From: "Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)" <ljs@kernel.org>
To: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>,
David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
Andrey Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>,
Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alexander@mihalicyn.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2026 09:49:10 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <auG8bgpy-m5JUYWp@gremlin> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <auGNkhSHpBRd2U_5@chrisdown.name>
On Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 01:52:18PM +0800, Chris Down wrote:
> Hi Jeff,
>
> Thanks for the review!
>
> Jeff Xu writes:
> > Could we please keep the test coverage for the unsealed [vdso] case and
> > avoid unconditionally skipping whenever [vdso] is unsealed?
> >
> > There are two regressions I'd love for us to still be able to catch:
> >
> > 1. Kernel or config regressions when sealing is expected to be on:
>
> Yeah agreed. With the cleanup it matters even more I think because when
> sealing is set in one place the most likely regression is probably one that
> unseals everything at once.
>
> > 2. Regressions in the new `no_mseal_sys_mappings` boot parameter itself:
>
> In v2 I can check /proc/cmdline for no_mseal_sys_mappings to do that.
>
> Lorenzo, I think that also may inform your question about whether checking
> for the disabled case is redundant, right?
>
> > When booted with `no_mseal_sys_mappings` (or when unsealed), running
> > the assertions in Patch 3 (verifying system mappings have no `sl` flag
> > and that `munmap()` / `mremap()` -- and ideally `mprotect(PROT_READ |
> > PROT_WRITE)` -- on [vdso] succeed) directly verifies that the boot
> > parameter works and doesn't regress.
>
> Sounds good.
>
> > or keep strict failure as an option (e.g. `./sysmap_is_sealed` fails if
> > unsealed without the boot param, while `run_vmtests.sh` passes a flag
> > like `--allow-disabled` when `CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS` may not be
> > enabled), so CI environments that expect sealing still catch a broken
> > seal.
>
> I like this and I think we can do it without adding some of the complexity
> that Lorenzo was not so happy about:
>
> - Have check_sealed skip as usual when [vdso] isn't sealed and param is not set
> - A new test, say expect_sealed, fails in the same case
I'm confused about this one - we want to skip altogether if the feature isn't
enabled, right?
> - run_vmtests runs with -T expect_sealed when CONFIG_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS=y
run_vmtests I will have to best-guess it, e.g. if /proc/config.gz is present
check it, I suppose?
>
> That should be pretty minimal. Lorenzo, Jeff, how does that sound?
Sounds reasonable!
I am a bit leery though of requiring a CI to enable the option when it is known
to break things, however, as CI's might rely on some of the software this
impacts.
--
Cheers, Lorenzo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-28 9:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-27 11:42 [PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot Chris Down
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 1/3] mseal sysmap: Add mseal_system_mappings= boot parameter Chris Down
2026-10-27 14:53 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:37 ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 16:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 4:30 ` Jeff Xu
2026-10-28 5:52 ` Chris Down
2026-10-28 5:55 ` Chris Down
2026-10-28 6:16 ` Jeff Xu
2026-10-28 9:49 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) [this message]
2026-10-28 11:43 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 12:18 ` Pedro Falcato
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 2/3] mseal sysmap: Allow with CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, default off Chris Down
2026-10-27 14:57 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:37 ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 16:59 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-27 11:43 ` [PATCH 3/3] selftests/mseal_system_mappings: Test vdso unmap and remap Chris Down
2026-10-27 15:03 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-27 16:40 ` Chris Down
2026-10-27 17:02 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-28 11:43 ` sashiko-bot
2026-10-28 15:34 ` [PATCH 0/3] mseal sysmap: Choose system mapping sealing at boot Andrei Vagin
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=auG8bgpy-m5JUYWp@gremlin \
--to=ljs@kernel.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alexander@mihalicyn.com \
--cc=avagin@gmail.com \
--cc=chris@chrisdown.name \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=david@kernel.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jeffxu@chromium.org \
--cc=jeffxu@google.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=kees@kernel.org \
--cc=kernel-team@meta.com \
--cc=liam@infradead.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=pfalcato@suse.de \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=shuah@kernel.org \
--cc=vbabka@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.