCI/TSM: Add device interface security LOCKED support Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 11/15] PCI/TSM: Add device interface security RUN support Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:21 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 12/15] PCI/TSM: Add device interface security DMA enable/disable Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 13/15] PCI, device core: Add private memory access for DEVICE_TRUST_TCB Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 12:42 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-07-08 18:06 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-08 18:10 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-07-09 6:32 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-09 7:38 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 14/15] PCI/TSM: Create MMIO descriptors via TDISP Report Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 9:49 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-05 22:08 ` [PATCH 15/15] PCI/TSM: Add relative MMIO offset support? Dan Williams
2026-07-05 22:25 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-08 2:25 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-08 18:05 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-06 12:51 ` [PATCH 00/15] Device Evidence and Trust for PCI Security Protocol (TDISP) Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-06 20:55 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-07 12:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-08 0:12 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-08 14:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-09 2:45 ` Dan Williams (nvidia)
2026-07-09 13:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-15 9:04 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-16 18:51 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-07-28 8:20 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-28 23:29 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-08-04 1:48 ` Xu Yilun
2026-08-04 20:33 ` Ankit Agrawal
2026-08-05 17:43 ` Xu Yilun
2026-08-05 0:55 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-02 2:12 ` Xu Yilun
2026-09-02 2:20 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-02 7:28 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-09-02 9:30 ` Xu Yilun
2026-09-02 15:01 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-03 2:21 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-09-03 5:59 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-09-03 6:51 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-09-03 8:11 ` Ankit Agrawal
2026-09-03 11:04 ` Ankit Agrawal
2026-09-03 13:36 ` Lukas Wunner
2026-09-03 15:05 ` Dave Hansen
2026-09-03 17:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-09-03 20:02 ` Jonathan Cameron
2026-09-04 9:52 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-09-30 11:22 ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2026-09-30 14:14 ` Quigley, David
2026-09-30 14:47 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-09-14 19:29 ` Quigley, David
2026-09-15 2:07 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-10-07 12:21 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-07-29 1:57 ` Ankit Agrawal
2026-08-02 18:12 ` Ankit Agrawal
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