From: "Serge Hallyn (AMD)" <sergeh@kernel.org>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] keys: Address lookup_user_key() mutability
Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2026 13:52:28 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <asVDbPtyCNy210-R@shallyn-amd> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <asPwkdi7ZdO4YoRu@kernel.org>
On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 09:46:41PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 05, 2026 at 08:09:24AM -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > On Sun, Oct 04, 2026 at 08:54:06PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 08:55:16AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > The main objective in these patches is to remove to unneeded mutability
> > > > from key look ups. It does harm and brings no value so it is pretty obvious
> > > > to me that addressing this harmful behaviour is what we should do.
> > > >
> > > > I based the first patch on what Jann suggested in [1]. Nothing too clever here
> > > > and I'm ofc open for further suggestions.
> > > >
> > > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/CAG48ez0XjVSR=M--UBauTm8sJuc+ZbhKzaPa3a6wrSVHyoKevw@mail.gmail.com/
> > > >
> > > > Jarkko Sakkinen (2):
> > > > keys: Return user session keyring on lookup
> > > > keys: Reject keyring creation with overridden credentials
> > > >
> > > > Documentation/security/keys/core.rst | 7 ++-
> > > > security/keys/process_keys.c | 65 +++++++++++++++-------------
> > > > 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > 2.47.3
> > > >
> > >
> > > So.. should I move forward to with non-RFC v2?
> >
> > Patch 2 absolutely makes sense, "doc, it hurts when I do this", "don't do
> > that then."
> >
> > Regarding patch 1, that seems like quite a change in behavior, right? I
> > don't see any docs or comments that promise the current behavior, but
> > has any userspace or subsystem come to depend on it? I guess that, if so,
> > then it just has to create a link to the user session keyring like pam
> > (according to what I've read) does?
>
> Thanks a lot of responding.
>
> I fully agree with you but I'd need help for evaluating things further.
>
> 1/2 based on Jann's email about the topic and my interpretation of the
> suggestion. I neither used brains nor AI for this and consider the patch
> merely as a conversation starter (and what a great success it was on doing
> that) :-)
:)
> All feedback is good feedback at this point. I need supporting code to
> remember/recall later on so at least this serves that purpose.
>
> Br, Jarkko
I've been staring at the before and after code for a bit now.
It does even more than I was thinking :) But I was trying to
detail the changed behavior (from userspace's pov), and after
several attempts, it seems maybe there actually isn't any.
Q: is there any path whereby the
```
else if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING,
&ctx.cred->session_keyring->flags) &&
lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
```
case can still happen? Or was this the only place where we installed
the user_session keyring as session keyring, so that we can drop this
branch?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-06 18:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-24 5:55 [RFC PATCH 0/2] keys: Address lookup_user_key() mutability Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-09-24 5:55 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] keys: Return user session keyring on lookup Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-09-24 6:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-24 5:55 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] keys: Reject keyring creation with overridden credentials Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-09-24 6:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-04 17:54 ` [RFC PATCH 0/2] keys: Address lookup_user_key() mutability Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-05 13:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-05 18:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-06 18:52 ` Serge Hallyn (AMD) [this message]
2026-10-08 14:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-10-08 15:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-10-08 20:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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