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* [PATCH] block/vhdx: Prevent out-of-bounds BAT accesses with malicious vhdx files
@ 2026-10-23 13:00 Thomas Huth
  2026-11-06 14:50 ` Acknowledgements for AI-assisted trivial bug reports (was: [PATCH] block/vhdx: Prevent out-of-bounds BAT accesses with) " Kevin Wolf
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Huth @ 2026-10-23 13:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: qemu-devel, qemu-block, Kevin Wolf, Hanna Reitz; +Cc: qemu-stable

virtual_disk_size is read directly from a VHDX image's metadata region
and never checked for sane sizes.  The 64 TiB limit (VHDX_MAX_IMAGE_SIZE)
is only enforced in vhdx_co_create(), so it limits images QEMU creates
but never images QEMU opens.

Without the bound, vhdx_calc_bat_entries() computes the block count
into a uint32_t, so a huge image size gets truncated and the BAT is
undersized relative to total_sectors.
vhdx_block_translate() then converts sector numbers into BAT indices
with no bounds check, allowing out-of-bounds access on the BAT array
from both the read and write paths.

To fix the problem, add a VHDX_MAX_IMAGE_SIZE check to vhdx_parse_metadata()
so images opened for reading are subject to the same limit as images
created by QEMU.
With this limit, the calculation in vhdx_calc_bat_entries() cannot get
truncated anymore (block_size is at least 1 MiB):

 VHDX_MAX_IMAGE_SIZE / block_size = 64 TiB / 1 MiB = 64 MiB

... and 64 MiB fit nicely into 32 bits.

To be really on the safe side, let's also add an assertion in
vhdx_block_translate() to catch accesses that exceeds the allocated
entry count.

Buglink: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3762
Reported-by: Daniel Wade <danjwade95@gmail.com>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/4470
Reported-by: Mayank Jangid (OpenSec)
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/4487
Reported-by: Ken Hsu, Royce Lu, and Bo Qu of Palo Alto Networks
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/4638
Reported-by: Thai Duong (Calif.io)
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/4733
Reported-by: Xiang Chen
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
 block/vhdx.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/block/vhdx.c b/block/vhdx.c
index c16e4a00c8d..8013a90a1a4 100644
--- a/block/vhdx.c
+++ b/block/vhdx.c
@@ -815,6 +815,11 @@ vhdx_parse_metadata(BlockDriverState *bs, BDRVVHDXState *s)
     }
 
     s->virtual_disk_size = le64_to_cpu(s->virtual_disk_size);
+    if (s->virtual_disk_size > VHDX_MAX_IMAGE_SIZE) {
+        ret = -EFBIG;
+        goto exit;
+    }
+
     s->logical_sector_size = le32_to_cpu(s->logical_sector_size);
     s->physical_sector_size = le32_to_cpu(s->physical_sector_size);
 
@@ -1149,6 +1154,7 @@ static void vhdx_block_translate(BDRVVHDXState *s, int64_t sector_num,
 
     sinfo->bytes_avail = sinfo->sectors_avail << s->logical_sector_size_bits;
 
+    assert(sinfo->bat_idx < s->bat_entries);
     sinfo->file_offset = s->bat[sinfo->bat_idx] & VHDX_BAT_FILE_OFF_MASK;
 
     sinfo->block_offset = block_offset << s->logical_sector_size_bits;
-- 
2.56.0



^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-06 15:16 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-10-23 13:00 [PATCH] block/vhdx: Prevent out-of-bounds BAT accesses with malicious vhdx files Thomas Huth
2026-11-06 14:50 ` Acknowledgements for AI-assisted trivial bug reports (was: [PATCH] block/vhdx: Prevent out-of-bounds BAT accesses with) " Kevin Wolf
2026-11-06 14:58   ` Peter Maydell
2026-11-06 15:15     ` Acknowledgements for AI-assisted trivial bug reports Thomas Huth

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