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From: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 04/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Only shadow writable-dirty guest descs as writable
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 23:26:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <atxPs59WnhOM1cJ9@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <sashiko-outbox-183253@kernel.org>

On Fri, Oct 23, 2026 at 09:25:39PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> > @@ -1781,7 +1788,7 @@ int kvm_handle_vncr_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >  		kvm_inject_nested_sync(vcpu, esr);
> >  		break;
> >  	case 0:
> > -		perm = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu) ? vt->wr.pw && vt->hpa_writable : vt->wr.pr;
> > +		perm = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu) ? vncr_can_map_writable(vt) : vt->wr.pr;
> >  		if (!perm)
> >  			handle_vncr_perm(vcpu);
> >  		break;
> 
> [Severity: Medium]
> Does handle_vncr_perm() in arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c also need to check
> vt->wr.dirty when deciding whether to promote a write fault to an external
> abort?

Yep, what we have 'works' for the direct permission model but S1PIE
style software dirty state makes a mess of it.

> With FEAT_S1PIE enabled at guest EL2, compute_s1_indirect_permissions()
> computes vt->wr.pw = true from PIR_EL2 and the descriptor's permission index
> independently of BIT(7), while compute_s1_permissions() sets vt->wr.dirty =
> false when BIT(7) is set on a writable-clean stage-1 descriptor.

Hey, look at that! You got the architecture right this time.

Thanks,
Oliver

> When a nested guest takes a VNCR write fault on such a writable-clean
> descriptor backed by a read-only memslot or HPA (!vt->hpa_writable),
> kvm_handle_vncr_abort() sees !vncr_can_map_writable(vt) and calls
> handle_vncr_perm():
> 
> arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c:handle_vncr_perm() {
> 	...
> 	if (kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu) && vt->wr.pw && !vt->hpa_writable)
> 		fsc = ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT;
> 	/*
> 	 * Otherwise, inject a permission fault using the guest's translation
> 	 * level rather than the host's.
> 	 */
> 	else
> 		fsc = ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM_L(vt->wr.level);
> 	...
> }
> 
> Because handle_vncr_perm() only checks vt->wr.pw && !vt->hpa_writable
> without checking vt->wr.dirty, won't it inject ESR_ELx_FSC_EXTABT instead of
> the architectural stage-1 permission fault ESR_ELx_FSC_PERM_L(vt->wr.level)?
> 
> -- 
> Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261023205610.1044532-1-oupton@kernel.org?part=4

  reply	other threads:[~2026-10-24  6:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-23 20:55 [PATCH v2 00/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Implement FEAT_HAFDBS, FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 01/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Introduce struct for stage-2 walk step Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 02/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Consolidate computation of stage-2 permissions Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 03/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Get rid of kvm_s2_trans*() accessors Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 04/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Only shadow writable-dirty guest descs as writable Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 21:25   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-24  6:26     ` Oliver Upton [this message]
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 05/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Pass an access descriptor for stage-2 walks Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 06/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Use a helper for stage-2 descriptor updates Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 07/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Set dirty state at stage-2 Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 08/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Treat DBM as writable " Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 09/28] KVM: arm64: Compute S1 permissions as part of s1_walk() Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 10/28] KVM: arm64: Plumb through access descriptor for stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 21:06   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 11/28] KVM: arm64: Use a struct for stage-1 walk context Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 12/28] KVM: arm64: Create helper for stage-1 descriptor updates Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 13/28] KVM: arm64: Set dirty state at stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 14/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Respect HA when computing translated TCR Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 15/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Respect HD " Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 16/28] KVM: arm64: Grant write permission when DBM is set at S1 Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:55 ` [PATCH v2 17/28] KVM: arm64: Don't update descriptors for "non-arch" access Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 18/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Emulate CMOs via writable-clean translations as NOPs Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 19/28] arm64: Add command line switch to disable FEAT_S2FWB Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 20/28] KVM: arm64: Reject non-coherent DMA when using forced writeback Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 21:16   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 21/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFDBS Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 22/28] KVM: arm64: Set Access flag on table descriptors at stage-1 Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 21:22   ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-24  6:24     ` Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 23/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Set access flag on table descriptors at stage-2 Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 24/28] KVM: arm64: nv: Expose FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 25/28] KVM: arm64: selftests: Only test AF behavior for emulated AT insns Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 26/28] KVM: arm64: selftests: Test AT emulation for FEAT_HAFT Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 27/28] KVM: arm64: Add tracepoints for S1 page table walk Oliver Upton
2026-10-23 20:56 ` [PATCH v2 28/28] KVM: arm64: Add tracepoints for S2 " Oliver Upton

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